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Abstract  
 
This thesis is composed of three papers aimed at contributing to the understanding 
of the role of corporate governance in the European banking sector in the context of the 
2007-2008 financial crisis, using a sample of 72 publicly listed European banks. 
Specifically, these papers analyse the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
the performance of banks, on the likelihood of banks participating in a bailout 
programme and on risk-taking by banks, using different econometric estimation 
methods. 
The first paper investigates the impact of several characteristics of the board of 
directors on the performance of banks during the crisis period. As not all banks across 
Europe performed equally poorly, albeit exposed to similar macroeconomic conditions, 
it is very relevant to examine whether, and to what extent, the characteristics of the 
board explain the performance of banks during the crisis or, put differently, how the 
better-performing banks during the crisis differed, in terms of board characteristics, 
from the other banks before the crisis. 
The second paper examines the determinants of European banks’ bailouts 
following the financial crisis. The numerous and expensive public support programmes 
to save troubled banks call for a clear identification of the bailout determinants in the 
banking sector. The results obtained can, therefore, have important public policy 
implications in helping regulators and other public authorities avoid costly bailouts. 
The third paper analyses the influence of bank corporate governance on their risk-
taking. The importance of risk-taking by banks in the crisis context and the renewed 
focus on corporate governance justify the relevance of the paper. Additionally, the 
analysis is replicated for the period before the crisis in order to test whether such 
influence depends on macroeconomic conditions.   
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Resumo  
 
Esta tese é composta por três artigos que visam contribuir para a compreensão do 
papel do corporate governance no setor bancário europeu no contexto da crise 
financeira de 2007-2008, utilizando uma amostra de 72 bancos europeus cotados. 
Concretamente, estes artigos analisam o impacto dos mecanismos de corporate 
governance no desempenho dos bancos, na probabilidade dos bancos participarem num 
programa de resgate e na assunção de risco pelos bancos, utilizando diferentes métodos 
econométricos de estimação. 
O primeiro artigo investiga o impacto de diversas características do conselho de 
administração no desempenho dos bancos durante o período da crise. Como nem todos 
os bancos tiveram desempenhos igualmente pobres, apesar de expostos a condições 
macroeconómicas similares, é muito relevante examinar se, e em que medida, as 
características do conselho de administração explicam o desempenho dos bancos na 
crise, ou, por outras palavras, como os bancos com melhor desempenho na crise 
diferiam, em termos das características do conselho de administração, dos outros bancos 
antes da crise. 
O segundo artigo analisa os determinantes dos resgates dos bancos Europeus na 
sequência da crise financeira. Os numerosos e dispendiosos programas públicos de 
apoio para salvar bancos em dificuldades exigem uma clara identificação dos 
determinantes dos resgates no sector bancário. Os resultados obtidos podem, portanto, 
ter importantes implicações em termos de políticas públicas, ajudando reguladores e 
outras autoridades públicas a evitar dispendiosos resgates. 
O terceiro artigo analisa a influência do corporate governance dos bancos na sua 
assunção de risco. A importância da assunção de risco pelos bancos no contexto da crise 
e o renovado foco no corporate governance justificam a relevância do artigo. 
Adicionalmente, a análise é replicada para o período antes da crise de modo a testar se 
tal influência depende das condições macroeconómicas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation and research purpose 
 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis has been described as the most serious crisis since 
the Great Depression (Brunnermeier, 2009; Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2010; Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2012) with important effects on the real economy, posing challenges to 
economists, regulators and policymakers (Gorton, 2009). In fact, the United States 
subprime market crisis had a major impact on financial institutions and banks all over 
the world: fall in market capitalisation, liquidity problems, defaults and bailouts. Many 
renowned academics, economists, public authorities and several observers have argued 
that poor governance contributed to, or even caused, the collapse of an impressive 
number of large banks throughout the world. Corporate governance is generally defined 
as the set of mechanisms for addressing agency problems and controlling risk within the 
firm and so, it is not surprising that the importance of the effectiveness of corporate 
practices in the banking sector has been emphasised. Given the unique universal harm 
caused by the crisis, one has to wonder whether corporate governance mechanisms, 
namely the board of directors, correctly executed their role and did all that was expected 
of them. 
Although the need to improve the existing instruments and develop new 
mechanisms to minimise the losses associated with the potential conflicts of interests 
among participants in corporate structure had long been advocated, the global financial 
crisis brought into the public domain, with special focus and widespread concerns, the 
issue of the weak corporate governance, in particular in the banking sector. This 
increased interest on governance motivates to analyse whether, and to what extent, 
governance is linked to the 2007-2008 financial turmoil.  
In this manner, the aim of this thesis is to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the European banking sector in the 
context of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
The chosen research focus is both interesting and important due to various factors.  
First, “the panic should be a momentous event for economic research” (Gorton, 
2009, p. 11), so the 2007-2008 financial crisis constitutes an obvious natural event for 
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research that must be carefully analysed. Financial crises are devastating, thus 
understanding if, and how, governance can help banks to minimise their negative 
impact is of crucial importance.  
Second, when dealing with governance issues most studies exclude financial firms 
from their sample. Thus, we know very little about the effectiveness of banking firm 
governance (Adams and Mehran, 2012), whose understanding has become even more 
important in the context of the financial crisis. In addition, the European context is 
sparsely analysed by the literature, being even more scarce the existence of European 
cross-country studies. 
Third, the importance of banks in the economy1 and the nature of their activity 
(Andres and Vallelado, 2008), as well as the significant costs that the failures in bank 
governance can cause (Pathan and Faff, 2013), make the analysis of the governance 
mechanisms in the banking sector simultaneously highly specific and important. Banks 
are “special” financial institutions creating distinct corporate governance challenges2 
(Staikouras et al., 2007). There are at least four particularities of banks that make them 
“special” and justify a separate analysis: greater opaqueness (Caprio and Levine, 2002; 
Morgan, 2002; Levine, 2004; Mülbert, 2009; Becht et al., 2011; de Haan and Vlahu, 
2016; John et al., 2016), greater complexity (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Becht et al., 
2011; de Haan and Vlahu, 2016; John et al., 2016), greater government regulation 
(Prowse, 1997; Caprio and Levine, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2003; Levine, 2004; 
Adams, 2010; de Haan and Vlahu, 2016; John et al., 2016) and deposits insurance 
(Morgan, 2002; Becht et al., 2011). These attributes can weaken many traditional 
governance mechanisms in that they may interfere negatively with the way in which the 
usual corporate governance mechanisms work. First, banks are generally more opaque 
than non-financial firms. The quality of bank loans as well as the quality of other bank’ 
assets are not readily observable, which makes it difficult to accurately assess the risks 
they bear. Second, the complexity of the banking business increases the asymmetry of 
information and diminishes the capacity of stakeholders to monitor the decisions of 
                                                 
1 Banking institutions are especially well suited to minimising transaction costs and adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems. This is, why banks are “special” and play such an important role in the financial 
system (Mishkin, 2006). 
2 Consistently, Adams and Mehran (2003) and Macey and O'Hara (2003), for example, emphasise the 
importance of taking differences in governance between banking and non-banking firms into 
consideration. 
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bank managers. Third, due to the vital role of banks in economic development and 
prosperity, these entities are heavily regulated and supervised. Fourth, the specific 
nature of banking makes it susceptible to greater moral hazard problems. Despite the 
positive effect of deposit insurance on preventing depositor runs, this can also 
encourage excessive risk-taking by banks. When protected, the depositor has little 
incentive to monitor the bank’s activities and withdraw funds if the bank is taking on 
too much risk. Moreover, excessive bank size can also exacerbate important moral 
hazard problems (the problem known as “too-big-to-fail”).  
Finally, our research offers insights not only to bank directors, but also to 
policymakers and bank regulators and other public authorities by showing whether 
governance mechanisms matter in especially adverse macroeconomic conditions. 
Although some of them may not be of much importance on a day-to-day basis they can, 
nevertheless, matter in a crisis situation. 
 
 
1.2 Sampling procedure and composition  
 
Our sample consists of 72 publicly listed banks from 173 European countries. We 
use the following criteria to compile our sample. First, we restrict our sample to 
European banks that were publicly listed at the end of December 2005 that is, listed, at 
least, for the whole of 2006 (so, at least one complete year before the beginning of 
2007) and not delisted during the crisis period. This results in 191 banks. Second, we 
restrict our sample to banks with common shares traded on a regulated market and that 
are not a subsidiary of a bank already included in the sample so as to prevent 
duplication of data. These restrictions reduce our sample to 164 banks. Third, we 
restrict our sample to banks that are covered by BoardEx, our data source on board 
information. Additionally, we use Datastream and Thomson Financial. While BoardEx 
is the leading database on board composition of publicly listed firms, only a limited 
number of European banks are covered in the database. So, our final sample consists of 
                                                 
3 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. We began by analysing thirty 
countries but in thirteen of them no bank met all the criteria, so they were excluded from the sample. 
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72 publicly listed banks. Nevertheless, our sample is representative as it corresponds to 
43.9% of total banks that meet our criteria.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
Building on the three pillars of the research which are governance, crisis and 
banking sector, three papers were developed, offering diversity as regards research 
theme/focus (performance, bailouts and risk-taking), contributions to the existing 
literature, policy implications and methods of estimation used. Such diversity strongly 
enriches the thesis.  
The first paper “Supervisory Boards, Financial Crisis and Banks’ Performance: 
Do the Characteristics of the Board Matter?”, presented in Chapter 2, investigates the 
impact of various board characteristics, such as different dimensions of diversity, before 
the crisis on the performance of banks, measured by equity return, during the crisis. The 
purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on if, and how, the features of 
bank board before the crisis affect the performance of banks during the crisis period or, 
in other words, to what extent the performance of banks during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis can be attributable to characteristics of the board in the period (year) immediately 
prior to the crisis. The main question that motivates this study is “why did some banks 
perform worse/better during the crisis although the macroeconomic factors (e.g., loose 
monetary policy) related to the financial crisis generically impact on all firms?”4 At the 
same time, the governance of banks, specially the boards of banks, has been criticised 
and often has been suggested that better governance would have led to better 
performance. Based on the above, it is timely to analyse whether differences in 
performance are the result of differences in internal governance mechanisms,5 as is the 
case of the board. The paper identifies a set of board characteristics that affect the 
performance of banks such as board banking experience and busyness as well as various 
aspects of board diversity. The results are robust to the use of alternative definitions of 
                                                 
4 For Taylor (2009), for example, a combination of macroeconomic factors such as loose monetary 
policies and complex securitisations is at the roots of the financial crisis. 
5 Although the main variables in this paper are board variables, it also includes a variable of ownership 
structure which is the institutional ownership variable. 
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the crisis period (i.e., July 2007 to December 2008 and January 2007 to September 
2008) and to the endogeneity issue. The paper also examines the relationship between 
an index of the quality of governance, constructed on the basis of corporate governance 
codes and best practices recommendations concerning board characteristics, and stock 
return of banks. A positive and significant relationship was found. 
The second paper “Determinants of European Banks’ Bailouts Following the 
2007-2008 Financial Crisis”, presented in Chapter 3, provides empirical evidence on the 
determinants of bank bailouts in Europe, following the 2007-2008 financial earthquake. 
Given the massive and costly interventions by governments to support troubled banks, 
the main issue is to know what is behind bank bailouts, which justify the pertinence of 
analysing the determinants of the likelihood of bailouts in the banking sector. 
Furthermore, although the existing literature covers in detail the likelihood of financial 
distress and bankruptcy the same is not verified regarding bailouts. This paper aims to 
fill this gap. Overall, the findings show that a set of bank board characteristics, bank 
risks as well as bank-level and country-specific banking sector factors explain the 
likelihood of bank bailouts. The main results are robust to several checks and additional 
tests and have relevant policy implications mainly for public authorities as regulators.  
Finally, the third paper “What Explains European Banks’ Risk-Taking in the 
Context of the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis? A Simultaneous Equations Approach”, 
presented in Chapter 4, examines the influence of a set of factors, in line with the 
existing literature, theoretical arguments and recommendations regarding banking risk 
governance, on risk-taking by banks. The financial crisis emphasised the importance of 
strong risk management and overseeing, especially at board-level, to assure protection 
and stability of banks. For Mongiardino and Plath (2010, p. 116) “the failure of the 
directorial boards of such [financial] institutions to oversee risks properly is widely 
viewed as contributing to the crisis.” Given the significance of studying bank risk-
taking, this paper aims to answer the question of which factors explain the risk taken by 
banks in the financial crisis, using a simultaneous equations approach. Also, the 
analysis is replicated for the period immediately before the crisis to investigate whether 
the influence of such factors depends on environmental conditions. 
Table 1.1 compares the three papers systematising their purpose, focus, data 
sources, main research contributions, policy implications and method of estimation. 
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Table 1.1 – Comparison between the three papers 
 Paper 1 
“Supervisory Boards, Financial Crisis 
and Banks’ Performance: Do the 
Characteristics of the Board Matter?” 
Paper 2 
“Determinants of European Banks’ 
Bailouts Following the 2007-2008 
Financial Crisis” 
Paper 3 
“What Explains European Banks’ 
Risk-Taking in the Context of the 
2007-2008 Financial Crisis? A 
Simultaneous Equations Approach” 
Purpose Analyse the impact of a wide range of 
board characteristics, in multiple 
dimensions such as experience, education, 
diversity and activity, on the returns of 
European banks, in the crisis period. 
Investigate the determinants of the 
likelihood of bailouts of European 
banks following the financial crisis. 
Answer the question "What is behind 
the bailouts of European banks?” 
Examine the main factors that are 
likely to influence risk-taking by 
European banks. Answer the question: 
“Which factors affect the risk taken by 
European banks?” 
Focus European banks’ performance, measured 
by stock returns, in the financial crisis. 
European banks’ bailouts, following 
the financial crisis. 
European banks’ risk-taking, in the 
financial crisis. 
Data Sources BoardEx, Datastream, Thomson Financial, 
Annual Reports, European Corporate 
Governance Institute website, Djankov et 
al. (2007), Kaufmann et al. (2009) and 
Spamann (2010). 
European Comission, Google and 
Bank’s official websites, BoardEx, 
Datastream, Thomson Financial, 
Annual Reports, World Bank and 
Heritage Foundation websites.  
BoardEx, Datastream, Thomson 
Financial and Annual Reports. 
Main Research Contributions Identification of the features of boards 
before the crisis that really impact on bank 
performance during the crisis in Europe; 
differences at board-level explain 
differences in performance. 
Identification of the factors that make 
banks more prone to being bailed out 
by their governments, helping to 
predict bank bailouts and permitting the 
development of the necessary steps to 
avoid them. 
Identification of the factors that have 
predictive power in explaining risk-
taking by banks, aiding the prevention 
of excessive risk and promoting the 
safety and soundness of the financial 
system.  
Policy Implications At bank-level (bank management and 
shareholders) and at country-level (e.g., 
regulators, regarding the development and 
improvement of corporate governance 
codes and best practices recommendations). 
Mainly at country-level (e.g., regulators 
and governments, concerned with 
avoiding costly bailouts that impact on 
the whole economy, helping them in 
the process of introducting new 
recommendations and legal rules, so as 
to prevent/mitigate future collapses 
and, thus, promote stability.  
At bank-level (e.g., bank management 
and shareholders) and at country-level 
(e.g., regulators, bank risk is a major 
concern for bank regulators as the 
banking sector is crucial to the stability 
of the financial system). 
Method of Estimation Weighted Least Squares. Probit model. Simultaneous equations approach: 
Three-Stage Least Squares and Two-
Stage Least Squares. 
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2 SUPERVISORY BOARDS, FINANCIAL CRISIS AND BANKS’ 
PERFORMANCE: DO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BOARD 
MATTER? 
 
Abstract 
 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis is considered to be the worst since the Great 
Depression and failures in governance, especially concerning boards, have been blamed 
for this financial turmoil. Increased public scrutiny on the role of the board of directors 
of banks, following the crisis, motivates us to examine whether and, to what extent, the 
characteristics of the board of banks influence their performance in the context of the 
above mentioned financial crisis. 
We find that banks with more independent and busy boards experienced worse 
stock returns during the financial crisis. On the contrary, the better-performing banks 
had supervisory directors with more experience in the banking sector. Additionally, we 
find that gender and age diversity improve banks’ performance during the crisis. So, in 
fact, diversity matters.  
Also, we construct an index of the quality of governance based on the corporate 
governance codes and best practices recommendations as regards the characteristics of 
the board and we conclude that governance quality affects positively bank performance 
during the crisis period. Overall, our results suggest that the performance of banks 
during the financial crisis is a function of the quality of their governance and 
particularly the characteristics of their boards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Performance, Banks, Financial Crisis. 
JEL classification: G01; G21; G34.  
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2.1 Introduction  
 
During the financial crisis the quality of governance attracted more public 
attention especially concerning the quality of the board of banks. While nearly all banks 
suffered during the crisis period, some banks were affected much more than others 
despite being exposed to similar macroeconomic factors. So, can the features of the 
board explain the variation of bank returns during the crisis?  
On the one hand, banks have specific governance issues (Becht et al., 2011) 
whereas on the other hand, the board of a bank plays a critical role in achieving 
effective governance6 (Pathan and Faff, 2013). In the distinct context that involves the 
bank´s activities, the board is a key element in its governance structure (Caprio and 
Levine, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2003; Macey and O'Hara, 2003). Caprio and Levine 
(2002), for example, highlight the fact that the role of the board is fundamental because 
neither the small equity and debt holders nor the market for corporate control (for 
example takeovers) and market competition can enforce an effective governance at 
banks. Also, the board as a governance mechanism is even more important in banks 
than it is in non-banks because the scope of fiduciary duties of directors extends beyond 
shareholders to depositors, other creditors and regulators (Macey and O'Hara, 2003; 
Mülbert, 2009). But, it has undoubtedly never been as vital to understand the 
governance of banks and their boards as it is now in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
The resignations of several top executives (e.g., Charles Prince at Citigroup and Stan 
O’Neal at Merrill Lynch) and the recommendations by several proxy advisors against 
the re-election of the board of some banks (e.g., Citigroup) show that the boards are, at 
least partly, being blamed for their poor performance. The OECD Steering Group on 
Corporate Governance, for instance, defends that board failures in financial firms are 
one of the main causes of the financial crisis, evidencing that boards failed to set up 
appropriate risk strategies and establish suitable metrics to monitor their implementation 
in a timely and effective manner (Kirkpatrick, 2009). For Francis et al. (2012, p. 40) 
“although weak corporate boards may not be the direct trigger of the current crisis, 
corporate board practices could affect the extent to which firms are vulnerable to the 
                                                 
6 However, for Adams (2012) understanding what constitutes an effective governance structure for a 
financial firm is complicated. Boards of financial firms may face more pressure to satisfy non-shareholder 
stakeholders interests than boards of non-financial firms as is the case of regulators and depositors. 
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financial crisis.” To address fundamental deficiencies in bank corporate governance that 
became apparent during the financial crisis, 7  the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has issued a final set of principles for enhancing sound corporate 
governance practices at banking organisations in a document titled “Principles for 
Enhancing Corporate Governance” in which the board is identified as a vital part of 
banks’ regulatory reforms (BCBS, 2010). 
In this paper, we explore whether, and to what extent, the features of the board of 
banks affect their performance in the financial crisis.  
First, the corporate governance of banks attracted pronounced interest during the 
financial market turmoil which emerged in 2007 and banks clearly appear to have 
distinct governance structures than non-financial firms (Adams and Mehran, 2012). 
Second, boards are one of the most important, probably even the most important, 
corporate governance mechanisms that: monitor and evaluate management – 
supervisory role, make managerial decisions such as which projects to undertake and 
which employees to hire – managerial role and offer valuable advice – advisory role. 
All these are especially important in certain types of firms8 (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Williamson, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; John and Senbet, 1998; Adams and Mehran, 
2003; Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Coles et 
al., 2008; Adams et al., 2010; Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013).  
Third, the existing literature on the relationship between corporate boards and 
performance shows mixed results. One reason commonly cited for the inconclusive 
results is that a significant number of these studies fail to account for the endogeneity 
issue that emerges from the joint determination of board structure and the value of the 
firm (Hermalin and Weisback, 2003). “Endogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible” (Roberts and 
Whited, 2012, p. 6). Thus, the findings of the studies that examine the board structure-
performance relationship must be analysed with caution if the empirical methods do not 
appropriately control for all relevant sources of endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). In 
our research this issue is less likely to be problematic because the financial crisis is an 
                                                 
7 Often, weak corporate governance in the banking industry has been considered as one of the causes of 
the global financial crisis (Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi, 2015). 
8 Complex firms such as those that operate in multiple segments, are large in size, or have high leverage 
are likely to have greater advising requirements (Coles et al., 2008). 
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exogenous macroeconomic shock (Baek et al., 2004; Erkens et al., 2012; Francis et al., 
2012). So, by testing the impact of a set of board characteristics immediately before the 
crisis on the performance of banks during the crisis, we can largely eliminate/mitigate 
the endogeneity concern. 
Finally, the uniqueness of bank governance suggests that the effects of boards on 
bank performance may be different to their effects on non-financial firms and, thus, 
worthy of special attention (Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). 
We draw several conclusions from our results. The better-performing banks 
during the crisis had, in 2006, less independent and less busy boards, more banking 
experience and more diversity (gender and age). Interestingly, banks with the highest 
returns in 2006 had the worst returns during the crisis. Also, banks’ performance during 
the crisis is positively related to capital and market-to-book ratios and negatively related 
to institutional ownership before the crisis. Finally, banks with a corporate governance 
committee in 2006 perform better during the crisis period. This suggests that having a 
corporate governance committee gives banks greater ability to evaluate and adapt their 
governance. So, flexibility matters. 
Additionally, we construct a governance index as proxy for the quality of 
governance, and we find that better governance, according to governance policies, 
improves the performance of banks during the crisis. 
Although we focus on bank-level governance mechanisms, we also examine how 
country-level governance mechanism such as the quality of legal institutions, the extent 
of laws protecting shareholder rights and creditor rights protection influenced the 
performance of banks during the crisis. We find that shareholder rights protection is 
positively related to the performance of banks but the general quality of the legal system 
and creditor rights protection are not. 
Our paper adds to the literature which investigates whether the cross-variation in 
the performance of banks during the 2007-2008 global financial crisis can be explained 
by corporate governance mechanisms. In particular, our paper contributes to the 
academic governance studies that attempt to understand the role of corporate boards in 
the crisis period as those of Adams (2012), Erkens et al. (2012) and Francis et al. 
(2012). We complement the existing literature by showing that bank-level differences in 
boards are crucial to determining changes in bank performance during the crisis. Also, 
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our study provides evidence consistent with the financial crisis being a unique event in 
which board members play a critical role. While the vast majority of the existing studies 
analyses United States (US) firms, our research focuses on European banks from several 
different countries. 
Additionally, our research extends the literature by examining a broad set of 
bank’s board characteristics namely, experience, education, diversity, busyness and 
activity. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the first that examines diversity in its 
multiple dimensions: gender diversity, nationality (or cultural) diversity and age (or 
generational) diversity. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the literature 
review and the hypotheses development, Section 2.3 describes the data and 
methodology, Section 2.4 provides the empirical results, Section 2.5 presents additional 
analysis and robustness tests and Section 2.6 provides the conclusion. 
 
 
2.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
In this section, we review prior literature on corporate performance in order to 
formulate our hypotheses. We present arguments that justify the expected relationship 
between the characteristics of the board of directors and the performance of banks. 
 
 
2.2.1 Board independence and performance 
 
The emphasis on board independence in both academic and practitioner work 
suggests that independent directors are better monitors of management as they have 
concerns about their personal reputation, which affects their ability to receive additional 
director appointments9 (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, the empirical findings are 
mixed on the relationship between independence and performance.  
Some academic literature provides evidence that the contribution of independent 
directors to the performance of the firm is positive. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 
                                                 
9 Gilson (1990) supports the importance of diretor reputation by finding evidence that directors who 
resign from financially distressed firms subsequently serve on fewer boards of other companies. 
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examine shareholder wealth effects surrounding the appointment of an outside director 
and conclude that stock price reacts positively to the nomination. Also, Daily and 
Dalton (1994) report a positive correlation between the proportion of affiliated directors 
and the likelihood of future bankruptcy and O’Connell and Cramer (2010) find a 
positive and significant association between the performance of listed Irish firms and 
the percentage of non-executives on the board. More recently, Francis et al. (2012) find 
no significant relationship between traditional board independence and the performance 
of non-financial firms during the crisis. But when they redefine independent directors as 
outside directors who preceded the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO), called 
“strong independent” directors, they find a significant and positive relationship between 
this strong independence and the stock performance of the firm.  
However, notwithstanding these findings, there is a relative scarcity of empirical 
evidence indicating a significant positive association between the performance of the 
firm and board independence. Indeed, several studies show that there is no significant 
relationship between board independence and performance in non-financial firms 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 1999, 
2002) or in banks (Staikouras et al., 2007; Adams and Mehran, 2012). For example, 
Staikouras et al. (2007) find that the impact of board independence in banks, although 
positive in all models is, in most cases, insignificant. Also, Adams and Mehran (2012) 
using a sample of banking firm data show that board independence is not related to 
performance, as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q. Likewise, in the context of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, no effect was observed between board independence and the 
performance of non-financial firms (Leung and Horwitz, 2010). 
Differently, Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), 
Borokhovich et al. (1996), Cotter et al. (1997), Raheja (2005), Boone et al. (2007), 
Coles et al. (2008), Harris and Raviv (2008) and Duchin et al. (2010), find that more 
independent boards add value, but only in some circumstances such as ownership 
structure, adoption of poison pills, cost of information acquisition and firm-specific 
knowledge. The results support the notion that a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate 
governance is likely to result in sub-optimal board structures and hinder the strategies of 
firms in dealing with poor performance (Coles et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2012). A 
stream of theoretical research shows that the effectiveness of outsiders depends on the 
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information environment. Theoretically, it has long been recognised that the 
effectiveness of outside directors is limited by their inferior information compared to 
corporate insiders. So, in a context of high information asymmetry the inclusion of 
more inside directors may be beneficial, as they have greater specific information about 
the firm’s activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Also, for Adams and Ferreira (2007) a 
potential disadvantage of outside directors is that they may lack relevant firm-specific 
information.10 The more accurate the information available to the board, the greater the 
risk facing the CEO that the board will interfere in his/her decision-making. As a result, 
the CEO will not communicate firm-specific information to a board that is too 
independent (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). In this regard, Duchin et al. (2010) report that 
outsiders significantly improve performance when their information cost is low and 
decrease performance when their information cost is high.  
Additionally, Coles et al. (2008) show that firms for which the firm-specific 
knowledge of insiders is relatively important are likely to benefit from greater insider 
representation on the board. This is relevant for firms operating in more uncertain 
environments, namely those that have a greater need for specialised knowledge (Pathan 
and Faff, 2013), as is the case of banks. In fact, “independent directors are less likely to 
have an in-depth knowledge of the internal workings of the banks on whose boards they 
sit” and “they are also less likely to have the financial expertise to understand the 
complexity of the securitization processes banks were engaging in or to assess the 
associated risks banks were taking on” (Adams, 2012, p. 32). Consistent with this view, 
Erkens et al. (2012) find that financial firms with more independent directors 
experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period and Adams (2012) shows that 
banks receiving bailout money had boards that were more independent than in other 
banks. In the same line, Pathan and Faff (2013) note that independent directors decrease 
US bank performance. 
Given the regulatory nature and complexity of the banking business, whose 
activity is developed in a high information asymmetry environment, the inclusion of 
more independent directors might not be reflected in an increased performance as they 
                                                 
10 The problem associated with outside directors’ lack of firm-specific knowledge may be exacerbated for 
banks because regulatory restrictions may act to limit the pool of directors from which they can choose 
(Adams and Mehran, 2012) and because the complex nature of their businesses (Adams, 2012). 
 
  18 
may not always have the knowledge required. So, the above discussion leads us to the 
first hypothesis (H1): 
H1: More independent directors have a negative impact on bank performance in the 
financial crisis. 
 
 
2.2.2 Board size and performance 
 
The negative relationship between board size and the performance of the firm is 
one of the most common finding in the research on non-financial firms (Hermalin and 
Weisback, 2003) due to the lack of cohesiveness of larger boards as well as their higher 
coordination and communication costs (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Raheja, 
2005). These costs highlight the difficulty in decision-making as board size increases. 
So, smaller boards should be more effective because decision-making costs are lower in 
smaller groups (Adams, 2012). When boards are larger it becomes more difficult for 
directors to express their opinions and points of view within the restricted time available 
during the board meetings (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). A larger board size may also 
create a free-riding problem, making it more difficult for board members to convince 
each other to monitor (Raheja, 2005). On large boards, since the incentive of an 
individual director to acquire and understand information as well as to supervise 
managers is low, it is easier for the CEO to control11 (Jensen, 1993). Thus, several 
studies show an inverse relation between board size and the performance of the firm 
(Yermack, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Mak and Kusnadi, 
2005; Guest, 2009; O’Connell and Cramer, 2010). Yermack (1996), for example, finds 
a negative relationship between the market valuation of non-financial firms, measured 
by Tobin’s Q, and board size.  
Although the literature on board size predominantly suggests that smaller boards 
perform better, the meta-analysis developed by Dalton et al. (1999), on the contrary, 
indicates a positive relationship between board size and the performance of the firm. 
However, Coles et al. (2008) defends that this relationship depends on the firm’s 
                                                 
11 Since agency problems (such as directors’ free-riding) become more severe as a board becomes larger, 
and thus it is easier for the CEO to influence and control the board, CEO power in decision-making 
increases with board size (e.g., Jensen, 1993). 
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complexity. Complex firms (diversified, large or highly levered) are more likely to 
benefit from a larger board of directors. Moreover, Raheja (2005) argues that since 
optimal board size is a function of the directors’ and the firm’s characteristics, a large 
board may be optimal under certain circumstances.  
For banks, the literature is less abundant and the results are mixed. In fact, the 
research reports a positive relationship (Adams and Mehran, 2012), a negative 
relationship (Staikouras et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013), an 
inverted U-shaped relationship (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Grove et al., 2011) and no 
relationship between board size and performance (Minton et al., 2014).  
Given the unique bank operating environment and complex organisational 
structure, a larger board facilitates manager supervision and compliance with regulatory 
requirements (regulation distinguishes the banking industry from other industries), 
provides more human capital to advise managers and increases the potential of 
establishing contacts with several customers and depositors. So, larger boards may be 
beneficial because they increase the pool of expertise and resources available to the 
organisation, leading to setting more appropriate strategies, particularly important in 
regulated and complex activities as is the case of the banking activity. Nevertheless, 
boards with too many members can lead to problems of coordination, control and 
flexibility in decision-making. Thus, the relationship can become negative when the 
board becomes too large, which may impair bank performance due to a lack of 
efficiency and increased agency conflicts. Improvement in performance reaches a limit 
as the board grows. Said differently, bank performance will increase as the number of 
supervisory directors increases to a point where the relationship reaches a maximum 
from which performance will decrease. Accordingly, we might expect a nonlinear 
relationship between board size and bank performance. Thus, the second hypothesis 
(H2) can be stated as follows: 
H2: Board size has a concave, or inverted U-shaped, relationship with bank 
performance in the financial crisis. 
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2.2.3 CEO duality and performance 
 
It has long been argued that when the CEO is also the Chairman12 the motivation 
of the board to monitor and oversee management is compromised due to a lack of 
independence and conflicts of interests (Jensen, 1993), reducing the board’s ability to 
ensure that management pursues the development of activities that create value.  
The choice of leadership type received increased public attention in the last 
decade due to a series of corporate and accounting scandals and, more recently, to the 
global financial crisis. Supporters of the separation between the roles of CEO and 
Chairman argue that when the the CEO is also the Chairman the agency cost are higher 
as the ability to supervise the CEO is reduced – Entrenchment Theory13 (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). This reduction in board 
oversight facilitates the pursuance of the CEO's agenda (Mallette and Fowler, 1992), 
which may diverge from shareholders’ goals and, so, negatively affect the performance 
of the firm. On the other hand, advocates of the combination of the two roles defend 
that the choice of board leadership is based on the firm’s economic and business 
environments so, joining both functions in the same individual may be best suited to a 
firm's conditions – Efficiency Theory (Brickley et al., 1997; Dey et al., 2011). In this 
sense the features of an effective board will change as a function of environmental 
conditions.14/15 Accordingly, each firm weighs the costs and benefits related to both 
leadership structures and choses the one that is best suited to its economic and business 
conditions. In this context, duality may offer a clear direction of a single leader and 
consequently a faster response to external events, facilitating effective action by the 
CEO and consequently leading to higher performance. Additionally, Brickley et al. 
(1997) refer that some costs related to the separation of the roles have been overlooked 
                                                 
12 We refer to the combination of the roles of CEO and Chairman of the board as CEO duality. So, CEO 
duality exists when a firm's CEO also serves as Chairman of the board of directors.  
13 Berger et al. (1997, p. 1411) define entrenchment “as the extent to which managers fail to experience 
discipline from the full range of corporate governance and control mechanisms, including monitoring by 
the board, the threat of dismissal or takeover, and stock- or compensation-based performance 
incentives.“ 
14 This idea is supported by studies linking board composition with environmental conditions as is the 
case of Pfeffer (1972) and Boyd (1990). 
15 According to Brickley et al. (1997) both leadership structures have costs and benefits and it is not 
theoretically obvious which of them is the best. In fact, the “optimal structure is likely to vary according 
to the economic circumstances facing the firm” (Brickley et al., 1997, p. 218).  
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by their advocates. These costs incorporate: agency costs of controlling the behaviour of 
the Chairman, information costs and costs associated with inconsistent decision making 
of shared authority.  
The literature presents different conclusions as to the impact of the leadership 
structure on the performance of a firm (e.g., Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991; Boyd, 1995, for a detailed survey of the literature).  
For non-financial firms, in the context of the financial crisis, Francis et al. (2012) 
find a negative coefficient on the “duality” variable but it is not significant at the 
traditional levels. So, board duality does not have a significant impact on performance. 
Using a sample of US commercial banks, Grove et al. (2011) show that CEO duality is 
negatively associated with bank performance in 2006 and 2007 but not in 2008. 
Additionally, Wang et al. (2012) find that CEO duality has a negative impact on the 
performance of US bank holding companies (BHCs). The opacity of banks16 (Caprio 
and Levine, 2002; Morgan, 2002; Mülbert, 2009), the very nature of the banking 
business and the regulation and valuation difficulties that also weaken the potential role 
of the market for corporate control (Becht et al., 2011) can further reduce CEO 
discipline, which makes it more important to separate the leadership roles at banks. So, 
the third hypothesis (H3) is formulated as follows: 
H3: CEO duality has a negative impact on bank performance in the financial crisis. 
 
 
2.2.4 Board experience and performance 
 
The effectiveness of internal control mechanisms in any financial or non-financial 
institution relies, to a great extent, on the monitoring and advising abilities of its board 
of directors.  
There is a recent and increasing consensus that the strict and effective 
performance of both the monitoring and advisory roles depends on the experience of 
directors (Hau and Thum, 2009; Fernandes and Fich, 2013; von Meyerinck et al., 2013). 
                                                 
16  Not only are bank balance sheets clearly opaque (Macey and O'Hara, 2003), but also “rapid 
developments in technology and increased financial sophistication have challenged the ability of 
traditional regulation and supervision to foster a safe and sound banking system” (Furfine, 2001, p. 33). 
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For Hau and Thum (2009, p. 719), for example, “effective monitoring of bank managers 
may involve industry-specific knowledge which depends on experience.” 
Regarding the valuation effects of director industry experience in non-financial 
firms, (Masulis et al., 2012) show that the proportion of independent expert directors on 
a board is positively and significantly correlated with the performance of the firm. Their 
findings suggest that industry expertise is associated with fewer earnings restatements, 
more cash holdings, a higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity, higher CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity, and more patents with more citations. Also, Faleye et al. (2013) 
find that board industry expertise is robustly associated with a significant increase in the 
value of the firm. Their results demonstrate that industry experts add value by 
facilitating investments in innovation. Furthermore, von Meyerinck et al. (2013) 
document that firms announcing the appointment of a new director with industry 
experience exhibit economically and statistically significantly higher announcement 
returns than firms announcing the appointment of a director without this experience. 
They also provide evidence that investors value more highly industry experience as an 
inside director compared to industry experience as an employee or an outside director. 
Güner et al. (2008) had previously contributed to the literature by focusing more 
specifically on financial expertise rather than on relevant industry expertise in general. 
Examining the role of financial experts on the board of non-financial firms, they find 
that those experts significantly affect the finance and investment policies of firms, 
although not necessarily in the best interest of shareholders. When commercial bankers 
join a board the external funding increases and the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
decreases. However, this increase in financing is restricted to firms with good credit but 
poor investment opportunities. So, increasing financial expertise may not be beneficial 
to shareholders if conflicts of interest (e.g., bank profits) are not considered. Similar 
findings are reported by Dittmann et al. (2010). They analyse the role of bankers on the 
boards of German non-financial firms and find that banks that are represented on the 
board of a firm promote their own business as lenders, as mergers and acquisitions 
advisors and also act as financial experts who help firms to obtain funding. However, 
there is little evidence that bankers monitor management and it seems that their 
presence on the board causes a decline in the valuation of non-financial firms.  
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In short, in the case of non-financial firms adding bankers to boards may be not 
advantageous to shareholders because their interests may be conflicting. 
Following the wave of the accounting scandals in the US and in particular in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators and shareholder activists, among others, 
have stressed the need for more financial and banking experience among directors.17 
The implicit assumption is that this would lead to better board oversight and advice and 
hence, would better serve the interests of shareholders. However, it is often asserted that 
bank board members lack banking and financial experience (Kirkpatrick, 2009). This 
finding is consistent with Guerrera and Larsen (2008) who report that more than two-
thirds of the directors at eight large US financial institutions did not have any significant 
recent experience in the banking business and more than half had no financial services 
industry experience at all.18 Further, Fernandes and Fich (2013) refer that an analysis of 
Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch prior to their collapse shows that their boards of 
directors lacked sufficient financial expertise.  
In Europe, it seems that banking experience is also often quite limited among 
board members. In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, Northern Rock, the first 
bank in 150 years to suffer a bank run and ended up being nationalised in 2008, had just 
two board members with banking experience (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Based on this 
discussion, some recent literature has been investigating the impact of directors’ 
financial expertise on the performance of banks during the recent financial crisis (Hau 
and Thum, 2009; Fernandes and Fich, 2013). Hau and Thum (2009), examining the 29 
largest German banks, conclude that financial expertise of the supervisory board 
correlates with crisis performance. Also, Fernandes and Fich (2013) show that US 
banks with more financially experienced board members did better during the crisis, 
exhibiting better stock return performance. 
The studies above suggest that a widespread lack of financial expertise on the 
boards of a large number of banks appear to have played a significant role in the recent 
crisis. Thus, we can reasonably expect that directors’ banking experience has influenced 
                                                 
17 In the survey “2012, Board practices report: Providing insight into the shape of things to come”, 
elaborated in 2012 by Deloitte and Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals, 47% of 
directors indicate industry experience as the most desired skill for board success in the next two years.  
18 Guerrera and Larsen (2008) also discuss the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) made 
more difficult for financial companies to hire financial experts as directors because of the problem of 
conflicts of interests. 
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the performance of European banks during the financial crisis. The fourth hypothesis 
(H4) is then stated as follows: 
H4: Supervisory directors’ experience in the banking sector has a positive impact on 
bank performance in the financial crisis.  
 
 
2.2.5 Board education and performance 
 
In addition to directors’ banking experience, the qualifications of directors may 
influence bank performance, as educational level leads to better judgments on a 
particular investment strategy and thus, to better corporate decisions.  
This is particularly important in the case of banking firms because the complexity 
of their activity often requires a great amount of specific knowledge. OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles, more specifically “the annotation to Principle VI.E.3 (board 
members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities) 
touches on board training and refers that “this might include that board members 
acquire appropriate skills upon appointment (…)”” (Kirkpatrick, 2009, p. 23). 
Widespread belief that director qualifications and experience matter is also reflected in 
the amendments to the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s disclosure rules 
introduced in December 2009 (SEC, 2009). The amendments are intended to improve 
disclosures regarding risk, corporate governance, the qualifications of the directors and 
compensation. 
However, academic papers emphasise experience rather than qualifications. 
Exception is the study by Hau and Thum (2009), which analyses the impact of the 
educational background of supervisory board members on the performance of banks 
during the financial crisis, defining three levels of educational achievement. The results 
reveal that board’s average educational achievement does not show a statistically 
significant correlation with bank losses. Nevertheless, we conjecture that qualifications 
matter for the managing ability of executive directors as well as for the monitoring and 
advising abilities of supervisory directors. Unfortunately, when studying the 
biographies of board members we were unable to obtain sufficient data on the level of 
the qualifications of the directors. So we use as proxy education of the board the 
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average number of qualifications of the directors. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis (H5) is 
formulated as follows: 
H5: Supervisory directors’ education, measured as the number of qualifications, has a 
positive impact on bank performance in the financial crisis.  
 
 
2.2.6 Board diversity and performance 
 
The limitations related to some traditional, and more extensively studied, board 
characteristics in explaining the performance of firms have spurred finance researchers 
to investigate whether other board features, such as diversity, can improve board 
effectiveness.  
The link between board diversity and shareholder value is relatively new, 
although there is literature since the 1990s that support expectations for improved 
performance and increased value for firms that implement diversity initiatives, thereby 
promoting action for managing diversity (Cox and Blake, 1991; Robinson and Dechant, 
1997).  
Firms which encourage diversity can create competitive advantages in several 
dimensions of business performance: cost, attraction of human resources, marketing 
success, creativity and innovation, problem-solving quality and organisational 
flexibility (Cox and Blake, 1991). Also, wider diversity in board member characteristics 
has been advocated as a means of improving organisational performance by providing 
boards with new insights and perspectives (Siliciano, 1996). For Fields and Keys (2003, 
p. 13) “a key factor in diversity’s successful impact on firm performance is the value 
found in the heterogeneity of ideas, experiences, and innovations that diverse 
individuals bring to the firm.”  
While Cox and Blake (1991) and Robinson and Dechant (1997), focus on 
workplace diversity in general, the issues are similar for board diversity (Carter et al., 
2003). The rationale behind the view of diversity as a positive force within boards 
builds on the assumption that the existence of multiple and divergent viewpoints within 
a board will decrease the likelihood that the agenda and initiatives will be dominated by 
the CEO and his/her inside director allies, thus improving the monitoring role of the 
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board (Kim et al., 2013). Also, fielding a team of top executives with varied cultural 
backgrounds and life experiences can broaden a firm’s strategic perspective (Barta et 
al., 2012). 
Diversity can take any number of forms, including personal demographics such as 
gender, race, ethnicity and nationality (Milliken and Martins, 1996; Erhardt et al., 
2003).  
Although board diversity has several dimensions the literature reveals a 
predominance of gender diversity (Carter et al., 2003; Bernardi et al., 2005; Farrell and 
Hersch, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Kang et al., 2010; Adams and Funk, 2012; 
Julizaerma and Sori, 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013), with ethnic diversity (Carter et al., 
2003; Bernardi et al., 2005; Julizaerma and Sori, 2012) and political ideology (Kim et 
al., 2013) being much less frequent. Following the increased attention that gender 
diversity has received, boards around the world are under increasing pressure to choose 
female directors. In fact, many proposals for governance reform explicitly emphasise 
the importance of gender diversity on the board. The most prominent promotion of 
gender diversity took place in Norway, where since January 2008 all listed companies 
must abide by a 40% gender quota for female directors or face dissolution (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Adams and Funk, 2012). Most of the national legislative initiatives are 
based on the view that the presence of women on boards creates value. Female board 
directors bring knowledge of female market segmentation (Daily et al., 1999) and 
provide unique perspectives, experiences, and work styles as opposed to their male 
counterparts (Daily and Dalton, 2003), which can greatly enhance deliberations of the 
board. Also, female directors are more likely to bring international diversity to the board 
and hold an MBA degree (Singh et al., 2008). These attributes will lead to better 
performance when combined with female characteristics such as communication and 
listening skills (Julizaerma and Sori, 2012). This allows them to perform better on 
group problem solving and in the decision-making process (Robinson and Dechant, 
1997; Daily and Dalton, 2003). Likewise, Bart and McQueen (2013) document that 
female directors can make significant contributions to the board due to their higher 
quality decision-making capability, which helps better explain the higher rates of return, 
more effective risk management and even lower rates of bankruptcy when women are 
present on the board. In addition, previous literature documents that female directors are 
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in general better prepared than men for board meetings (Huse and Solberg, 2006) and 
have better attendance records (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Moreover, Gul et al. (2011) 
find that gender diversity improves stock price informativeness.  
Although the positive benefits of female directorships have empirical 
support, 19 other studies fail to find a significant relationship between female 
directorships and the performance of the firm (Shrader et al., 1997; Farrell and Hersch, 
2005; Rose, 2007). Shrader et al. (1997) find negative but insignificant association 
between the proportion of female directors and several accounting performance 
measures for large US firms. In the same way, Farrell and Hersch (2005) report that 
women tend to serve on the board of better performing firms, although they document 
insignificant abnormal returns on the announcement of a woman added to the board. 
Also, Rose (2007) finds no significant link between the performance of a firm, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, and female board representation in Danish firms. On the 
contrary, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that female directors are more effective than 
men in monitoring, however the average effect of gender diversity on the performance 
of firms is negative. These mixed results may be due to different types of industries 
(Harrigan, 1981) and female directors’ ability and willingness to make alliances with 
the most influential board members and take leadership roles, among others factors 
(Huse and Solberg, 2006) and also could be a reflection of “methodological differences, 
such as how gender diversity and firm performance are measured, or to differences in 
national cultural attitudes toward women that affect the generalization of results across 
countries” (Kang et al., 2010, p. 889).  
In the context of the financial crisis, Francis et al. (2012) show evidence that 
female board representation does not affect the performance of the non-financial firms. 
On the contrary, García-Meca et al. (2015) find that gender diversity improves bank 
performance, confirming the positive role of female directors on the performance of 
banks. Nevertheless, regarding banks, or even financial firms, there is a clear lack of 
empirical studies that examine the link between performance and gender diversity, 
although in the light of the financial crisis this issue has been raised and discussed 
                                                 
19 For instance, Carter et al. (2003) find a significant positive association between the percentage of 
female directors and the performance of firms as measured by Tobin’s Q in a sample of Fortune 1000 
firms. More recently, Barta et al. (2012) evidence that between 2008 and 2010, companies with more 
diverse top teams were also top financial performers. 
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publicly, especially in the media. Kristof (2009) noticed the lack of women in banks 
around the world and implicitly suggested that male domination may have contributed 
to their recent poor performance. Similarly, Harriet Harman, at the time, the UK Deputy 
Leader of the Labour Party, laid the blame for the financial meltdown on male 
domination of the top jobs at banks and, citing, argued that the financial crisis would 
have been less extreme if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters (Morris, 2009). In 
addition, the European Union commissioner, Michel Barnier suggested that having 
more women on the boards of banks would help prevent the kind of “group-think” that 
exacerbated the crisis20/21 (Treanor, 2011). In their research, Pathan and Faff (2013) find 
that, although gender diversity improves US bank performance in the pre-SOX period, 
the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX and the crisis periods. In 
formulating our expectation related to gender diversity and the performance of 
European banks during the financial crisis we rely on the public belief of gender 
diversity value. So, the sixth hypothesis and the first related to board diversity (H6.1) is 
stated as follows: 
H6.1: The proportion of female supervisory directors’ on board has a positive impact on 
bank performance in the financial crisis.  
 
National culture has an important impact on executive mindsets, as demonstrated 
by the fact that executives of different cultural background are not equally open to 
change in organisational strategy and leadership profiles (Geletkanycz, 1997) and in the 
interpretation and response to strategic issues (Schneider and De Meyer, 1991).  
Group members drawn from various nationalities tend to differ in ways that have 
substantial implications for group functioning, since national culture has a significant 
effect on the outlook, perceptions, and behaviour of individuals (Hambrick et al., 1998).  
Masulis et al. (2012) argue that firms with foreign independent directors (FID) 
exhibit significantly poorer performance, especially as their business presence in the 
FID’s home region becomes less important. Also, FID display poor board meeting 
                                                 
20 According to him more diversity on boards of banks and other financial institutions, in particular more 
women, is not just one of better gender equality, but also one of better corporate governance. 
21  In November 2012, European Commission has proposed legislation that forces publicly listed 
companies in all, at the time, 27 member states, with the exception of small and medium enterprises, to 
reserve at least 40% of their non-executive director board seats for women by 2020. However, this 
legislation aims to accelerate progress towards a better gender balance on the corporate boards and not, at 
least explicitly, corporate governance. 
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attendance records and are associated with a greater likelihood of intentional financial 
misreporting, higher CEO compensation, and a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance. In addition, according to García-Meca et al. (2015) nationality diversity, 
measured as the percentage of foreign directors, has a negative impact on bank 
performance. However, the percentage of foreign directors on the board may not be the 
best measure to represent nationality diversity, given that a high percentage can be 
obtained by merely having a large number of foreign directors of a single country.  
On the one hand, foreign directors are likely to be less familiar with national 
accounting rules, laws and regulations, governance standards and management methods, 
thereby making it more difficult for them to evaluate managerial performance or 
challenge managerial decisions. The territorial scope of bank activities may offset some 
of the advantages of nationality diversity. When banks have a predominantly national 
emphasis, local knowledge of operations becomes crucial. On the other hand, foreign 
directors can provide valuable international expertise and advice to firms to the extent 
that they bring a wide range of knowledge and experiences from different institutional 
environments. So, “nationality diversity will lead to superior firm performance through 
(1) access to – and more thorough processing of – relevant information and (2) diverse 
institutionally embedded experiences leading to higher quality decisions via better 
filtering and interpretation” (Nielsen and Nielsen, 2013, p. 375). While nationality has 
received very little attention, Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) find that this dimension of 
diversity in top management teams is positively related to performance. Foreign 
directors may enhance the advisory capability of boards, despite the potential 
monitoring problems associated with them. Nationally diverse boards provide broad and 
complementary knowledge as well as experiences in different institutional contexts, 
which improve the quality of decisions. Despite these conflicting arguments, we rely on 
the idea that, in general, the benefits related to nationality diversity outweigh their costs. 
Therefore, the sixth hypothesis and the second related to board diversity (H6.2) is stated 
as follows: 
H6.2: Greater nationality diversity of supervisory directors on the board, measured as the 
proportion of supervisory directors from different countries, has a positive impact on 
bank performance in the financial crisis.  
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An individual's age is expected to influence strategic decision-making 
perspectives and choices (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). However, there are mixed views 
on how the average age of a director impacts agency conflicts and, subsequently, the 
performance of the firm (Grove et al., 2011).  
On the one hand, older directors have more knowledge and experience, which 
might facilitate effective monitoring and attenuate agency costs. On the other hand, 
flexibility decreases and rigidity and resistance to change increase as people age 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and older directors might, also, lack the incentive and 
energy to actively monitor managers, thereby increasing agency problems (Grove et al., 
2011). For Child (1974) younger men are able to expend more physical and mental 
effort on promoting the change and growth of their firms. In this viewpoint, young 
board members will be more vigorous and provide greater continuity into the future 
than will older board members (Cochran et al., 1984). Likewise, lower managerial age 
is associated with both risk-taking and strategic change (Child, 1974; Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992) which seems to suggest that boards of higher average age may be more 
likely to control young managers inclined to take risks at the expense of shareholders. 
However, for Vroom and Pahl (1971) younger persons place more value on risk taking 
than older persons. Bantel and Jackson (1989) argue that there are several reasons why 
we can expect young managers to bring better cognitive resources to decision-making 
tasks. For example: (1) some cognitive abilities seem to diminish with age, including 
learning ability and (2) younger managers are likely to have received their education 
more recently than older managers, so their technical knowledge should be superior. In 
this sense, young aged boards are more likely to have the skills and cognitive resources 
needed to evaluate risk effectively as well as the willingness to take the risks that result 
in higher returns for shareholders. Although lower age of managers is associated with 
receptivity to change, heterogeneity on age is neither significantly related to changes in 
corporate strategy (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) nor facilitates innovativeness (Bantel 
and Jackson, 1989). No study that directly examines the effect of age diversity on 
performance was found, however, we believe that the relationship between age diversity 
and bank performance can be positive as it brings to the board different points of view 
and perspectives and, consequently, might lead to better decisions and performance. 
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Therefore, the sixth hypothesis and the third related to board diversity (H6.3) is 
formulated as follows: 
H6.3: Greater age diversity of supervisory directors on the board has a positive impact 
on bank performance in the financial crisis.  
 
 
2.2.7 Board busyness and performance 
 
The literature disagrees on the link between the number of directorships held by 
directors and the performance of firms. In fact, the evidence on the association between 
busyness of directors and the value of the firm is mixed.  
The first strand of literature argues that busy directors should positively affect the 
performance of the firm. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that multiple directorship 
signal director’s abilities/quality. Similarly, Gilson (1990), Kaplan and Reishus (1990), 
Ferris et al. (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2007), amongst others, provide additional 
evidence that multiple directorships certify director quality. In this view, the number of 
directorships held by a director might proxy for reputational capital, with such 
individuals viewed as high quality directors, and higher quality directors are more 
frequently asked to serve on additional boards, Reputational Hypothesis. Confirming a 
reputation effect, Bugeja et al. (2009) find that directors with multiple directorships 
have a lower rate of turnover and a greater increase on future board seats. Poor 
performance is punished and greater performance is rewarded in the market for 
directors. This pattern is documented, for example, in financially distressed firms 
(Gilson, 1990), in firms that cut dividends (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990), in firms that fire 
a poorly performing CEO (Farrell and Whidbee, 2000) and in firms that are target of a 
takeover bid (Harford, 2003). For Perry and Peyer (2005) when fewer agency concerns 
exist, additional directorships relate to increased value of the firm, possibly through 
learning or networking opportunities or through the signalling of managerial quality. 
Additionally, Harris and Shimizu (2004) find that busy directors are important sources 
of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, Field et al. (2013) 
postulate that, due to the relatively high demand for advising over monitoring services, 
busy directors may be especially beneficial to young firms. Busy directors tend to be 
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better connected and more experienced than their non-busy counterparts which will be 
of evident value to firms with relatively few connections and little experience. 
Carpenter and Westphal (2001), in turn, show that the monitoring and advising 
behaviour of directors, and consequently shareholder value, depend on the strategic 
perspective and base of expertise provided by their appointments to other boards. More 
recently, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) show that the performance of BHCs, using 
accounting measures, is positively related to busyness of directors, based on the idea 
that busy directors provide better advice due to their valuable knowledge and 
connections. 
The second strand of literature defends that busy outside directors may be less 
effective monitors. The Busyness Hypothesis postulates that serving on too many 
directorships reduces directors’ time and attention, and consequently their ability to 
monitor management, decreasing the value of the firm. Directors with multiple 
directorships are too busy to monitor and advise management (Benson et al., 2015). 
While the number of directorships, according to some studies, appears to be closely 
linked to reputational capital of directors, other studies suggest that holding too many 
directorships may lower the effectiveness of outside directors as corporate monitors and 
decrease firm value (e.g., Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Jackling 
and Johl, 2009; Cashman et al., 2012; Méndez et al., 2015). Accordingly, Loderer and 
Peyer (2002) document that seat accumulation is negatively related to the value of the 
firm, possibly because of the conflicts of interest that directors are exposed to when they 
serve on several boards simultaneously and the insufficient time they can dedicate to 
any one of multiple mandates. The exception to this rule is a Chairman of the board 
with multiple seats in listed firms. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) also find that firms with 
busy directors, those where a majority of outside directors hold three or more 
directorships, exhibit lower market-to-book ratios, weaker profitability and lower 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to the performance of the firm. Likewise, Jackling and Johl 
(2009) find evidence of a negative effect of busy outside directors on a firm's 
performance, suggesting that “busyness” did not add value in terms of networks and 
improvement of resource accessibility and Ahn et al. (2010) show that acquiring firms 
where directors hold more outside board seats experience more negative abnormal 
returns. Nonetheless, this adverse effect does not extend across the entire range of 
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multiple directorships. Rather, the damanging impact is significant only when the 
number of outside board seats surpasses a certain threshold. On the contrary, Grove et 
al. (2011) show that a concave association between busy directors and performance is 
not supported by any of the regression models. Cashman et al. (2012) find evidence 
that: (1) the distinct results in prior work derive from differences in both sample 
composition and empirical design and (2) on balance the results suggest a negative 
relationship between board busyness and the performance of the firm. Directors who 
take on too many directorships are spread too thinly, impairing their ability to attend 
meetings. More recently, Méndez et al. (2015) find that busy directors are detrimental to 
the monitoring capability of the board and its committees. Additionally, Jiraporn et al. 
(2009) report a higher tendency of busy directors to be absent from board meetings. 
Regarding the financial crisis period, Francis et al. (2012) find that the number of 
directorships has no impact on the performance of non-financial firms. However, 
Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) report a positive relationship between outside 
director busyness and subprime lending, from 1997-2005, supporting the view that 
serving on multiple boards compromises a director’s ability to effectively perform 
monitoring duties. Although busy directors are expected to bring more skills and 
connections as defended by Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), the opaque and complex nature 
of the banking business requires more time and attention from a director in order to 
effectively fulfil the monitoring and advising roles (Liang et al., 2013). Considering the 
specificities associated with the banking activity and times of crisis we expect that the 
costs of having busy directors outweigh the benefits related to the additional 
connections/network of contacts that such directors may bring. So, the seventh 
hypothesis (H7) is stated as follows: 
H7: Busier supervisory directors on the board, measured as the average number of 
directorships, have a negative impact on bank performance in the financial crisis.  
 
 
2.2.8 Board activity and performance 
 
In the agency framework, the intensity of board activity, measured by the 
frequency of board meetings, may indicate an active monitoring role of corporate 
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boards and so influence corporate performance. Following this view, board meetings are 
beneficial to shareholders. Conger et al. (1998) suggest that board meeting time is an 
important mechanism in improving the effectiveness of boards. The higher the 
frequency of meetings, the greater the supervision of top management, indicating a 
more effective monitoring role, which might mitigate agency costs and subsequently 
improve the performance of the firm (Grove et al., 2011). An opposing view is that 
board meetings are not necessarily useful because, given their limited time, they cannot 
be used for the meaningful exchange of ideas among directors or with management 
(Jensen, 1993). Moreover, routine tasks absorb much of the meetings, thereby limiting 
opportunities for outside directors to meaningfully exercise control over management 
(Vafeas, 1999). Vafeas (1999) finds that boards that meet more frequently are less 
valued by the market. This relation disappears when prior stock performance is included 
in the model, suggesting that the relation runs from poor performance to higher board 
activity and not vice-versa. According to him, the association between board meeting 
frequency the value of the firm is not a priori clear.  
On the one hand, there are costs associated with board meetings, including 
managerial time, travel expenses and meeting fees of directors. On the other hand, there 
are benefits, including more time for directors to confer, define strategy and monitor 
management. Also, Andres and Vallelado (2008) find explanations both for and against 
a positive relation between the frequency of meetings and the performance of banks. 
Meetings provide board members with the opportunity to come together to discuss and 
exchange ideas on how they intend to monitor managers and bank strategy. Therefore, 
the more frequent the meetings, the closer the control over managers, the more 
significant the advisory role, factors that lead to a positive impact on performance 
(proactive boards). Furthermore, the complexity of the banking business and the 
importance of information require a more active and effective advisory role by boards. 
Additionally, boards of banks tend to be larger and have more committees, which are 
required to meet more frequently in order to be effective (Adams and Mehran, 2003). 
However, frequent meetings might also be a result of the board’s reaction to poor 
performance (reactive boards) (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Concerning US banks, 
Grove et al. (2011) find weak evidence that board meeting frequency is positively 
associated with financial performance. The more frequent the meetings, the increased 
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the supervision of top management, which might mitigate agency costs and 
subsequently improve bank performance. Consistent with this view, the eighth 
hypothesis (H8) is, thus, formulated as follows: 
H8: Board meeting frequency is positively associated with bank performance in the 
financial crisis.  
  
 
2.3 Data and methodology 
 
In this section we first characterise the sample and describe the data sources used. 
Next, we discuss the variables and characterise the 2007-2008 financial crisis timeline. 
Finally, we present the empirical framework. 
 
 
2.3.1 Sample and data sources 
 
The sample examined in this study includes European listed banks from 17 
different countries. The fact that it is restricted to banks included in BoardEx, the main 
data source concerning board information, limits its size to 72 banks. Furthermore, due 
to missing values relating to some variables of governance, the sample size used in this 
paper is slightly lower. For some banks, board data was also drawn from their annual 
reports. Financial data was obtained from Datastream and ownership data from 
Thomson Financial. In order to construct the governance index, data from corporate 
governance codes was gathered from the European Corporate Governance Institute code 
database, available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php. Data related to best 
practices recommendations on the characteristics of boards was also collected (e.g., the 
available report of Deloitte (2013)). We supplemented this data with data from 
commercial codes.  
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2.3.2 Variables description 
 
We now discuss our key variables of interest. As in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), 
Aebi et al. (2012), Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Erkens et al. (2012), Fahlenbrach et al. 
(2012) and Francis et al. (2012), we collect data on various variables for the year 2006, 
the last complete year before the beginning of the financial crisis. Please see 
Appendix 2.1.  
 
 
2.3.2.1   Performance variable 
 
Similar to Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Erkens et al. 
(2012) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), our measure of performance is buy-and-hold stock 
returns over the crisis period, Bank performance variable. We gather data on the stock 
returns of banks from Datastream. 
 
 
2.3.2.2   Board characteristics variables 
 
We focus our analysis on board independence and board size, which are the two 
board characteristics that have been more extensively studied in the US (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003), CEO duality, board experience, board education, board diversity, 
board busyness and board activity. The data was obtained from BoardEx and 
Datastream databases, as well as from annual reports, and refers to 2006 (i.e., prior to 
the onset of the crisis) like Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), Beltratti and Stulz (2012), 
Erkens et al. (2012), Francis et al. (2012) and Fernandes and Fich (2013). BoardEx 
provides detailed information on the composition of the board of publicly listed firms. 
Recent studies also rely on BoardEx as a source of governance and board data (e.g., 
Engelberg et al., 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Fernandes and Fich, 2013; van Essen et al., 
2013). We define Board independence as the percentage of independent directors. 
BoardEx does not classify directors as independent as part of its own analysis, instead 
when it classifies a director as an independent director it is because the firm which they 
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work for has disclosed them as such. In other words, BoardEx takes the firm’s 
classification for granted and accordingly provides this information. But, this fact does 
not constitute a serious problem because the Codes of Best Practices of European 
countries, to the best of our knowledge, tend to converge on the definition of board 
independence. Board size is defined as the total number of directors on the board and 
CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman and zero 
otherwise. Board experience is measured as the average years of experience in the 
banking sector of the supervisory directors. Board education is measured as the average 
number of qualifications held by supervisory directors. Although it was useful to use the 
average level of directors' qualifications, we are unable to use it because after 
examining each director's biography we obtain insufficient data on their qualifications 
level. Board diversity is measured in three different but complementary ways: gender 
diversity (Women), calculated as the percentage of female supervisory directors on the 
board; nationality diversity (Nationality_mix) computed as the proportion of 
supervisory directors from different countries and age diversity (Age diversity) 
computed as the standard deviation of the age of supervisory directors. Board busyness 
is measured as the average number of board positions (number of directorships) held by 
supervisory directors and, finally, Board activity is measured as the annual number of 
board meetings.  
 
 
2.3.2.3   Control variables 
 
Following previous studies such as Mitton (2002), Adams and Mehran (2012), 
Erkens et al. (2012), Francis et al. (2012) and Pathan and Faff (2013), some control 
variables are included to account for several factors that might affect stock performance 
of banks. The first one is the performance in 2006, measured as the buy-and-hold stock 
returns from January 2006 to December 2006, to control for prior bank performance 
(2006 performance). The second is the size of the bank, (Bank size) measured by the 
natural logarithm of market capitalisation. The third is the capital of the bank (Capital) 
measured by the ratio of total equity to total assets. The fourth is the market-to-book 
ratio (MBR) measured by the market value of equity to the book value of equity. Also, 
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to control for ownership structure we include the Institutional ownership variable, 
measured as the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors and, finally, to 
account for the existence of a corporate governance committee we include the 
CG committee variable, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank has a 
corporate governance committee and zero otherwise. 
 
 
2.3.3 Timeline 
 
We conduct our empirical analysis using two different and alternative definitions 
of the crisis period. First, like Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), Aebi et al. (2012), Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), Fernandes and Fich (2013) and van Essen et 
al. (2013) we define our crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008. According to 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012), admittedly, the crisis did 
not end in December 2008 and bank stocks lost substantial ground in the first quarter of 
2009. However, during this period the banking sector suffered losses not witnessed 
since the Great Depression. Also, subsequent losses were, at least partly, affected by the 
uncertainty surrounding the possibility of bank nationalisations. Second, we investigate 
the robustness of our results using an alternative crisis period from January 2007 to 
September 2008 as Erkens et al. (2012). In this case, the crisis period is defined as 
starting at the beginning of 2007, because according to Ryan (2008) the first wave of 
the crisis started in early 2007,22 and ended in the third quarter of 2008 for two main 
raisons: (1) at the end of the third quarter of 2008, regulators in various countries 
imposed short-selling prohibitions on the stocks of many financial institutions to 
contain sharp falls in their stock prices (Erkens et al., 2012) and (2) in October 2008 the 
International Accounting Standards Board issued amendments to grant companies the 
option of abandoning fair value recognition for selected financial assets. Such changes 
allow firms to reclassify financial assets from market value based valuation to historical 
cost based valuation (Erkens et al., 2012). Thus, some European banks use the 
reclassification option to forgo the recognition of fair value losses (Bischof et al., 2011). 
                                                 
22 We note that, although in early 2007 the market first realized the severity of the subprime mortgages 
problems, the credit crunch did not really begin until July 2007 (Ryan, 2008). 
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In order to avoid the confounding effects of government intervention Erkens et al. 
(2012) choose as the end of the crisis period the third quarter of 2008.  
 
 
2.3.4 Empirical framework  
 
In this sub-section we present the estimation method and the empirical models 
used to analyse the relationship between bank performance and the characteristics of 
boards and the relationship between bank performance and the quality of the 
governance, using a governance index constructed in accordance with the corporate 
governance codes and best practices recommendations, regarding the characteristics of 
boards. 
 
 
2.3.4.1   Bank performance and board characteristics 
 
We examine the relationship between bank performance and board characteristics 
during the crisis, by regressing buy-and-hold-stock return during the crisis on our board 
characteristics and control variables using the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) method. 
The WLS method provides a method for dealing with heteroscedasticity (e.g. Gujarati 
and Porter, 2010; Greene, 2012; Wooldridge, 2012). In the presence of 
heteroscedasticity of known form we can use WLS, which is more efficient than 
Ordinary Least Squares (Wooldridge, 2012). The BLUE23 estimators are provided by 
WLS (Gujarati and Porter, 2010). We expect that the source of heteroscedasticity is 
bank size. Using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity (Breusch and Pagan, 
1979), the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected at conventional levels. 
Additionally, we test for model misspecification using the RESET test24 and the null 
hypothesis of correctly specified model could not be rejected at conventional levels. So 
we conclude that the model is correctly specified. 
                                                 
23 Best Linear Unbiased Estimator. 
24 Some tests have been proposed to detect general functional form misspecification. The regression 
specification error test (RESET) by Ramsey (1969) has proven to be useful in this regard (Wooldridge, 
2012). 
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Our regression model is as follows: 
(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
         + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 
         + 𝛽4(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
         + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7(𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
         + 𝛽8(𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑚𝑖𝑥)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9(𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
         + 𝛽10(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
         + 𝛽12(2006 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
         + 𝛽14(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽15(𝑀𝐵𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
         + 𝛽16(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
         + 𝛽17(𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
+ ∑ 𝛽(17+𝑗)(𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)𝑗𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                   (2.1)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank, 𝑡 is the crisis time period, 𝑡 − 1 is the pre-crisis 
time period (2006), 𝑛  is the number of country dummies and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the stacked vector of the dependent variable, the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank buy-
and-hold stock returns from July 2007 to December 2008, 𝑀𝐵𝑅 is the market-to-book 
ratio and  𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 are the country dummies indicating the country of the bank.  
For a detailed definition of the variables please see sub-section 2.3.2 and 
Appendix 2.1. 
 
 
2.3.4.2   Bank performance and compliance with corporate governance codes and 
best practices recommendations regarding board characteristics 
 
We examine whether bank performance in the financial crisis can be attributed to 
the fact that these institutions were non-compliant with corporate governance codes and 
best practices recommendations concerning the board characteristics previously 
analysed. The arguments presented in Section 2.2 to predict how these characteristics 
relate to bank performance are based on those that the literature reports more frequently. 
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However, academics do not all agree on these predictions and sometimes the 
literature also “defies” some governance principles, as is the case of board 
independence.  
We use regulation or regulatory recommendations concerning each particular 
characteristic regardless of the literature predictions. Corporate Governance Codes of all 
countries in our sample promote, even before the crisis, board independence. On the 
other hand, most of them do not make recommendations concerning board size, 
typically only referring to something like “the board should be small enough for 
efficient decision-making. It should be large enough for its members to contribute 
experience and knowledge from different fields and for changes to the board's 
composition to be managed without undue disruption” (Belgian Corporate Governance 
Code, 2004, p.12) or “the board should not be so large as to be unwieldy. The board 
should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for 
the requirements of the business and that changes to the board’s composition can be 
managed without undue disruption” (The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 
2006, p. 5). The exceptions are Spain and Finland whose codes refer, respectively, that 
“in the interests of maximum effectiveness and participation, the Board of Directors 
should ideally comprise no fewer than five and no more than fifteen members” (Unified 
Good Governance Code, 2006, p. 14) and “to ensure the effective implementation of the 
duties of the board, it should comprise at least five directors. In some circumstances, 
however, it may be justified to elect less than five directors. In a relatively small 
company, a board consisting of three directors may be able to adequately discharge the 
duties pertaining to the board” (Corporate Governance Recommendations for Listed 
Companies, 2003, p. 7).  
Following the crisis, the general recommendation is also that the board should 
have a size that enables it to perform its duties in an efficient manner. The UK´s Walker 
Review (2009) states that board size will depend on particular circumstances and so, 
there can be no general prescription as to optimum board size. However, the 
behavioural studies of the optimal group size prepared for this Review report that the 
optimum size for a board is within the range of 8 to 12 persons. The separation of the 
role of CEO and Chairman is a general recommendation and the division of 
responsibilities between them should be clearly established. Also, the codes emphasise 
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that board members must have relevant experience, knowledge, qualifications and 
competence. The need for boards to have industry experience in banks and other 
financial institutions is greater than in the non-financial business (Walker, 2009). 
Although the improvement of diversity, especially gender diversity, is addressed by 
some codes even before the crisis, following the recent financial turmoil this issue 
gained significantly more relevance. 25  Numerous countries are implementing 
boardroom gender quotas (Deloitte, 2013). For example, since January 2008, Norway 
has enforced a gender quota requirement for corporate board membership at all public 
limited liability companies. They are obliged, by law,26 to ensure that at least 40% of 
their board directors are women. Concerning board busyness, in France, Germany and 
Denmark, for example, there are limits on the number of directorships directors can 
hold.27  Finally, regarding board activity, the board should meet with the necessary 
frequency so as to allow an in-depth review and discussion of the matters and so, 
effectively perform its functions. 
Table 2.1 summarises regulatory policy/recommendations (increase or decrease) 
for each board characteristic in order to improve governance quality. Using the 
predictions we construct a governance index. For each characteristic (except for board 
size and for CEO duality) we define a dummy variable which, is equal to one if the 
bank has better than the mean quality governance for that characteristic and zero 
otherwise. For board size we assign a value of one if it ranges between 8 and 12 
members and zero otherwise. For CEO duality we assign a value of one if the CEO is 
not the Chairman and zero otherwise. Governance index is the sum of all dummy 
variables. A higher value means better quality of governance. 
 
                                                 
25 “The board's composition should ensure that decisions are made in the corporate interest. It should be 
determined on the basis of gender diversity and diversity in general, as well as complementary skills, 
experience and knowledge” (The 2009 Belgian Corporate Governance Code, 2009, p. 13). 
26 Public Limited Liability Companies Act § 6-11a. 
27  For example, article 100(2) of the German Stock Corporations Act prohibits supervisory board 
members from serving on more than ten supervisory boards of any incorporated companies that are 
legally required to have a supervisory board, although up to five additional directorships are allowable for 
group companies.  
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Table 2.1 – Regulatory policy/recommendations concerning board characteristics 
Board characteristic Regulatory policy/recommendations According to regulatory 
policy/recommendations, board 
characteristic must… 
Governance index 
Board independence Corporate Governance Codes and Principles Increase 1 if above sample mean, 0 otherwise 
Board size UK’s Walker Review (2009), according to the 
specific analysis of the Tavistock Institute of 
Human Relations (TIRH)28 
Increase within the range of 8 – 12 
persons (the optimum size); otherwise 
decrease (the overall effectiveness of 
the board, outside a quite narrow range, 
tends to vary inversely with its size) 
1 if between 8 and 12, 0 otherwise 
CEO duality Corporate Governance Codes and Principles Decrease 1 if the CEO is not the Chairman, 0 
otherwise 
Board experience Corporate Governance Codes and Principles; UK’s 
Walker Review (2009) 
Increase 1 if above sample mean, 0 otherwise 
Board education Corporate Governance Codes and Principles Increase 1 if above sample mean, 0 otherwise 
Board diversity Corporate Governance Codes and Principles; 
Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies 
Act; Deloitte (2013)  
Increase 1 if above sample mean, 0 otherwise 
Board busyness France’s New Economic Regulations Law (May 15, 
2001)  
(http://uk.practicallaw.com/5-107-0184?q= 
&qp=&qo=&qe); German Stock Corporations Act, 
Article 100(2); Danish Corporate Governance Code, 
amongst others 
Decrease 1 if below sample mean, 0 otherwise 
Board activity Corporate Governance Codes and Principles Increase 1 if above sample mean, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 In Annex 4 of the Walker report, the TIHR makes the link between understanding the behaviour of board chairs, group dynamics and improving board performance 
effectiveness.  
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Our regression model is as follows: 
(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
          + 𝛽2(2006 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
          + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽5(𝑀𝐵𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
          + 𝛽6(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑖,𝑡−1 +   
          + 𝛽7(𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
+ ∑ 𝛽(7+𝑗)(𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)𝑗𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                    (2.2)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank, 𝑡 is the crisis time period, 𝑡 − 1 is the pre-crisis 
time period (2006), 𝑛  is the number of country dummies and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the stacked vector of the dependent variable, the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank buy-
and-hold stock returns from July 2007 to December 2008, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 is the 
index of the quality of governance, 𝑀𝐵𝑅 is the market-to-book ratio and 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 are 
the country dummies indicating the  country of the bank. 
For a detailed definition of the variables please see sub-section 2.3.2 and 
Appendix 2.1. 
 
 
2.4 Empirical results 
 
In this section we first report and analyse the descriptive statistics and the Pearson 
correlation matrix. Second, we present and discuss the core results.  
 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Table 2.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics of bank performance (during the crisis). Panel B 
presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of boards (before the crisis) and 
Panel C presents descriptive statistics of control variables (before the crisis).  
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Table 2.2 – Descriptive statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of each variable by showing mean, median, standard deviation 
(Std. dev.), maximum (Max.) and minimum (Min.).  
Variable # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
Panel A: Bank performance variable 
Bank performance (%) 72 -64.50 -66.70 21.41 27.99 -98.87 
Panel B: Board characteristics variables 
Board independence (%) 72 41.45 44.10 28.73 95.45 0.00 
Board size (Nº) 72 16.39 15.00 5.70 31.00 6.00 
CEO duality 72 0.07 0.00 0.26 1.00 0.00 
Board experience (years) 72 12.75 10.78 6.51 35.06 3.00 
Board education (Nº) 72 1.49 1.45 0.71 3.00 0.10 
Women (%) 72 10.87 9.10 10.77 42.90 0.00 
Nationality_mix 70 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.80 0.00 
Age diversity (years) 72 7.48 7.21 2.85 16.60 1.20 
Board busyness (Nº) 72 2.63 2.38 1.01 5.75 1.10 
Board activity (Nº) 58 10.81 10.00 6.26 36.00 4.00 
Panel C: Control variables 
2006 performance (%) 72 25.07 20.84 19.61 93.98 -29.25 
Bank size (€ bil.) 72 22.73 11.41 29.59 160.44 0.22 
Capital (%) 72 5.48 5.24 2.71 14.67 1.79 
MBR (%) 72 238.59 209.70 108.61 692.48 47.08 
Institutional ownership (%) 69 44.46 44.32 27.00 100.00 0.03 
CG committee 68 0.18 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 
Note: Observations vary because of missing data. 
Please refer to Appendix 2.1 for the definition of each variable.  
 
 
Panel A reports large negative average returns during the crisis period, 
substantially more pronounced than in other studies as is the case of Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Fernandes and Fich (2013), whereas the minimum 
stock return is -98.87% and the maximum is 27.99%. 
The descriptive statistics of board characteristics in Panel B shows that, on 
average, 41.45% of the directors on the board are independent, a much lower percentage 
when compared to other studies (e.g., Fernandes and Fich, 2013; Pathan and Faff, 
2013). The board has on average 16.39 directors, although there is a wide distribution of 
board size in the sample (a minimum of 6 directors and a maximum of 31 directors). 
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The average number of directors on the board of banks, in our sample, is higher than the 
average number of directors on the board of non-financials firms (e.g., 12.25 in 
Yermack (1996), 10.4 in Coles et al. (2008) and 9.14 in Francis et al. (2012)), 
confirming that, as evidenced by Adams and Mehran (2003) and Adams (2012), banks 
have on average larger boards. Only 7% of the CEOs in our sample also serve as 
Chairman of the board. In relation to board experience and board education we find, 
respectively, that on average supervisory directors have 12.75 years of bank experience 
and hold 1.49 qualifications. The descriptive statistics of board diversity show that: 
(1) the percentage of female supervisory directors is, on average, 10.87%, with a 
minimum of 0% (no women as supervisory directors) and a maximum of 42.90%, (2) 
nationality-mix is, on average, 0.21, exhibiting a minimum of 0, which means that there 
is no foreign supervisory directors on board, and a maximum of 0.80 and (3) age 
diversity is, on average, 7.48 years, with a minimum of 1.20 years and a maximum of 
16.60 years. With regard to board busyness, supervisory directors held on average 2.63 
directorships, ranging from 1.10 to 5.75 board positions. The annual number of board 
meetings is, on average, 10.81, ranging from 4 to 36 meetings per year.  
Finally, Panel C shows that the stock returns in 2006 are, on average, 25.07%, 
with a minimum of -29.25% and a maximum of 93.98%. Bank size is, on average 
€22.73 billion, with a minimum of €0.22 billion and a maximum of €160.44 billion. The 
quite positively skewed distribution of the Bank size variable motivates the use of the 
natural logarithm, ln(Bank Size), in the regression analysis. The capital ratio is, on 
average, 5.48% and the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity 
is, on average, 238.59%, exhibiting high variability. Institutional investors own, on 
average, 44.46% of bank shares and 18% of our sample banks have a corporate 
governance committee.  
Table 2.3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables.  
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Table 2.3 – Pearson correlation matrix 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Bank performance  1.00                 
2 Board 
independence 
0.15 1.00                
3 Board size -0.15 -0.35 1.00               
4 CEO duality 0.13 -0.06 -0.08 1.00              
5 Board experience 0.13 -0.25 0.24 -0.02 1.00             
6 Board education -0.25 0.31 -0.24 -0.14 -0.11 1.00            
7 Women 0.01 0.07 -0.09 -0.14 -0.43 0.07 1.00           
8 Nationality_mix -0.41 0.25 -0.09 -0.09 0.09 0.53 -0.12 1.00          
9 Age diversity 0.26 -0.11 0.26 0.05 0.41 -0.21 -0.16 -0.15 1.00         
10 Board busyness -0.27 -0.24 0.43 0.04 0.39 0.14 -0.24 0.32 0.12 1.00        
11 Board activity 0.16 0.30 -0.19 -0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.15 -0.26 0.10 -0.18 1.00       
12 2006 performance 0.07 -0.20 -0.04 -0.10 0.24 -0.23 -0.19 -0.20 -0.06 0.03 0.11 1.00      
13 Bank size -0.34 0.29 0.27 0.08 0.02 0.40 -0.02 0.42 -0.07 0.19 -0.11 -0.26 1.00     
14 Capital 0.38 -0.07 -0.29 0.05 0.10 -0.05 -0.31 -0.20 0.09 -0.10 0.07 0.02 -0.40 1.00    
15 MBR 0.08 0.18 -0.47 0.02 -0.11 0.12 -0.04 0.00 -0.21 -0.21 -0.12 0.42 -0.35 0.21 1.00   
16 Institutional 
ownership 
0.01 -0.27 
 
0.20 
 
-0.28 
 
0.17 
 
-0.14 
 
0.12 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.02 
 
0.09 
 
-0.16 
 
0.17 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.17 
 
1.00  
17 CG committee -0.19 0.14 -0.01 -0.12 0.10 0.20 -0.18 0.26 -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.10 -0.18 0.09 -0.14 1.00 
Bold text indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 2.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Correlation coefficients indicate that the higher correlation is 0.53,29 among the 
variables Nationality_mix and Board education, which is considered a moderate 
correlation. Thus, multicollinearity should not be a serious issue in this regression.  
 
 
2.4.2 Core results 
 
Table 2.4 presents the results of the WLS estimations. Columns (1) to (10) report 
the regression result on each of the characteristics of the board and the control variables. 
Column (11) reports the results of our full regression model.  
                                                 
29 This is well below the threshold of 0.8 beyond which multicollinearity is considered a problem (e.g., 
Berry and Feldman, 1985; Retherford and Choe, 1993; Gujarati, 2004). Regarding multicollinearity “in 
practice the pairwise correlations usually tell most of the story” (Retherford and Choe, 1993, p. 40). 
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Table 2.4 – Relationship between bank performance and board characteristics  
The table reports the WLS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis on board characteristics. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Board 
independence 
-3.17*** 
(0.000) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.76* 
(0.052) 
Board size --- 
 
55.11** 
(0.022) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -35.40 
(0.478) 
Board size2 --- 
 
-1.04 
(0.104) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.11 
(0.379) 
CEO duality --- 
 
--- -63.17** 
(0.017) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- 44.83 
(0.112) 
Board 
experience 
--- --- --- 20.67*** 
(0.000) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 13.84*** 
(0.006) 
Board 
education 
--- --- --- --- -5.15 
(0.832) 
--- --- --- --- --- 17.77 
(0.374) 
Women --- 
 
--- --- --- --- -12.08*** 
(0.001) 
--- --- --- --- 8.23** 
(0.015) 
Nationality_
mix 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 237.27*** 
(0.001) 
--- --- --- 67.64 
(0.274) 
Age diversity --- 
 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 32.76*** 
(0.000) 
--- --- 14.41* 
(0.079) 
Board 
busyness 
--- 
 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- -78.53* 
(0.085) 
--- -39.54* 
(0.093) 
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Table 2.4 – Relationship between bank performance and board characteristics (cont.) 
The table reports the WLS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis on board characteristics. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Board 
activity 
--- 
 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -22.15*** 
(0.011) 
-2.55 
(0.603) 
2006 
performance 
-5.73*** 
(0.001) 
-0.53 
(0.723) 
-3.04 
(0.198) 
-5.11*** 
(0.007) 
-1.92 
(0.479) 
-7.78*** 
(0.007) 
-3.78* 
(0.100) 
-5.17*** 
(0.005) 
-1.76 
(0.465) 
-3.13 
(0.232) 
-2.95* 
(0.095) 
Bank size -18.08 
(0.572) 
32.21 
(0.284) 
16.86 
(0.738) 
152.81*** 
(0.000) 
61.94 
(0.241) 
47.39 
(0.290) 
73.76 
(0.111) 
-66.70* 
(0.095) 
-1.30 
(0.983) 
1.55 
(0.978) 
7.80 
(0.780) 
Capital 22.86** 
(0.017) 
27.58*** 
(0.004) 
32.20** 
(0.029) 
21.99** 
(0.047) 
29.72* 
(0.058) 
38.37*** 
(0.007) 
64.83*** 
(0.000) 
31.17*** 
(0.005) 
22.50 
(0.145) 
39.09** 
(0.021) 
16.69* 
(0.056) 
MBR 0.58** 
(0.011) 
1.09*** 
(0.000) 
0.94*** 
(0.009) 
1.40*** 
(0.000) 
0.75** 
(0.045) 
1.13*** 
(0.002) 
1.54*** 
(0.000) 
0.57** 
(0.026) 
0.37 
(0.371) 
0.86** 
(0.028) 
0.65*** 
(0.010) 
Institutional 
ownership 
-4.36*** 
(0.000) 
-2.79*** 
(0.001) 
-2.09* 
(0.060) 
1.12 
(0.238) 
-2.00 
(0.103) 
-3.01*** 
(0.007) 
0.62 
(0.624) 
-1.46* 
(0.072) 
-3.92** 
(0.018) 
-0.61 
(0.640) 
-1.12* 
(0.063) 
CG 
committee 
90.49*** 
(0.000) 
62.23*** 
(0.000) 
60.87*** 
(0.004) 
74.25*** 
(0.000) 
79.35*** 
(0.001) 
106.43*** 
(0.000) 
116.07*** 
(0.000) 
159.31*** 
(0.000) 
43.09 
(0.128) 
79.75*** 
(0.001) 
87.52** 
(0.011) 
Country 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 66 66 66 66 66 66 64 66 66 55 54 
Adj-R2 0.95 0.95 0.88 0.93 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.87 0.88 0.99 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please 
refer to Appendix 2.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Table 2.4 shows that the estimated coefficient on the Board independence 
variable is negative and statistically significant, confirming hypothesis H1 that board 
independence decreases bank performance during the financial crisis. The negative 
impact for independence is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Erkens et al., 2012; 
Pathan and Faff, 2013). As found in the US context, likewise in a pan-European 
context, board independence negatively influences the performance of banks.  
With regard to the Board size variable, both the coefficients on the linear and non-
linear factors are insignificant at conventional levels and so, contrary to Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) and Grove et al. (2011), we do not find a concave association between 
the size of the board and bank performance. Thus, hypothesis H2 is not confirmed. 
Concerning the CEO duality variable, Column (3) reports, as predicted, a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient but the joint regression of all variables shows that 
the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. Thus CEO duality has no 
impact on bank performance, which does not confirm hypothesis H3. 
Regarding the banking experience of supervisory directors, as expected, banks 
with more experienced boards perform better during the financial crisis, which confirms 
hypothesis H4. The estimated coefficient on the Board experience variable is not only 
statistically significant but also economically significant. Banking experience of 
supervisory directors, which is associated with a deep understanding of regulatory 
issues and banking activity specificities and complexity, has a positive and 
economically important effect on the performance of banks during the crisis. This 
finding confirms the recent frequently heard claim for having more financial/banking 
experts on the boards. A better understanding of banking activity helps supervisory 
directors to oversee management. Furthermore, supervisory directors with banking 
experience provide valuable advice to management.  
In relation to the education of supervisory directors, the coefficient on the Board 
education variable is not statistically significant. So, we do not find support for 
hypothesis H5 that supervisory directors with a higher number of qualifications improve 
the performance of banks.  
With regard to gender diversity, the estimated coefficient on the Women variable 
is positive and statistically significant. Thus, we find support for hypothesis H6.1 that 
female supervisory directors improve the performance of banks during the financial 
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crisis, which is in accordance with Kristof (2009), Morris (2009) and Treanor (2011) 
that the lack of women on boards of banks contributed to their poor performance. Thus, 
an increased percentage of women as supervisory directors increased the performance 
of banks. 
With regard to nationality diversity, the estimated coefficient on the 
Nationality_mix variable is positive but not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Thus, concerning hypothesis H6.2 we do not find evidence that board nationality 
diversity increases the performance of banks. So, the predominantly national activity 
focus of many banks in our sample makes local knowledge fundamental, offsetting the 
advantages relating to nationality diversity.  
Further, regarding diversity, the estimated coefficient on the Age diversity 
variable is positive and statistically significant which is consistent with hypothesis H6.3. 
Thus, age diversity of supervisory directors improves bank performance during the 
financial crisis.  
Concerning the busy supervisory directors, hypothesis H7, the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on the Board busyness variable indicates, as 
expected, that supervisory directors holding multiple directorships decrease the 
performance of banks. Thus, our finding provides support for the Busyness Hypothesis. 
Contrary to our expectation, the coefficient on the Board activity variable is 
negative, but statistically insignificant. Therefore, the number of meetings exhibits no 
significant impact on bank performance and so, hypothesis H8 is not confirmed. 
The estimated coefficients on the control variables offer some further interesting 
insights. As in Beltratti and Stulz (2012) banks that perform better in 2006 have worse 
returns during the crisis or, in other words, the better-performing banks in the crisis had 
lower returns immediately before the crisis. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
banks that suffered the most in the crisis seemed to have policies that the market 
favoured before the crisis and/or that these were engaging in riskier activities. On the 
contrary, the size of the bank has no impact on its performance. 
When a financial crisis occurs, we would expect banks with more capital to 
perform better. We find that this is the case. The statistically significant positive 
coefficient on the Capital variable indicates that highly capitalised banks perform better 
during the crisis as in previous studies (e.g., Pathan and Faff, 2013). Most conservative 
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banks in their capital structure report higher stock returns. Therefore, the better-
performing banks had less leverage before the crisis. An explanation for this finding is 
that a bank with more capital has a cushion to absorb adverse shocks. Also, the banks 
most valued by the market relative to their book value exhibited better performance. 
The market valuation of the banks and, therefore, the market’s growth expectations are 
positively associated with performance during the crisis. Our result is consistent with 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), which report a negative relation between the book-to-
market ratio and the crisis returns. Consistent with Erkens et al. (2012) our analysis 
finds that institutional ownership is associated with worse stock returns during the 
crisis. Finally, the statistically significant positive coefficient on the CG committee 
variable demonstrates that banks with a corporate governance committee perform better 
during the crisis. A potential explanation for this finding is that such banks are able to 
better periodically review and reassess the adequacy of their governance to 
environmental circumstances and, more timely, recommend any changes. So, these 
banks are adept at introducing changes in their governance, having greater flexibility 
and responsiveness. Finally, we note that we find similar results when we use the 
natural logarithm of assets as a proxy for bank size. 
Table 2.5 presents the results when we use an aggregate governance index instead 
of individual board characteristics.  
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Table 2.5 – Relationship between bank performance and governance index 
The table reports the WLS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis on governance 
index, which measures governance quality. 
 (1) 
Governance index 36.56*** 
(0.000) 
2006 performance -4.09* 
(0.070) 
Bank size -13.50 
(0.773) 
Capital 42.10*** 
(0.004) 
MBR 0.96*** 
(0.005) 
Institutional ownership -0.71 
(0.496) 
CG committee 99.99*** 
(0.000) 
Country dummies Yes 
N 54 
Adj-R2 0.91 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 2.1 for the 
definition of each variable. 
 
 
Table 2.5 shows that governance quality according to corporate governance codes 
and best practices recommendations, measured by the governance index, impacts 
positively and very significantly on bank performance during the crisis. 
 
 
2.5 Additional analysis and robustness tests 
 
In this section we present additional analysis, by considering the impact country-
level governance on the performance of banks and we also perform robustness tests. 
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2.5.1 Bank performance and country-level governance  
 
Primarily we focus on the role of corporate boards features on bank performance. 
Additionally, the international corporate governance literature suggests that another 
important dimension of corporate governance is the external governance mechanism in 
a country (Denis and McConnell, 2003), mainly the legal institutions that protect 
shareholder rights, both in terms of the quality of a country’s legal institutions and its 
laws protecting shareholder rights, and creditor rights (La Porta et al., 1998). Since our 
primary analysis includes country dummies to control for country-specific factors, it 
does not address how country-level governance influenced the performance of banks 
during the crisis. So, we explore the influence of country-level governance on bank 
performance. As proxy for the quality of legal institutions we use the governance 
indicators compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2009) for six dimensions of governance: (1) 
voice and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of violence, (3) government 
effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption and, 
following Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Erkens et al. (2012), we consider the simple 
average of the six governance indicators for each country. We call this index 
Institutions and a higher value of the index indicates a better institutional environment. 
We measure the laws protecting shareholder rights using the updated antidirector rights 
index (ADRI) compiled by Spamann (2010).30 A higher value means better shareholder 
rights. Finally, to assess the impact of creditor rights protection in each country, we use 
the Djankov et al. (2007) creditor rights index, which we call Creditor rights, which 
follows that constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) with minor differences. The index 
varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Like Erkens et al. (2012) we use the legal institutions variable of Kaufmann et al. (2009) and the antidirector 
index of Spamann (2010) because we want to utilise an index measured closest to the beginning of the 
financial crisis. 
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Our regression model is as follows: 
(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝐴𝐷𝑅𝐼)𝑖,𝑡−1 +   
          + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
          + 𝛽4(2006 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
          + 𝛽6(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽7(𝑀𝐵𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
          + 𝛽8(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑖,𝑡−1 +   
          + 𝛽9(𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                           (2.3) 
 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank, 𝑡 is the crisis time period, 𝑡 − 1 is the pre-crisis 
time period (2006 except if another year is indicated) and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the stacked vector of the dependent variable, the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank buy-
and-hold stock returns from July 2007 to December 2008. 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 is the simple 
average of six governance indicators: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability 
and absence of violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of 
law and (6) control of corruption, based on the 2006 index value in Kaufmann et al. 
(2009), 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝐼 is the corrected antidirector index of La Porta et al. (1998), based on the 
2005 index value in Spamann (2010) and 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 is the creditor rights index 
of Djankov et al. (2007), following that constructed by La Porta et al. (1998). 𝑀𝐵𝑅 is 
the market-to-book ratio.  
For a detailed definition of the variables please see sub-section 2.3.2 and 
Appendix 2.1. 
 
Table 2.6 reports the analysis on country-level governance variables. Panel A 
shows the values of the country-level governance variables. Panel B provides 
descriptive statistics for these variables. Panel C presents the results from the regression 
analysis. 
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Table 2.6 – Analysis on country-level governance variables 
Panel A: Country-level governance variables 
Country Institutions Antidirector rights Creditor rights 
Austria 1.58 4 3 
Belgium 1.35 2 2 
Cyprus 0.97 --- --- 
Denmark 1.82 4 3 
Finland  1.92 4 1 
France 1.21 5 0 
Germany 1.52 4 3 
Greece 0.66 3 1 
Ireland 1.55 4 1 
Italy 0.57 4 2 
Netherlands 1.62 4 2 
Norway 1.70 4 2 
Portugal 1.02 4 1 
Spain 0.92 6 3 
Sweden 1.71 4 2 
Switzerland 1.78 3 1 
UK 1.55 5 4 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of country-governance variables 
 # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
Institutions 72 1.26 1.43 0.44 1.92 0.57 
ADRI 70 4.14 4 0.95 6 2 
Creditor rights 70 1.90 2 1.02 4 0 
Note: Observations vary because of missing data. 
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Panel C: Regression of stock returns during the crisis on country-governance variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Institutions -55.75*** 
(0.008) 
--- --- -29.17 
(0.194) 
ADRI --- 27.12*** 
(0.002) 
---  23.85*** 
(0.010) 
Creditor rights --- --- -7.72 
(0.215) 
-6.85 
(0.259) 
2006 performance -3.61*** 
(0.000) 
-5.66*** 
(0.000) 
-2.91*** 
(0.000) 
-5.55*** 
(0.000) 
Bank size 23.11 
(0.300) 
-32.92 
(0.151) 
9.42 
(0.686) 
-7.97 
(0.755) 
Capital 12.83** 
(0.035) 
1.05 
(0.894) 
25.40*** 
(0.001) 
 5.22 
(0.554) 
MBR 0.20 
(0.180) 
-0.04 
(0.770) 
0.20 
(0.232) 
0.17 
(0.267) 
Institutional ownership -3.16*** 
(0.000) 
-4.03*** 
(0.000) 
-2.92*** 
(0.000) 
-3.31*** 
(0.000) 
CG committee 69.88*** 
(0.000) 
48.84*** 
(0.002) 
67.22*** 
(0.000) 
53.17*** 
(0.001) 
Country dummies No No No No 
N 66 64 64 64 
Adj-R2 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.85 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 2.1 for the 
definition of each variable. 
 
 
Columns (1) to (3) report the results on each of the country-level governance 
variables and the control variables.  
Column (4) presents our full model. Panel C shows that the coefficient on the 
Institutions variable is statistically insignificant, meaning that the quality of legal 
institutions does not affect the performance of banks during the financial crisis, as found 
by Erkens et al. (2012) in a dataset of financial firms. On the contrary, the coefficient on 
the ADRI variable is positive and statistically significant. So, laws protecting 
shareholders rights improve bank performance during the financial crisis. Differently, 
Erkens et al. (2012) and van Essen et al. (2013) do not find that antidirector rights have 
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beneficial impact, respectively, on the performance of financial firms and non-financial 
firms during the recent crisis. Finally, creditor rights protection has no impact on banks 
performance, unlike non-financial firms (van Essen et al., 2013). 
 
 
2.5.2 Using an alternative definition of the crisis period 
 
We investigate the robustness of our results using an alternative crisis period from 
January 2007 to September 2008 as Erkens et al. (2012). So, we re-run our model 
regression. Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 report the results of this analysis.  
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Table 2.7 – Relationship between bank performance and board characteristics using an alternative definition of the crisis period 
The table reports the WLS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis – January 2007 to September 2008 – on board characteristics. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Board 
independence 
-1.32*** 
(0.000) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.40** 
(0.021) 
Board size --- 
 
29.89** 
(0.039) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -22.97 
(0.481) 
Board size2 --- 
 
-0.64* 
(0.100) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.64 
(0.438) 
CEO duality --- 
 
--- -23.44* 
(0.065) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- 60.97*** 
(0.002) 
Board 
experience 
--- --- --- 9.70*** 
(0.000) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 7.17** 
(0.025) 
Board 
education 
--- --- --- --- 10.91 
(0.341) 
--- --- --- --- --- 28.74** 
(0.036) 
Women --- 
 
--- --- --- --- -4.99*** 
(0.004) 
--- --- --- --- 4.82** 
(0.028) 
Nationality_
mix 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 110.59*** 
(0.001) 
--- --- --- 30.02 
 (0.455) 
Age diversity --- 
 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 15.19*** 
(0.000) 
--- --- 9.30*  
(0.083) 
Board 
busyness 
--- 
 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- -21.05 
(0.337) 
--- -19.95 
(0.189) 
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Table 2.7 – Relationship between bank performance and board characteristics using an alternative definition of the crisis period 
(cont.) 
The table reports the WLS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis – January 2007 to September 2008 – on board characteristics. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Board 
activity 
--- 
 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -7.42* 
(0.081) 
0.40 
(0.900) 
2006 
performance 
-1.46* 
(0.100) 
-0.53 
(0.566) 
-0.30 
(0.791) 
-1.36 
(0.120) 
-0.46 
(0.720) 
-2.30* 
(0.086) 
-0.73 
(0.497) 
-1.37 
(0.113) 
0.13 
(0.910) 
-0.31 
(0.809) 
-1.13 
(0.238) 
Bank size 6.57 
(0.716) 
28.86 
(0.117) 
22.91 
(0.354) 
82.57*** 
(0.000) 
32.71 
(0.189) 
33.74 
(0.129) 
45.41** 
(0.042) 
-19.74 
(0.305) 
22.40 
(0.444) 
19.14 
(0.502) 
16.53 
(0.369) 
Capital 25.09*** 
(0.000) 
27.62*** 
(0.000) 
28.84*** 
(0.000) 
24.32*** 
(0.000) 
27.20*** 
(0.001) 
31.50*** 
(0.000) 
44.31*** 
(0.000) 
28.61*** 
(0.000) 
25.95*** 
(0.001) 
31.03*** 
(0.001) 
16.09*** 
(0.007) 
MBR 0.27** 
(0.032) 
0.50*** 
(0.001) 
0.41** 
(0.018) 
0.65 
(0.000)*** 
0.36** 
(0.041) 
0.50*** 
(0.004) 
0.71*** 
(0.001) 
0.26** 
(0.037) 
0.24 
(0.230) 
0.38* 
(0.051) 
0.09 
(0.562) 
Institutional 
ownership 
-2.14*** 
(0.000) 
-1.32*** 
(0.007) 
-1.19** 
(0.030) 
0.30 
(0.503) 
-0.98* 
(0.088) 
-1.57*** 
(0.004) 
0.06 
(0.921) 
-0.91** 
(0.023) 
-1.66** 
(0.037) 
-0.69 
(0.294) 
-0.64* 
(0.100) 
CG 
committee 
72.49*** 
(0.000) 
62.28*** 
(0.000) 
60.93*** 
(0.000) 
65.57*** 
(0.000) 
63.25*** 
(0.000) 
79.05*** 
(0.000) 
85.08*** 
(0.000) 
105.03*** 
(0.000) 
57.88*** 
(0.000) 
67.90*** 
(0.000) 
82.26*** 
(0.001) 
Country 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 66 66 66 66 66 66 64 66 66 55 54 
Adj-R2 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.99 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please 
refer to Appendix 2.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Regarding Table 2.7, we find that board independence, board experience, female 
supervisory directors (gender diversity), age diversity, bank capital, institutional 
ownership and the existence of a corporate governance committee maintain their impact 
on bank performance. 31  So, our main conclusions on the relation between bank 
performance during the crisis and board characteristics are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 2.4.  
 
 
Table 2.8 – Relationship between bank performance and governance index using 
an alternative definition of the crisis period 
The table reports the WLS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis – January 2007 to 
September 2008 – on governance index, which measures governance quality. 
 (1) 
Governance index 18.72*** 
(0.000) 
2006 performance -0.98 
(0.318) 
Bank size 1.28 
(0.950) 
Capital 34.29*** 
(0.000) 
MBR 0.45*** 
(0.003) 
Institutional ownership -0.51 
(0.275) 
CG committee 78.64*** 
(0.000) 
Country dummies Yes 
N 54 
Adj-R2 0.97 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 2.1 for the 
definition of each variable. 
                                                 
31 Regarding our main variables, we also note that now, board busyness has no impact on the performance 
of banks, contrary to the CEO duality and board education that have a positive impact. 
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Concerning Table 2.8, we also conclude that the quality of governance, measured 
by an index of governance, impacts positively on bank performance during the crisis. So, 
our conclusion is not sensitive to an alternative definition of the crisis period. 
 
 
2.5.3 Additional econometric issues 
 
Endogeneity is a common issue in governance studies that makes interpretation of 
the results difficult. As pointed out by Hermalin and Weisback (2003) the 
characteristics of the board and the performance of firms are endogenously, and not 
exogenously, determined. While this issue is less likely to be problematic in our 
analysis because the financial crisis is mostly an exogenous macroeconomic shock 
(Baek et al., 2004), we mitigate the endogeneity issue in some ways. First, we measure 
all the board variables at the end of 2006, just before the beginning of the crisis, whilst 
we measure performance during the crisis. Therefore, our empirical framework 
mitigates the endogeneity issue due to reverse causality as we regress bank crisis 
performance on (lagged) pre-crisis variables. Second, we examine board characteristics 
changes from 2005 to 2006. If boards of banks could have anticipated the crisis, it is 
expected that at least some board characteristics would have exhibited a drastic change. 
For example, boards could hire directors with more banking experience. Similarly, 
boards could increase their meeting frequency in order to deal with the looming crisis. 
However, the results in Table 2.9 show that there are no significant differences between 
2005 and 2006 regarding the characteristics of the board, none of them is significantly 
different between the two years, indicating that the financial crisis is an unexpected 
event to the board of directors of banks. 
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Table 2.9 – Univariate comparison of board characteristics between 2005 and 2006 
The table compares the characteristics of the board of banks in 2005 and 2006. 
Variables Mean 2005 Mean 2006 Test for Equality of Means 
(p-values) 
Board independence 42.808 41.449 0.78 
Board size 16.442 16.389 0.96 
CEO Duality 0.086 0.069 0.72 
Board experience 11.672 12.751 0.30 
Board education 1.435 1.486 0.67 
Women 11.359 10.872 0.80 
Nationality_mix 0.208 0.209 0.98 
Age diversity 7.525 7.485 0.93 
Board busyness 2.735 2.631 0.54 
Board activity 10.556 10.810 0.82 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. 
Please refer to Appendix 2.1 for the definition of each variable. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we test if, and how, different supervisory characteristics affect bank 
performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Using buy-and-hold stock return as a 
measure of bank performance, we find that the better-performing banks during the crisis 
had in 2006, less independent boards, boards with more banking experience and 
diversity (gender and age) and less busy supervisory directors. Also, such banks have 
lower returns in 2006, higher capital and market-to-book ratios, lower institutional 
ownership and possess a corporate governance committee. Our results are robust to an 
alternative definition of the crisis period as well as to the endogeneity issue.  
The findings in our study support the notion that the characteristics of boards are 
an important determinant of bank performance and provide a clear understanding as to 
why some banks were more affected by the crisis than others. Thus, bank managers and 
shareholers as well as policymakers, regulators and other public entities should benefit 
from the findings of our research. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 2.1 – Variables definitions 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Bank performance Buy-and-hold stock returns. Specifically, for each bank, the annual 
stock return is calculated as the natural logarithmic of the ratio of the 
stock price (adjusted), that is, 𝑙𝑛 (𝑃𝑖𝑡/𝑃𝑖𝑡−1). 
July 2007 to December 2008; 
alternatively, 
January 2007 to September 2008 
Datastream 
Board independence Percentage of independent directors, that is, the number of independent 
board directors on the board divided by board size. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Board size Total number of directors serving on the board of the bank. December 2006 BoardEx 
CEO duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Board experience Supervisory directors’ average years of experience in the banking 
sector. To track banking experience we examine each supervisory 
director’s biography as provided in the BoardEx database. First, we 
compute the number of years each supervisory director has worked in 
the banking sector and sum all these years. Second, we divide this total 
by the number of supervisory directors on the board of the bank. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Board education Average number of qualifications, that is, sum of the number of 
qualifications held by the supervisory directors divided by the total 
number of supervisory directors.  
All qualifications have a count of one. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Women Percentage of female supervisory directors on the board, that is, the 
number of woman supervisory directors divided by the total 
supervisory directors. Measures gender diversity. 
 
December 2006 BoardEx 
 Nationality_mix Proportion of supervisory directors from different countries. Measures 
nationality diversity. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Age diversity Standard deviation of supervisory directors’ age. Measures age 
diversity. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
 
Board busyness  Average number of board positions (number of directorships) held by 
supervisory directors. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
 
Board activity Annual number of board meetings. December 2006 Datastream 
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Appendix 2.1 – Variables definitions (cont.) 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
2006 performance Buy-and-hold stock returns. January 2006 to December 2006 Datastream 
Bank size Natural logarithm of the bank’s market capitalisation. December 2006 Datastream 
Capital Bank capital, computed as the ratio of total equity to total assets. December 2006 Datastream 
MBR  Market-to-book ratio, that is, the ratio of the market value of equity to 
the book value of equity.  
December 2006 Datastream  
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. December 2006 Thomson Financial 
CG committee A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has a corporate governance 
committee, 0 otherwise. 
December 2006 BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Governance index Index of the quality of governance. For each characteristic (except for 
board size and for CEO duality), a dummy variable is defined, which is 
equal to 1 if the bank has better than the mean quality governance for 
that characteristic and 0 otherwise. For board size a value of 1 is 
assigned if it ranges between 8 and 12 members and 0 otherwise. For 
CEO duality a value of 1 is assigned if the CEO is not the Chairman 
and 0 otherwise. Governance index is the sum of all dummy variables. 
A higher value means better quality of governance. 
December 2006 BoardEx; Annual 
Reports; Datastream 
Institutions The simple average of six governance indicators: (1) voice and 
accountability, (2) political stability, (3) government effectiveness, (4) 
regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption. 
2006 Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
ADRI Antidirector rights. The corrected antidirector index of La Porta et al. 
(1998), by Spamann (2010). 
2005 Spamann (2010) 
Creditor rights The index aggregating creditor rights by Djankov et al. (2007), 
following that constructed by La Porta et al. (1998). 
2004 Djankov et al. (2007) 
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3 DETERMINANTS OF EUROPEAN BANKS’ BAILOUTS FOLLOWING 
THE 2007-2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Abstract 
 
Extraordinary amounts of public funds and/or assistance were made available to 
banks since the onset of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Governments worldwide have 
launched a massive bailout package to support banks in distress.  
Using a probit model, we analyse the likelihood of bailouts for a sample of 72 
publicly listed European banks following the financial crisis.  
Our results lead us to conclude that the governance characteristics of banks, 
specifically the features of boards, bank risks, as well as bank-level and country-specific 
banking sector variables, used as control variables, explain the likelihood of bailouts in 
the European banking sector.  
Our study therefore suggests relevant policy implications, which might help 
supervisors, regulators and other public authorities in avoiding costly bailouts. 
Regarding our main variables, robust to numerous checks and additional tests, we find 
that board banking experience, longer directors’ tenure and less busy boards decrease 
the likelihood of banks participating in a bailout programme. Inversely, credit and 
liquidity risks increase the probability of banks being bailed out. Additionally, some 
bank-level and country-level control variables also have predictive power. We highlight 
that the indicator of financial freedom, a regulatory environment variable, is positively 
related to the likelihood of bailouts in the European banking sector. Accordingly, fewer 
limitations on banking freedom and greater openness of the banking sector have a 
harmful impact on the occurrence of bailouts. Finally, we note that board independence 
and the existence of a corporate governance committee have, respectively, a positive 
and negative influence on the probability of bailouts and their significance is unchanged 
in almost all robust and additional tests. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Banks, Financial Crisis, Risk, Bailouts.  
JEL classification: G01; G21; G34. 
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3.1 Introduction  
 
The global financial crisis, starting in 2007, generated numerous public 
interventions into banking systems. Given that the failure of many banks was imminent, 
governments all over the world enacted a variety of rescue plans to prevent wide scale 
financial collapse. 32  Among the many means of government intervention were: 
(1) direct equity injections, providing liquidity support to banks, (2) government 
guaranteed debt issuance programmes and the issuance of guarantees to reassure 
depositors and (3) purchases of distressed assets by the government or, more generally, 
the provision of mechanisms to relieve financial institutions from impaired or “toxic” 
assets (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2010; Grossman and Woll, 2014).  
Most of the government bailout programmes were a mix of distinct means of 
government interventions. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the United 
States (US) was a mix of equity injections and distressed asset purchases, while most of 
the European bailout programmes combined government guaranteed debt issuance 
programmes with direct equity injections (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2010). More 
specifically, in the European Union (EU) most member states provided general 
guarantees for the whole banking system as well as support for the weakest banks, 
through guarantees on bank liabilities, capital injections, impaired asset relief and 
funding support. State aid to the banking system in each member state had to be notified 
to – and approved by – the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Competition, which aims to ensure that the measures do not distort competition. Since 
October 2008 hundreds of decisions authorising State aid measures were taken. The 
bulk of this aid represented guarantees on liabilities, with recapitalisations being the 
second most used support instrument.33 However, member states have not actually used 
(or implemented) all the approved aid. In contrast to TARP, most of the aid did not take 
the form of capital injections but rather guarantees,34 based on the idea that banks were 
not insolvent but simply suffering from a liquidity crisis. The expectation was that 
                                                 
32 Although, according to some observers this massive intervention was necessary to keep the banking 
sector from collapsing, for others, it constituted an unacceptable gift to private institutions that will help 
them maintain unreasonable investment decisions in the future (Grossman and Woll, 2014). 
33 For detailed information see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html 
34 Capital injections have been less common in the EU area than in the US. 
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guarantees and other liquidity-supporting measures would ensure that these would never 
result in actual losses for the states (Becht et al., 2011). Nevertheless, whenever it was 
clear that the banks were facing not only liquidity strains, but also potential risks to their 
solvency, several governments began to complement liability guarantee schemes with 
direct injections of capital into banks. For the EU countries, guarantees and other forms 
of liquidity support peaked in 2009. Support measures have commonly been 
accompanied by restrictions on dividend payments and on executive compensation, 
requirements for regular reporting on banking activity developments, government 
participation in the management of banks and restructuring requirements. 
When banks have very serious financial problems, solving them will imply, very 
often, the need for bailouts, which are extremely costly. The enormous magnitude of the 
global financial crisis, illustrated by the unparalleled volume of government support 
packages for the financial system, has highlighted the need for a clear identification of 
the determinants of bailouts in the banking sector. However, the literature lacks a deep 
and detailed analysis of the factors that determine bailouts in the context of the financial 
crisis.  
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. Unlike previous studies that focus on the 
likelihood of financial distress or bankruptcy, which raises the question of defining the 
requirements, not always consensual, for a firm to be considered in financial distress35/36 
or in bankruptcy, in this study, we focus on bailouts, that can be considered a specific 
status in the firm’s life, in the crisis context. So, our sample consists of banks which 
received government assistance, due to their critical financial distress status, in order to 
avoid the stage of bankruptcy. Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988, p. 1) describe bankruptcy 
as a “protracted process of decline” and a “downward spiral”. Consequently, 
substantial financial distress effects are incurred well prior to default (Elloumi and 
Gueyié, 2001). Fich and Slezak (2008) identify the various aspects of a firm’s 
governance structure that affect the probability and the predictability of bankruptcy 
once the firm has entered the state of financial distress. Overall, their findings indicate 
that governance characteristics are associated with the likelihood that financially 
                                                 
35 “Different countries have different accounting procedures and rules, and the definition of financial 
distress put forward by different scholars is not always the same” (Geng et al., 2015, p. 236). 
36 For example, according to Baldwin and Mason (1983, p. 505) “when a firm's business deteriorates to 
the point where it cannot meet its financial obligations, the firm is said to have entered the state of 
financial distress.” 
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distressed firms become bankrupt. Bailed-out banks are, by definition, in some sort of 
distress and exhibit high risk (Dam and Koetter, 2012). According to Miglani et al. 
(2015) few prior studies have examined the direct association between various corporate 
governance attributes and the financial distress of firms. Some exceptions are Elloumi 
and Gueyié (2001) for Canadian firms, Tsun-Siou and Yin-Hua (2004) for Taiwanese 
firms, Abdullah (2006) for Malaysian firms and Miglani et al. (2015) for Australian 
firms. Also, and even more clearly, the literature that analyses the determinants of the 
probability of bailouts of banks in the financial crisis, including governance 
mechanisms, either in a cross-country or in a single country context, is to the best of our 
knowledge almost non-existent.37 However, there is some literature that examines how 
bailout plans in the context of the financial crisis should be arranged (e.g., Bebchuk, 
2009; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). A proper rescue package avoids principal agent 
conflicts, while providing immediate liquidity to institutions which are in the state of 
distress (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2010). 
The board of directors is central to corporate governance in market economies 
(John and Senbet, 1998), serving as a firm’s internal monitoring mechanism (Walsh and 
Seward, 1990). Actually, being the “ultimate centre of control” of a firm (Mizruchi, 
1983), the board is responsible for its health and survival and thus, for the potential 
need of a bailout. “The ability of a board to recommend appropriate actions and to 
monitor the implementation of these recommendations is likely to determine the 
financial position of the firm and the outcome of a bankruptcy proceeding” (Robinson 
et al., 2012, p. 271), as well as the outcome of a financial distress process. Governments 
also rely on the effectiveness of the board of a bank when approving bailout packages, 
usually accompanied by the approval of reorganisation plans.  
Corporate boards of directors are responsible for different tasks and 
responsibilities. “Among these, and possibly the most critical is the obligation to 
maintain the firm's solvency” (Platt and Platt, 2012, p. 1139). The relevance of this role 
by a board of directors becomes clear following the financial crisis, which forced so 
many firms to request State support. Previous studies have acknowledged that the 
board’s functions of monitoring, advising and providing resources are essential to any 
                                                 
37 The exceptions are the studies of Adams (2012) and Carty and Weiss (2012) both analysing the US 
Federal Government bailout programmes. 
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firm’s survival but they do not devote attention to how board configuration influences 
the probability of bailouts of banks in the financial crisis. So, our first research question 
is whether bank board characteristics prior to the financial crisis affect the likelihood of 
bank bailouts following the crisis. 
The financial crisis has also raised questions related to risk measurement, risk 
growth and risk management within financial organisations in general and banks in 
particular. So, our second research question is whether the specific risks levels of 
banks – such as credit risk, liquidity risk and growth risk – before the crisis influence 
the probability of receiving bailouts following the crisis and, consequently, whether the 
presence of such risks has explanatory power in predicting bailouts. If this relationship 
exists then a proper and regular assessment/analysis of risk can mitigate or even avoid 
bank bailouts.  
Finally, our third research question is whether the pre-crisis size of banks, in order 
to analyse the well-known “too-big-to-fail” issue and the pre-crisis bank capital, an 
important indicator of bank health under the Basel framework, is related to the 
likelihood of banks being bailed out following the crisis. 
We examine the effect of the board of banks, specific risks levels of banks, size 
and capital of banks capital immediately prior to the financial crisis (2006) on the 
likelihood of bailouts following the crisis (2007 to 2009). Additionally, we include a set 
of control variables: bank-level and country-level control variables. We measure the 
variables before the crisis for two main reasons. First, since the effects of the crisis are 
overwhelming it is crucial to know if, and how, boards, specific risks levels, size and 
capital determine the probability of bank rescue from financial distress, in order to 
avoid bankruptcy, thereby influencing banking stability. For example, it is very useful 
to be aware whether a bank that has more experienced boards when entering the crisis 
will benefit from this greater experience following the crisis. Thus, we attempt to 
identify, at a bank level, early warning indicators of bank bailouts. Second, this 
approach mitigates endogeneity concerns because we use lagged independent variables 
to explain the probability of bailout, which makes it less likely that these variables are 
jointly determined. 
Our study contributes to the ongoing debate regarding appropriate regulatory 
reform in the banking system by shedding light on the extent to which bank-specific 
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corporate governance characteristics and in particular the features of the board of banks, 
which is one of the main governance mechanisms, specific risks levels of banks, bank 
size and bank capital have an impact on the likelihood of bailouts and, consequently, on 
the stability/fragility of the banking system. The severity of the financial crisis has 
produced strong pressure in favour of reforming financial regulation. So, by analysing 
the determinants of the likelihood of banks receiving State aid, our study helps public 
authorities in the process of introducting new recommendations, rules and practices, 
namely in their corporate governance codes, in order to prevent or mitigate a collapse in 
the future and, thus, promote stability. In short, our findings provide useful insights into 
the determinants of the banking sector health in Europe and, thereby, they are helpful in 
assisting banking supervisors and regulators in their task of guaranteeing a stable 
system.  
Our paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature in four ways. First, unlike 
previous studies that analyse firms’ probability of financial distress or bankruptcy in 
individual countries or groups of countries outside of Europe, we focus on the 
likelihood of bailout occurrence for banks in 17 European countries. We are not 
interested in financial distress per se nor in bankruptcy, but rather in financial distress 
that due to bailouts do not reach the stage of bankruptcy. So, we focus on a specific and 
different dimension of financial distress. Second, our paper adds to the literature that 
examines the influence of the features of the board on bank life as it provides a detailed 
analysis of the impact of the characteristics of the board on bailouts. Therefore, it may 
be useful in the process of (re)configuring boards and may assist directors in taking 
steps that will decrease the likelihood of State aid. Third, we also include in our study 
the examination of the role of the specific risks of banks in predicting bailouts, using 
accounting and market measures. So, risk indicators are explicitly incorporated in our 
model.  
In short, our findings show that different characteristics of the board of banks and 
types of risks help, in fact, to predict bailouts. Additionally, we find statistical 
significance for some control variables as is the case of concentration in the banking 
industry and financial freedom, a regulatory environment variable. 
Many banks had to be bailed out by their governments. It is believed that an 
analysis of the factors that led to the problems suffered by banks in Europe will be of 
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enormous benefit. First, the findings can help banking authorities in their duty of 
ensuring a stable financial system. Second, the early detection of potential problems is 
likely to help reduce the expected cost of State aid and to decrease the likelihood of the 
problem spreading more widely through the financial system due to banking 
interconnectedness. 
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 present the literature 
review and the hypotheses development, Section 3.3 describes the data and 
methodology, Section 3.4 provides the empirical results and Section 3.5 provides the 
conclusion. 
 
 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
In this section, we review the existing literature to help formulate our empirical 
hypotheses regarding the determinants of the likelihood of banks receiving bailouts 
following the financial crisis, that support our model. We point out that given the fact 
that the literature which focuses on bailouts in the context of the crisis is practically 
inexistent, we refer several times to the available literature relating to financial distress 
and bankruptcy as a basis for the formulation of our hypotheses. Our main explanatory 
variables can be aggregated in three groups of variables: governance, types of bank 
risks and other relevant characteristics of banks. In the first group we include the 
characteristics of the board, given that it is one of the main internal mechanisms of 
governance. In the second group we include three different types of bank risk: credit 
risk, liquidity risk and growth risk. Finally, in the third group we include bank size, in 
order to analyse the “too-big-to-fail” issue, and bank capital, which gained increased 
relevance in the context of the financial crisis. 
 
 
3.2.1 Board independence and bailouts 
 
Board composition critically influences the success of a firm (Hsu and Wu, 2014). 
Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) argue that corporate failure may occur when the 
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composition of a board is imbalanced or inadequate. So, incorrect representation of 
independent directors may affect a firm’s ability to survive. However, for Chaganti et 
al. (1985) the percentage of outsiders is not associated with the failure process. Also, 
others studies report that board independence is not related to bankruptcy, but when 
interacting with other governance attributes it has significant impact. Daily and Dalton 
(1994b) show that neither the number of independent directors nor the proportion of 
such directors are associated with bankruptcy, but the effect of the interaction between 
the percentage of independent directors and the joint Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO)/Chairman roles is strongly related to bankruptcy. Identically, for Lajili and 
Zéghal (2010) the proportion of independent directors is positively but not significantly 
associated with the likelihood of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the three-way interaction 
term between independence, cumulative blockholding and duality structure show a 
positive and significant relationship in their study. 
Concerning financial distress in banking firms, according to Simpson and Gleason 
(1999) the percentage of insiders on the board does not appear to impact future financial 
distress. Also, Abdullah (2006) does not support the contention that board independence 
is significant in explaining a non-financial firm’s distressed status. More recently, 
Brédart (2014a), Brédart (2014b) and Miglani et al. (2015) show that the impact of 
board independence on the occurrence of financial distress is not significant. On the 
contrary, Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) find that the proportion of outside directors is 
negatively associated with financial distress status. So, boards of financially distressed 
firms have significantly fewer outside members. Regarding bankruptcy, Daily and 
Dalton (1994a) show evidence that bankrupt firms have a higher proportion of affiliated 
directors. The structure-composition interaction term (the interaction between 
CEO/Chairman structure and the proportion of affiliated directors) is significant as well. 
Additionally, Platt and Platt (2012) comparing non-bankrupt firms with bankrupt firms 
conclude that non-bankrupt firms have a higher percentage of independent directors. 
However, more recently, Hsu and Wu (2014) examining the effect of board composition 
on the likelihood of corporate failure in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2010, 
demonstrate that the likelihood of corporate failure is positively related to the 
proportion of independent directors on boards. 
In the context of the financial crisis, Adams (2012) compares a set of selected 
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governance characteristics in 2007 between sample banks that received bailout money 
from the US government in 2008 and beginning of 2009 (up until April 10, 2009) and 
sample banks that survived until April, 2009 and did not receive bailout money and she 
concludes that banks receiving bailout money had boards that were more independent. 
According to Adams (2012), this suggests that board independence may not necessarily 
be beneficial for banks. Independent directors may not always have the required 
expertise to oversee complex banking firms. Regarding the advisory role of boards, the 
lack of firm-specific knowledge on the part of independent directors may compromise 
their effectiveness and, so, explaining the positive relationship between the incidence of 
bailouts and board independence. The above arguments lead us to the first hypothesis 
(H1): 
H1: Board independence increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout 
programme following the financial crisis. 
 
 
3.2.2 Board size and bailouts 
 
Board size has a number of implications for the functioning of the board 
(Chaganti et al., 1985). The results regarding the influence of board size on corporate 
survival are inconclusive.  
Jensen (1993) proposes that a small number of board members produces a more 
effective control mechanism. Larger boards may not be able to act effectively as a 
controlling body as they may have difficulties in coordinating their efforts, which leaves 
management relatively free to pursue their own goals (Chaganti et al., 1985). In 
addition, a smaller board may benefit from its ability to make decisions more quickly 
and avoid time-consuming debates.  
However, a smaller board may more easily be influenced by the CEO and, also, a 
larger board tends to offer a wider range of experience, skills and different views 
(Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Platt and Platt, 2012). Some studies support these 
arguments (Chaganti et al., 1985; Platt and Platt, 2012; Brédart, 2014b). Chaganti et al. 
(1985) find that non-failed retailing firms tend to have bigger boards than failed ones 
and Platt and Platt (2012) indicate that a smaller board is positively associated with 
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bankrupt firms. In the period leading up to bankruptcy declaration, declining firms 
experience a decrease in board size (Gales and Kesner, 1994). Also, Brédart (2014b) 
shows a negative association between board size and financial distress. Additionally, for 
Brédart (2014a) the hypothesis which suggests that the board size has a negative impact 
on financial distress probability is partially supported by his model. 
In contrast, other studies contradict this evidence. For Simpson and Gleason 
(1999) the number of directors on the board does not appear to impact future financial 
distress and Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) report that there is no significant difference 
between the board size of the financially distressed and healthy firms. Additionally, 
Lajili and Zéghal (2010) and Darrat et al. (2014) report that board size is not 
significantly associated with the likelihood of bankruptcy. Moreover, Darrat et al. 
(2014) note that the interaction between board size and the complexity dummy variable 
is significantly negative.  
Some other studies support the advantages of smaller boards (Fich and Slezak, 
2008; Adams, 2012; Salloum and Azoury, 2012). Fich and Slezak (2008) contend that 
distressed firms with smaller boards are more likely to avoid bankruptcy, meaning that 
board size is significantly positively related to the probability of bankruptcy. Also, 
according to Salloum and Azoury (2012) board size and financial distress are positively 
correlated. In the financial crisis, Adams (2012) compares banks that received TARP 
money in 2008 and 2009 to those that did not and concludes that banks with TARP 
funds have larger boards. The second hypothesis (H2) is then stated as follows: 
H2: Board size increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme 
following the financial crisis. 
 
 
3.2.3 CEO duality and bailouts 
 
The global financial crisis raises many governance issues regarding the role and 
responsibilities of board members. Simultaneously, CEO duality has come under 
renewed scrutiny because of the perceived loss of board vigilance and resultant abuse of 
power. Therefore, the financial crisis presents a unique opportunity to study the 
consequences of CEO duality, which are more likely to be observable in this context 
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characterised by perceived extremes of risk taking and large-scale organisational 
bailouts or even failure, than in “normal” times. Carty and Weiss (2012) investigate 
whether CEO duality is associated with the receipt of bailout funds by publicly traded 
banks in the US and they do not find evidence that banks with a dual CEO corporate 
governance structure are more likely to participate in the Federal Government’s bailout 
programmes. Consistent with this view, other studies do not find a significant 
association between duality and the probability of financial distress (Elloumi and 
Gueyié, 2001; Abdullah, 2006; Miglani et al., 2015). Similarly, in the US context and 
for the period from mid-2007 to 2009, Brédart (2014b) reports that the relationship 
between CEO duality and financial distress is not significant. In another study, Brédart 
(2014a) divides the referred period into two sub-periods: before 15 September 2008 and 
after 15 September 2008, which correspond to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. For the 
first sub-period, the impact of CEO duality on financial distress probability is negative 
and significant, whereas for the second sub-period the impact is positive but not 
significant. The lack of significant results in relation to the CEO duality variable raises 
concerns about the efficacy of separating the positions of CEO and Chairman on 
financial distress probability. The absence of predictive power of the CEO duality 
variable indicates that there is no difference regarding this variable between healthy and 
financially distressed firms. Previously, Daily and Dalton (1994b) have evidenced that 
bankrupt firms are not more likely to be associated with the joint CEO/board structures 
but firms that are simultaneously characterised by joint CEO/Chairman structures and 
lower proportions of independent directors are associated with bankruptcy. 
Additionally, Chaganti et al. (1985) have found no difference in the incidence of CEO 
duality, in each of the 5 years preceding failure, for failed as compared to non-failed 
retailing firms. In the same way Lajili and Zéghal (2010) note that the duality structure 
is not a significant governance variable that affects the likelihood of bankruptcy, but 
when combined with board independence and cumulative blockholding the impact is 
positively significant. 
On the contrary, for Simpson and Gleason (1999) the combination of CEO and 
the Chairman of the board into one position reduces the probability of financial distress 
in banks. So, banks where the same person is both the CEO and Chairman of the board 
have a lower probability of financial distress. In other words, combining the functions 
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of CEO and Chairman is beneficial to the firm’s survival. However, it has been 
repeatedly emphasised that boards are more effective when one person does not 
simultaneously occupy the positions of CEO and Chairman. Lorsch and MacIver (1989, 
p. 185) specifically suggest that “providing a leader [of the board] separate from the 
CEO could significantly help directors prevent crises, as well as to act swiftly when one 
occurs.” Evidence by Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) supports this idea as they report 
that dominant CEOs are more likely to be associated with firm bankruptcy. Also, other 
studies report that this duality is more prevalent in bankrupt firms (e.g., Daily and 
Dalton, 1994a; Darrat et al., 2014). Daily and Dalton (1994a) and Darrat et al. (2014), 
for example, find that firms with the CEO serving simultaneously as Chairman of the 
board are more likely to go bankrupt than are survivor firms. In addition, Daily and 
Dalton (1994a) reach exactly the same conclusion relative to the interaction between 
CEO duality and the percentage of affiliated directors. Based on the previous 
arguments, although not specific and directly related to bailouts, we predict the third 
hypothesis (H3) as follows: 
H3: Dual CEO corporate governance structure increases the likelihood of a bank 
participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis. 
 
 
3.2.4 Board experience and bailouts 
 
Operations of some firms are more technically demanding, thereby requiring 
specialist knowledge (Darrat et al., 2014) as is the case of banks. Industry expertise 
equips directors with a deeper understanding of the more complex financial instruments 
and transactions, industry dynamics and regulatory environment. Additionally, boards 
with financial experience have a better comprehension of the more opaque assets and 
complex activities, but financially experienced boards must also be given the right 
incentives to dissuade them from taking excessive risks (Becht et al., 2011). On the one 
hand, boards with significant financial expertise should moderate risk exposure at their 
financial institutions and consequently mitigate or even prevent losses. A more 
financially knowledgeable board can recognise risks that will not pay off or that are 
unsound for the financial stability of the bank and can advise managers on avoiding 
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such risks. On the other hand, financial experts on the board might recognise the 
government guarantee offered to banks and, consequently, be encouraged to pursue 
more risk-taking activities.38 
Concerning the financial crisis we expect that financial/banking experience plays 
a key role. An analysis of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch prior to their collapse 
shows that their boards of directors lacked sufficient financial expertise (Fernandes and 
Fich, 2013). Hau and Thum (2009) find evidence that the lack of financial experience of 
board members in German banks was strongly positively related to losses by the banks. 
In a sample of banks bailed out under the TARP, Fernandes and Fich (2013) show that 
the probability of a bailout decreases as experience increases. Also, bailout funds as a 
fraction of bank assets decrease as banking experience increases. Overall, the results 
indicate that banks with banking experts on their boards are less likely to be bailed out. 
So, the banking experience of boards is expected to equally be of great relevance 
concerning the probability of bailouts of banks in Europe, providing them monitoring 
and advisory advantages. The fourth hypothesis (H4) is then stated as follows: 
H4: Supervisory directors’ banking experience decreases the likelihood of a bank 
participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis. 
 
 
3.2.5 Director tenure and bailouts 
 
The question of dealing with the length of service period or tenure should directly 
impact the way firms are governed (Lajili and Zéghal, 2010). Short tenure directors and 
long tenure directors do not have the same knowledge of the firm (Salloum and Azoury, 
2012). Boards with low tenure lack internal knowledge of the firm and industry specific 
issues and thus, are not as effective in decision making as boards with longer tenure 
(Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011). On the other hand, Katz (1982) find that extended 
tenure decreases intra-group communication and isolates groups from key information 
sources. Furthermore, extended tenure may magnify agency problems between insiders 
and outsiders (McNulty et al., 2013).  
                                                 
38 “While policy circles have discussed the impact of independent directors with little financial experience 
(…) a dark side to expertise may be further alignment with risk-taking incentives” (Mehran et al., 2011, 
p. 10). 
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However, Vance (1983) contends that forcing directors to retire leads to a waste 
of talent and experience. By being allowed to serve more time on the board, supervisory 
directors could gain more intrinsic and precious knowledge about the firm’s business 
environment, products and markets, as well as its financial position and growth 
strategies (Lajili and Zéghal, 2010). Also, long director tenure enables greater 
experience with the firm's strategies and policies. Effective monitoring managerial 
behaviour requires good knowledge of the firm and short tenured directors may not 
have sufficient firm-specific knowledge to control managers. This firm-specific 
knowledge obtained over time helps reduce information asymmetry between the board 
and management (Kim et al., 2014). Additionally, boards with low tenure are more 
likely to engage in fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley, 1996), suggesting that at low 
levels of tenure boards are more likely to acquiesce to management (Muller-Kahle and 
Lewellyn, 2011). The results of the study by Lajili and Zéghal (2010) indicate that 
independent directors’ tenure on the board of the financially distressed firms is 
generally lower than independent directors’ tenure in financially healthy firms. On the 
contrary, Berberich and Niu (2011) find that long-serving directors are more likely to be 
associated with governance problems39 at the firms they oversee. However, for Salloum 
and Azoury (2012) it is equally probable (or improbable) that short-serving directors 
will be associated with financially distressed family business firms.  
In the context of the subprime lending, and using a sample of financial firms over 
the period 1997-2005, Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) find that the board 
configuration of the financial institutions that engaged in subprime lending were 
significantly different from those that did not. Specifically, subprime lenders had less 
board tenure. Hence, board tenure is negatively related to the decision to specialise in 
subprime lending. 
Effective corporate governance in banking firms should include monitors with the 
ability to identify and reverse undesirable bank-specific conditions and advisers that, 
knowing the bank's particularities in great detail, enable better decision-making. 
Considering the special nature of banks, by extending the tenure on the boards, 
                                                 
39 For Berberich and Niu (2011, p. 3) “A “governance problem” refers to a situation where a director has 
served on the board of a company that has suffered a corporate bankruptcy, major litigation or 
regulatory infraction, major accounting restatement, or other similarly major corporate scandal.” 
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supervisory directors are in a better position to effectively monitor, detect and control 
opportunistic managerial behaviour in a timely manner, as well as to provide valuable 
and appropriate advice, thus potentially avoiding bailouts of banks. Supervisory 
directors with relatively short tenure on the board would be unable to detect signs of the 
severity of the problems, as in the pre-crisis period, and respond in a timely manner to 
problems arising from the activities of the bank on whose board they serve, making it 
more likely to be bailed out. Therefore, we formulate the fifth hypothesis (H5) as 
follows: 
H5: The longer the supervisory directors have served on the board, the less the 
likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis. 
 
 
3.2.6 Board busyness and bailouts 
 
More recent theoretical and empirical research highlights the importance of busy 
directors for the board process. Nevertheless, there is compelling theory and evidence to 
support competing positions on the governance impact of busy directors. 
The first perspective, referred to as the Reputational Hypothesis, originates from 
the resource dependence theory literature. It reflects the view that busy directors are 
preferred due to their superior ability as they are familiar with different managerial 
styles and business strategies. Also, busy directors bring a useful network and business 
contacts.  
The second view of the role of busy directors comes from the agency theory 
literature and is called Busyness Hypothesis. It asserts that serving on multiple boards 
overcommits a director, which results in the director becoming too busy to adequately 
monitor management or, otherwise, shirking their governance responsibilities. The point 
behind the problem of busy directors is that, the busier a director is, the less effort 
he/she devotes to each of his/her tasks. So, multiple board appointments can adversely 
affect a board’s decision-making effectiveness. However, according to the Reputational 
Hypothesis the directors who are considered “busy” or “extremely busy” are chosen to 
be on so many boards precisely because of their high ability, which serves to offset the 
effect of their insufficient time.  
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In accordance with the Busyness Hypothesis, Beasley (1996) finds that as the 
number of outside directorships in other firms held by outside directors decreases, the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases. Forbes and Milliken (1999) argue that 
effort level is an important determinant of the effectiveness of boards as decision-
making groups and Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) provide evidence that effort 
levels by board members decrease when directors serve on several boards. Thus, busy 
directors will not be able to devote sufficient effort to any one board, which provides 
support for the Busyness Hypothesis. Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) show that the 
likelihood of financial distress increases as outside directors hold more directorships. 
This result is consistent with the view that additional directorships held by outside 
directors distract these directors from their monitoring responsibilities, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of financial distress. In the same way, Berberich and Niu 
(2011) document a positive relationship between director busyness and the likelihood of 
encountering governance problems, which suggests that holding too many board 
appointments has a detrimental effect on corporate governance. Further, Muller-Kahle 
and Lewellyn (2011) find a positive relationship between busy outside directors and 
subprime lending. Thus, subprime lenders had boards that were busier. Decisions by 
financial institutions to engage heavily in subprime lending may have arisen from the 
board being busy with the tasks of others firms, consequently lacking time and 
motivation to put in the effort required to provide significant and proper strategic 
guidance. “Thus, firms with busy boards are more likely to suffer from ineffective group 
decision making that could lead to financial firms choosing to take part in subprime 
lending” (Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011, p. 448) and, thereby, to participate in a 
bailout programme. In accordance with previous studies we expect to confirm the 
Busyness Hypothesis. Accordingly, we state the sixth hypothesis (H6) as follows: 
H6: Busier supervisory directors on the board increase the likelihood of a bank 
participating in a bailout programme. 
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3.2.7 Bank specific risks and bailouts 
 
The financial crisis has led to a further growing awareness and need for 
appropriate risk analysis in its different components. In quantitative risk management, 
the focus lies on how to enhance the measurement and management of specific risks 
such as liquidity risk, credit risk and market risk (Aebi et al., 2012). Also, the constant 
evaluation of the levels of risk is of extreme importance. In spite of the increasing 
emphasis on risk analysis, many financial institutions are still using reactive rather than 
proactive methods of risk monitoring and detection (Sabato, 2010).  
Bank soundness can be affected by different sources of risk, such as credit risk 
and liquidity risk (Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011) and so we examine whether, and how, 
various bank specific risks affect the likelihood of being bailed out. If there is a 
relationship, then regular monitoring of risk and early detection of related potential 
problems may help to prevent/mitigate government assistance. In order to capture bank 
specific risks, (i.e. credit risk, liquidity risk and growth risk of the equity markets), 
indicators from the balance sheets of banks and from the market are used.  
The deterioration in the quality of banks’ loan portfolio has been at the centre of 
episodes of costly banking system distress and economic crises in both developing and 
advanced economies, and the 2008 global financial crisis is no exception (Nkusu, 
2011). Also, one of the main reasons often cited as being at the root of the Asian 
financial crisis is that the financial sector was not properly supervised and regulated, 
with the result that banking institutions accumulated large amounts of non-performing 
loans (NPLs), not provided for in capital and reserves (Rahman et al., 2004). Most 
troubled banks have problems in their loan portfolio. Thus, bad loans were, in fact, a 
major problem for banks in Asia. In addition, the financial crises of 1997 and 1998 
revealed some weaknesses in the systems for monitoring the credit risk (Wanke et al., 
2015). Since loans exhibit the highest default rates, the asset quality of a bank will 
decline when there is an increasing number of NPLs. With worsening loan quality, 
more NPLs will have to be written off the books when they are declared worthless by 
the bank (Rahman et al., 2004). Stressing the key role non-performing plays in banking 
crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) suggest that a large increase in NPLs could seen 
as marking the onset of a crisis. Similarly, for Davis and Karim (2008) a symptom of 
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banking crises is increased credit risk or the probability that a borrower will default, 
converting an asset into a “bad” or non-performing loan. “Although banks enjoy 
advantages in screening and monitoring borrowers, both of which reduce credit risk, 
the high levels of NPLs associated with crises indicate risk assessment by banks 
deteriorates during pre-crisis periods” (Davis and Karim, 2008, p. 93). Cipollini and 
Fiordelisi (2012) find that a higher proportion of NPLs increases the probability of 
observed distressed Shareholder Value Ratio. Similarly, Mayes and Stremmel (2012) 
show that NPLs positively influence the likelihood of bank distress. Also, Dam and 
Koetter (2012) show that credit risk is associated with a higher expected bailout 
probability. Thus, the seventh hypothesis and the first related to bank specific risks 
(H7.1) is the stated as follows: 
H7.1: Credit risk increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme. 
 
Banks need liquidity to meet deposit withdrawals and satisfy customer loan 
demand. Liquidity risk at banks can be defined as the likelihood that the demand for 
cash by bank customers exceeds the bank’s ready supply of cash (DeYoung and Jang, 
2016). Liquidity risk arises from the inability of a bank to accommodate decreases in 
liabilities or to fund increases in assets (Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012). 
Faced with liquidity risk, a bank may be forced to borrow emergency funds at an 
excessive cost to cover its immediate cash needs, hence reducing its earnings (Rahman 
et al., 2004). Banks need to have sufficient liquidity assets to avoid incurring a high 
liquidity risk. This ensures that immediate funds will be available at the lowest cost. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) “liquidity is the 
ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, 
without incurring unacceptable losses” (BCBS, 2008, p. 1). High cash holding can 
reduce liquidity risk for banks and can help them survive (Berger and Bouwman, 2013) 
however, they can also be associated with agency problems (Jensen, 1986). Concerning 
non-financial firms Elloumi and Gueyié (2001) show that financially distressed firms 
have significantly less liquidity than healthy firms. Also, Mayes and Stremmel (2012), 
using as measure of liquidity the loan-to-deposit ratio find that the lack of liquidity 
influences positively the likelihood of bank distress. Additionally, to control for 
liquidity risk Dam and Koetter (2012) use the sum of cash and overnight interbank 
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assets to total assets and conclude that liquidity is not significant in explaining the 
probability of bank bailouts during 1995-2006. Betz et al. (2014), using two different 
indicators for liquidity, find that a high dependency on short-term borrowing increases 
the probability of bank distress, while deposits to funding ratio is not statistically 
significant at 10% level.  
In the context of the financial crisis and in accordance with the BCBS, which 
emphasises the importance of liquidity to the functioning of financial markets and the 
banking sector, as well as the need for adequate risk management (BCBS, 2008), the 
seventh hypothesis and the second related to bank specific risks (H7.2) is stated as 
follows: 
H7.2: Liquidity risk increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout 
programme. 
 
Finally, we analyse the growth risk measured by market-to-book ratio. Since book 
value does not include future growth potential but market value does, the ratio of the 
market value to the book value is expected to be higher for a firm that is perceived to 
have many growth opportunities (Ramezani et al., 2002). Therefore, the deviation of 
market value from book value depends on the expected growth opportunities and so, it 
reflects investor expectations regarding the future growth of the firm. Market-to-book 
ratio is considered a good proxy for the presence of profitable growth options 
(Ramezani et al., 2002), measuring the market‘s perception of the firm (Rose and 
Thomsen, 2004). Therefore, it may also be used as a proxy for growth risk. Higher 
market-to-book ratios may signal aggressive and riskier strategies to support a higher 
market evaluation of the growth opportunities materialised, for example, in the 
loosening of lending and other banking activity standards. Accordingly, the seventh 
hypothesis and the third related to bank specific risks (H7.3) is stated as follows: 
H7.3: Growth risk increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout 
programme. 
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3.2.8 Bank size and bailouts 
 
Large banks have received generous sums of government money and other 
support measures in order to keep them afloat, given their looming insolvency. “The 
argument for such policy intervention is that some banks are of a size (and with so 
important interconnections with other banks) that gives them system-wide relevance” 
(Rötheli, 2010, p. 123). The failure of a large financial institution will have 
ramifications for other financial institutions and therefore the risk to the economy would 
be enormous (Helwege, 2010). For Panageas (2010) governments sponsored bailouts 
given that some of the financial institutions were considered “too-big-to-fail”.  
The unprecedented bailouts of large and systemically important banks in the US 
and Europe during the ongoing global financial crisis show the relevance of “too-big-to-
fail” (Völz and Wedow, 2011). Bailouts are a form of State intervention in the economy 
with relevant redistributive effects, and economists have alerted against the moral 
hazard problem they create and their welfare reducing effects (Grossman and Woll, 
2014). On the one hand, public bailouts become necessary because the collapse of large 
banks can impose substantial costs on the real economy. On the other hand, government 
support of "too-big-to-fail" financial institutions during the crisis provided incontestable 
proof that these institutions benefit from large explicit and implicit public subsidies, 
including the expectation that they will receive similar public support during future 
emergencies (Wilmarth Jr., 2011). In this way, public bailouts can create moral hazard 
problems. Banks have an incentive to grow to a size that, in case of misfortune, ensures 
that they are saved (Stern and Feldman, 2004).  
Size and importance of individual banks seem to matter, as governments can 
allow individual banks to fail if they do not represent an important part of the national 
banking sector (Grossman and Woll, 2014). Fernandes and Fich (2013) find that the 
probability of a bank being bailed out increases as its size increases. This result is in 
accordance with the commonly held view that many banks were bailed out because they 
were deemed “too-big-to-fail” by regulators. Large banks are likely to play a greater 
role in a country´s economic performance and thus may be more likely to receive 
bailouts. Thus, the eighth hypothesis (H8) is formulated as follows: 
H8: Bank size increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme. 
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3.2.9 Bank capital and bailouts 
 
The financial crisis raises fundamental issues about the role of bank capital, 
especially from the standpoint of bank survival. Not surprisingly, public requirement for 
more bank capital tends to be greater after financial crises and reform proposals usually 
focus on how capital regulation should adapt to prevent future crises (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2013). Various proposals have been presented and approved as is the case of 
"Basel III", a set of reform measures developed by the BCBS following the 2007-2008 
financial crisis.  
Bank survival is central not only in strategic decisions made by banks, but also in 
decisions made by regulators worried about banking stability (Berger and Bouwman, 
2013). In the Basel framework bank capital is a main variable for ensuring healthy 
banks. Also, many theories suggest that capital improves a bank’s survival probability. 
On the one hand, bank capital serves as a cushion to absorb losses and shocks (Rahman 
et al., 2004; Repullo, 2004; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011). A higher level of capital acts 
as a buffer against financial losses, protecting a bank’s solvency, and is expected to 
decrease the probability of a bank failure (Rahman et al., 2004; Betz et al., 2014). On 
the other hand, bank capital has a direct positive effect on monitoring incentive, as well 
as reducing the probability of default (Mehran and Thakor, 2011).  
Cole and White (2012) use proxies for the CAMELS indicators 40  to explain 
banking failures in the recent financial crisis and they find that capital is one of the 
factors that explains bank failures during 2009. Berger et al. (2012) analyse the role of 
corporate governance on US commercial bank failures during the financial crisis and 
also find that larger amounts of capital decrease the probability of default. Finally, 
Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that having more capital increases the probability of 
survival of small banks at all times and of medium and large banks during banking 
crises. According with the arguments presented above, the ninth hypothesis (H9) is 
formulated as follows: 
H9: Bank capital level decreases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout 
programme. 
                                                 
40 CAMELS is an acronym for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and 
sensitivity to market risk that is used by bank supervisors. 
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3.3 Data and methodology 
 
In this section we first describe the sample and explain the process of collecting 
data in order to construct our dependent variable. Next, we discuss the variables and, 
finally, we present the empirical framework. 
 
 
3.3.1 Sample and data sources 
 
In our sample of 72 publicly listed European banks we are interested in the 
troubled banks, which received different types of State assistance (recapitalisation, 
guarantees or other aid) from their national government so as to avoid failure or 
dissolution. To identify such banks we use various sources of information.  
Our first source is the European Commission website, in which we run detailed 
searches on the individual banks (specifically, http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.
html). We combine this source with two other sources: the annual reports and other 
documents available on the bank’s official website. Additionally, we conduct keyword 
Google searches using a combination of: (1) the name of each bank in our sample, (2) 
the terms “bailout”, “bailed out”, “rescue”, “capital injection”, “recapitalisation”, 
“guarantee” or “aid” and (3) the words “government” or “State.” Based on all these 
searches, we create a bank bailout dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one 
reference to “bailout” for the particular bank during the interval 2007-2009.41 We are 
interested in whether a specific bank is bailed out, not in the total number of bailouts. 
More specifically, the distribution of the number of bailouts in each year is as follows: 
1 bailout in 2007, 20 bailouts in 2008 and 25 bailouts in 2009. There were 19 banks that 
were bailed out once, 12 banks that were bailed out twice and 1 bank that was bailed out 
three times. 
                                                 
41 The results of our study are unchanged over the period 2007-2011. All banks that received aid in 2010 
and 2011 had already received assistance in the previous period. 
  105 
Further, concerning independent and control variables, data has been extracted 
from several other sources: BoardEx, Datastream, Thomson Financial, annual reports, 
World Bank and Heritage Foundation websites.  
 
 
3.3.2 Variables description 
 
In this sub-section we characterise, in detail, all the variables used in our study: 
the dependent binary variable, the main explanatory variables and the control variables. 
Please see Appendix 3.1.  
 
 
3.3.2.1   Bailout variable 
 
A dichotomous qualitative dependent variable is used in this study, which we call 
Bank bailout. Bank bailout is a binary variable taking the value of one for a bailed-out 
bank and zero otherwise. 
 
 
3.3.2.2   Board characteristics variables 
 
Our variables of interest regarding the board of banks are: Board independence, 
Board size, CEO duality, Board experience, Director tenure and Board busyness. Board 
independence is defined as the percentage of independent directors. Board size is 
defined as the total number of directors on the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable 
with a value of one if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 
Board experience is measured as the average years of experience in the banking sector 
of the supervisory directors and Director tenure is measured as the average length of 
time, stated in years, that the supervisory directors have been on the board of the bank. 
Said differently, it is the average number of years that the supervisory directors have 
served on the board of the bank. Finally, Board busyness is measured as the average 
number of board positions (number of directorships) held by supervisory directors.  
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3.3.2.3   Risk variables 
 
We include a set of variables in order to capture various aspects of a bank’s 
vulnerability: Credit risk (or default risk), Liquidity risk and Growth risk. Information 
from the balance sheets of banks as well as the market is used to measure bank specific 
risks.  
Following the literature, we account for credit risk, which is directly linked to 
asset composition (or asset quality as defined in the CAMELS framework) (Simpson 
and Gleason, 1999; Rahman et al., 2004; Männasoo and Mayes, 2009; Berger et al., 
2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012). According to Rahman et al. (2004) and Dam and 
Koetter (2012), Credit risk is measured using the non-performing loan ratio, calculated 
as non-performing loans to total loans. A high ratio indicates a high probability of a 
bank being bailed out. Although some literature uses other measures as proxies for 
credit risk, we use the non-performing loan ratio, since it is more frequently used in the 
literature.42 
Liquidity risk reflects the probability that banks will be unable to satisfy the 
claims of depositors. Similarly to Mayes and Stremmel (2012), as proxy for Liquidity 
risk we use the loan-to-deposit ratio, this is, total loans divided by total deposits. A high 
ratio may indicate the lack of liquidity and possible repayment problems for sudden 
unforeseen obligations. We expect a positive sign for the Liquidity risk variable. 
Growth risk is measured by the market-to-book ratio, that is, the ratio of the 
market value to the equity book value. A higher ratio indicates a more favourable 
market perception and, thus, assessment of the growth options. Therefore, the likelihood 
of a bank being bailed out is lower. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 For a definition of non-performing loans see the document prepared by the Statistics Department 
International Monetary Fund, June 2005, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2005/05-
29.pdf 
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3.3.2.4   Other specific variables of banks: size and capital 
 
Large-scale collapses can impose substantial costs on the real economy, making a 
public bailout inevitable. Thus, large banks may be more likely to receive government 
support when confronted with financial distress. To capture the size of the bank, Bank 
size variable, we use the natural logarithm of market capitalisation. 
Additionally, following the literature, we measure bank capital, Capital variable, 
by the ratio of total equity to total assets. We expect that a higher ratio makes the bank 
more resilient to shocks (such a sudden decline in the value of bank assets), other things 
being equal.  
 
 
3.3.2.5   Control variables  
 
A set of control variables that help to explain the likelihood of bailouts are also 
included in our model: bank-level indicators, country-specific banking sector and 
macroeconomic environment indicators, supervisory and regulatory environment 
indicators and a corruption indicator. 
 
 
A. Bank-level indicators 
 
We consider stock returns from January 2006 to December 2006 (2006 
performance) to account for prior bank performance, institutional ownership 
(Institutional ownership) to control for ownership structure and the existence of a 
corporate governance committee (CG committee), which is represented by a dummy 
variable coded as one if the bank has a corporate governance committee and as zero 
otherwise. Institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors. Additionally, in an alternative version of our baseline model we 
account for the existence of a board audit committee (Audit committee), which is 
represented by a dummy variable coded as one if a separate audit committee is present 
in a particular bank and as zero otherwise. 
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B. Country-specific banking sector and macroeconomic environment indicators 
 
Evidence shows that country-level banking sector variables are important 
determinants of a firm’s policies, financial distress, bankruptcy and bailouts, although 
as regards bailouts the literature is far less abundant.  
First, we include Concentration as a control variable. Variables such as the 
concentration of the banking sector are proxies that can give indications on the 
economic importance of the sector and the potential influence of the sector’s lobby 
(Grossman and Woll, 2014). Economic theory provides conflicting predictions about 
the relationship between the concentration and the competitiveness of the banking 
industry and banking system fragility (Beck et al., 2006). Some theoretical arguments 
support the “concentration-stability” view that banking system concentration reduces 
fragility (Allen and Gale, 2000). Concentration enhances market power and increases 
profits. Higher profits provide a “buffer” against adverse shocks, decreasing the 
probability of bank distress. In contrast, alternative arguments support the 
“concentration-fragility” view that a more concentrated banking structure raises bank 
fragility and so, bank distress (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005). Caminal and Matutes (2002) 
show that less competition can lead to less credit rationing, larger loans and a higher 
probability of failure if loans are subject to multiplicative uncertainty. Also, De Nicoló 
et al. (2004) find that the probability of failure measure for the five largest banks in a 
country, viewed as an indicator of systemic risk, is positive and significantly associated 
with bank concentration (a five-bank concentration ratio), meaning that a more 
concentrated banking industry is more prone to bank fragility. In the same way, 
Poghosyan and Čihak (2011) show that banks operating in more concentrated banking 
sectors are more likely to experience bank distress relative to banks operating in less 
concentrated markets, using as measure of concentration the Herfindahl Index. 
Advocates of the “concentration-fragility” view also argue that policymakers are more 
concerned about bank failures when there are only a few banks. Concentration may 
reduce competition, increase the market power and political influence of financial 
conglomerates and cause instability of the financial system as banks use their influence 
to shape banking regulations and policies. Our Concentration variable is a measure of 
concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the 
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five largest banks in each country. 
Second, another relevant country-level banking sector variable relates to the 
degree of international integration. To control for this we include as variable the ratio of 
consolidated foreign claims to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the banks that are 
reporting to Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (Čihák et al., 2012), which we call 
IIBIS. We can, then, evaluate whether bailed out banks were from countries where the 
banking system was more exposed to the international environment. Additionally, in 
order to control for international exposure, and as alternative to the variable IIBIS, we 
also include the foreign presence in domestic banking markets as an additional control 
variable (Foreign). Recent decades have seen an unprecedented degree of globalisation, 
especially in financial services. Banking markets have become increasingly 
international on account of financial liberalisation and overall economic and financial 
integration (Claessens et al., 2001). In many countries, foreign bank presence in terms 
of numbers has increased dramatically between 1995 and 2009 (Claessens and van 
Horen, 2011). Banks have expanded internationally, namely, by establishing foreign 
subsidiaries and branches. The global financial crisis has highlighted that there can be 
risks associated with cross-border banking and foreign bank presence (Claessens and 
van Horen, 2011). In fact, since the onset of the global financial crisis, several papers 
have pointed out the risks of foreign banking for financial stability. Increasingly foreign 
bank presence may work as a channel of international shocks transmission, increasing 
the vulnerability of domestic banking markets to the international environment. As 
stated by Donald Kohn,43 former vice-president of the Federal Reserve, “One result of 
this financial integration is that the financial channels are growing in importance in the 
transmission of shocks between economies. (…) when liquidity conditions tighten in one 
country, globally active banks may attempt to pull liquidity from overseas affiliates, 
reducing the liquidity consequences at home but simultaneously transmitting the shock 
abroad.” As a measure of foreign bank presence, we consider the importance of foreign 
banks in terms of numbers and not in terms of assets. On the one hand, data on banking 
assets that are held by foreign banks is not available for all the countries of our sample, 
whereas, on the other hand, the number of foreign entrants matters rather than their 
                                                 
43   Speech by Donald Kohn at the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, Frankfurt, 
Germany, on June 26, 2008, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20080626a.htm 
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market share (Claessens et al., 2001). So, our measure of the degree of foreign 
participation in domestic banking markets, Foreign, which is a proxy of the level of 
international exposure/integration to foreign banks, is the ratio of the number of foreign 
owned banks to the number of the total banks in an economy. A foreign bank is defined 
as having at least 50% of its shares owned by foreigners. 
Third, as a macroeconomic environment control variable, similarly to Faccio et al. 
(2006), we include GDP per capita to control for differences in the level of economic 
development across countries. More specifically, our variable GDP per capita is the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita.  
Data on country-level variables is taken from the World Bank website. 
 
 
C. Supervisory and regulatory environment indicators 
 
Additionally, to control for supervisory and regulatory environment we include 
two variables: Official index and Financial freedom. 
The official supervisory powers index, Official index, measures the degree to 
which the country’s commercial bank supervisory agency has the authority to take 
specific actions. It comprises information on many features of official supervision, 
including elements such as the right of the supervisor to meet with the external auditors, 
demand information from them and take legal action against them for negligence and 
force a bank to change its internal organisational structure. The official supervisory 
powers index has a maximum value of 14 and a minimum value of 0, where higher 
numbers indicate greater power. Data on official supervisory powers was obtained from 
the third survey of bank regulation and supervision carried out by the World Bank, 
available at the World Bank website, and discussed in Barth et al. (2008). 
Financial freedom is an indicator of banking efficiency, as well as a measure of 
independence from government control and interference in the financial sector. It is a 
composite index covering if foreign banks are able to operate freely, the degree to 
which the government influences allocation of credit, how difficult it is to open 
domestic banks and other financial services firms, the extent to which the financial 
system is regulated, the presence of State-owned banks and whether banks are free to 
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provide insurance and securities services to customers. Thus, this aggregate financial 
freedom indicator, Financial Freedom, uses data from regulatory restrictions, entry 
restrictions and State ownership. Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on banking 
freedom and a greater openness of the banking system. On the one hand, fewer official 
impediments to bank operations and entry can stimulate efficiency and diversification 
that fosters stability. On the other hand, greater freedom and openness promotes greater 
international exposures which, during a crisis, can serve as a contagion channel. One 
source of instability in financial systems is the possibility of contagion, in which a small 
shock that initially affects one region or sector or even a few institutions, spreads from 
bank to bank throughout the rest of the system, and then affects the entire economy 
(Allen and Gale, 2003), as well as other economies (Eichengreen et al., 2012).  
 
 
D. Corruption indicator 
 
Finally, in order to control for differences in perceived corruption across 
countries, we include the variable freedom from corruption, called Freedom corruption. 
Higher values denote lower levels of corruption. Corruption deteriorates freedom by 
introducing insecurity and uncertainty into economic relationships and is a failure of 
integrity in the economic system. Freedom from corruption is expected to promote 
equitable treatment and greater regulatory efficiency. 
There is an overlap between some of the control variables, which are used for 
robustness purposes. Thus, we note these overlaps and we do not include them 
simultaneously in the regressions.  
 
 
3.3.3 Empirical framework 
 
In the proposed empirical model the dependent variable is binary (bailed out or 
not bailed out), so that it would be inappropriate to use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression (e.g., Maddala, 1983; Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2012). Thus, we estimate 
cross-sectional probit model regressions to determine the likelihood of bank bailouts.  
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Generally, since 𝑌𝑖  is a binomial variable, which assumes a value of 1 with 
probability 𝐹(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽) and a value of 0 with probability 1 − 𝐹(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽), the log-likelihood 
function is: 
ln 𝐿 = ∑{𝑌𝑖ln[𝐹(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽)] + (1 − 𝑌𝑖)ln[1 − 𝐹(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽)]}                           (3.1) 
 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ observation, 𝑋𝑖
′ is the vector of explanatory variables of 
observation 𝑖, 𝛽 is the vector of coefficients of the explanatory variables and 𝐹(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽) is 
the cumulative distribution function evaluated at 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽.  
 
The probit model assumes that 𝐹(. ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function thus, 
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽) = Φ(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽) = ∫
1
√2𝜋
𝑋𝑖
′𝛽
−∞
𝑒−0,5𝑡
2
𝑑𝑡                                    (3.2) 
 
More specifically, in our model the dependent variable 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 is a bailout 
indicator variable equal to one for banks that are bailed out at any time over the interval 
July 2007 to December 2009 and equal to zero otherwise. Thus, 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009] = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖𝑛 [2007,2009]      (3.3) 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                 
 
 
We assume that 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗  is an unobserved variable of the 
probability that bank 𝑖 received a bailout in the period between July 2007 and December 
2009 and is a function of the board of the bank, bank specific risks, bank size, bank 
capital and a set of control variables, 𝑋𝑖, so that: 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ + 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009]                            (3.4) 
 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  bank, 𝑋𝑖,2006
′  is the vector of explanatory variables of 
bank 𝑖  as of December 31, 2006, 𝛽  is the vector of coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009] is the error term. 
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Let 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]  be an observable variable that is equal to one if 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗ > 0  and zero if 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗ ≤ 0. Since 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗  is equal to 𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ + 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009] , the probability that 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009] > 0 is equal to the probability that 𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ + 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009] >
0 or, equivalently, the probability that 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009] > −𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ . Therefore, we can 
write the probability that 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2011] is equal to one as the probability that 
𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009] > −𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′  or that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009] = 1) = 1 −
 𝐹(−𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ ) = 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ ). The probability that 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009] is equal to 
zero is then 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ ) = 1 − 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ ).  
 
The log-likelihood function for this model is: 
ln 𝐿 = ∑{𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009] ln[𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ )] +    
         + (1 − 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009])ln[1 − 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ )]}              (3.5) 
 
The probit model is:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009] = 1) = 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ ) = ∫
1
√2𝜋
𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′
−∞
𝑒−0,5𝑡
2
𝑑𝑡     (3.6) 
 
Specifying Equation (3.4) then, 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,2006+ 𝛽3(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽4(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽5(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,2006 +  
        + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑖,2006 + 𝛽7(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖,2006 +  
        + 𝛽8(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖,2006 + 𝛽9( 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 )𝑖,2006 + 
        +  𝛽10(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,2006 + 𝛽11(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽12(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,2006 + 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009]                 (3.7) 
 
For a detailed definition of the variables please see sub-section 3.3.2 and 
Appendix 3.1. 
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When a binary model incorrectly assumes that error variances are the same for all 
observations (homocedasticity), the classical standard errors are wrong and (unlike OLS 
regression) the parameter estimates are inconsistent. Since, heteroscedasticity causes 
parameter estimates from probit (and logit) model to be inconsistent, it is a serious 
problem (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1984) that has to be taken into account. Thus, we 
examine the heteroscedasticity using the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test.44  Also, we 
estimate the model with robust variances-covariances.45 
 
 
3.4 Empirical results 
 
In this section we first present and analyse the descriptive statistics, the univariate 
tests of differences between bailed out and not bailed out banks and the Pearson 
correlation matrix. Then, we present and discuss the estimation results of the probit 
regressions and, finally, the predictive performance of the model. 
 
 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in 
our analysis. 
  
                                                 
44 We carry out the LM test for heteroscedasticity using the artificial regression method described in 
detail by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). We test the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity against the 
alternative of heteroscedasticity of the form: 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(2𝑍𝐼
′𝛾), where 𝛾 is an unknown parameter. 
45 So, the standard errors are robust to certain misspecification of the underlying distribution of the binary 
dependent variable. 
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of each variable by showing mean, median, standard deviation 
(Std. dev.), maximum (Max.) and minimum (Min.). 
Variable # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
Board independence (%) 72 41.449 44.097 28.729 95.454 0.000 
Board size (Nº) 72 16.389 15.000 5.700 31.000 6.000 
CEO duality 72 0.069 0.000 0.256 1.000 0.000 
Board experience (years) 72 12.751 10.778 6.509 35.064 3.000 
Director tenure (years) 72 5.286 4.900 1.741 11.700 1.100 
Board busyness (Nº) 72 2.631 2.375 1.011 5.750 1.100 
Credit risk (%) 57 2.127 1.080 3.993 28.920 0.080 
Liquidity risk (%) 68 177.439 157.400 148.217 1186.760 46.320 
Growth risk (%) 72 238.588 209.703 108.612 692.477 47.080 
Bank size (€ bil.) 72 22.727 11.410 29.588 160.442 0.220 
Capital (%) 72 5.480 5.244 2.705 14.672 1.792 
2006 performance (%) 72 25.072 20.836 19.611 93.981 -29.251 
Institutional ownership (%) 69 44.464 44.320 27.001 100.000 0.030 
CG committee 68 0.176 0.000 0.384 1.000 0.000 
Audit committee 69 0.812 1.000 0.394 1.000 0.000 
Concentration (%) 72 80.348 82.283 15.275 100.000 49.460 
IIBIS (%) 72 102.401 73.553 57.191 307.321 58.280 
Foreign (%) 72 22.847 13.000 22.324 90.000 1.000 
GDP per capita (US$) 72 38,304.91 36,472.07 10,794.59 72,959.73 19,820.43 
Official index 72 9.306 8.000 2.499 14.000 5.000 
Financial freedom 72 65.000 70.000 15.291 90.000 50.000 
Freedom corruption 72 73.139 75.000 16.733 97.000 43.000 
Note: Observations vary because of missing data.  
Please refer to Appendix 3.1 for the definition of each variable. 
 
 
As can be noted from Table 3.1, on average, 41.449% of the directors on the 
board are independent. The board has, on average, 16.389 directors, confirming the 
existing literature that banks have on average larger boards than non-financial firms, 
and a very small proportion of banks (6.9%) have a dual CEO corporate governance 
structure. Concerning board experience, director tenure and board busyness we find 
that, on average, supervisory directors have 12.751 years of experience in the banking 
sector, have served on the board 5.286 years and held 2.631 board positions. One aspect 
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relating to bank specific risks that stands out is, with the exception of the credit risk, the 
high dispersion. Bank size is, on average € 22.727 billion46 and the capital ratio is, on 
average, 5.48%, which is a low value comparatively to the limits of the different 
components of capital imposed in the Basel III framework.47 
Regarding bank-level control variables, the stock returns before the financial 
crisis (2006) are, on average 25.072%, a positive value, although the minimum value is 
negative (-29.251%) and institutional investors own, on average, 44.464% bank shares. 
Also, 17.6% of banks have a corporate governance committee, while about 81.2% have 
an audit committee. So, in our sample of banks the existence of an audit committee is 
more common than a corporate governance committee.  
With respect to country-specific control variables, we note that the percentage of 
assets held by the five largest banks is, on average, 80.348%, a higher percentage 
relatively to other studies (e.g., De Nicoló et al. (2004) report a mean five-firm 
concentration ratio of 57% in 1995, which increased slightly to 60% in 2000). The ratio 
of consolidated foreign claims to GDP of the banks that are reporting to BIS is, on 
average, 102.401% and the percentage of foreign banks among total banks is, on 
average, 22.847%.  
The GDP per capita ranges from a high of US$72,959.73 to a low of 
US$19,820.43 and the mean is U$38,304.91.48  
Furthermore, in our sample, the official supervisory index ranges from a 
minimum of 5 to a maximum of 14, which is also the highest value of the index, and the 
mean is 9.306. Financial freedom ranges from a minimum of 50 to a maximum of 90, 
where the highest value of the index is 100, and a mean is 65. Finally, freedom from 
corruption ranges from a minimum of 43 to a maximum of 97, where the highest value 
of the index is 100, and the mean is 73.139. 
                                                 
46 Due to the quite positively skewed distribution of the Bank size we use the natural logarithm, ln(Bank 
Size), in the regression analysis. 
47 In the Basel III framework, 1) Common Equity Tier 1 must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at 
all times, 2) Tier 1 Capital must be at least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times, 3) Total Capital (Tier 
1 Capital plus Tier 2 Capital) must be at least 8.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times and 4) a minimum 
Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2017. 
Although these risk-weighted capital ratios measures are used in some previous studies, they face a clear 
drawback (Mayes and Stremmel, 2012). "They are open to manipulation and provide space for discretion 
to cover up the real condition of the bank” (Mayes and Stremmel, 2012, p. 12). Accordingly, we use a 
non-risk-weighted capital measure. 
48 Although we use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in the regression analysis, ln(GDP per 
capita), in Table 3.1 the GDP per capita is reported. 
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To obtain a first impression on potential differences between bailed out and not 
bailed out banks we compare our main variables, underlying to our hypotheses, between 
these two groups of banks. Descriptive statistics and the univariate tests of differences 
between bailed out and not bailed out banks are reported in Table 3.2. The univariate 
tests are the t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for the 
continuous variables and the Chi-squared test for the categorical variable. 
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Table 3.2 – Comparison between bailed out and not bailed out banks  
The table reports a comparison of the main variables used in the paper’s multivariate analysis between bailed out and not bailed out banks. Descriptive statistics and 
the univariate tests of differences between the two groups of banks are presented. 
Variable # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. t-test a) Wilcoxon test/Chi-squared 
test a) 
Board independence         
   Bailed out 32 41.971 46.875 31.316 94.736 0.000 -0.137 0.380 
   Not bailed out 40 41.032 43.651 26.882 95.455 0.000   
Board size         
   Bailed out 32 17.875 16.000 5.890 31.000 10.000 -2.021** 1.745* 
   Not bailed out 40 15.200 15.000 5.321 29.000 6.000   
CEO duality         
   Bailed out 32 0.098 0.000 0.296 1.000 0.000 --- 0.527 
   Not bailed out 40 0.050 0.000 0.221 1.000 0.000   
Board experience         
   Bailed out 32 12.722 10.060 7.783 35.064 3.751 0.033 0.799 
   Not bailed out 40 12.773 11.298 5.384 26.613 3.000   
Director tenure         
   Bailed out 32 5.053 4.900 1.741 8.100 1.700 0.859 0.544 
   Not bailed out 40 5.473 4.900 2.278 11.700 1.100   
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Table 3.2 – Comparison between bailed out and not bailed out banks (cont.) 
The table reports a comparison of the main variables used in the paper’s multivariate analysis between bailed out and not bailed out banks. Descriptive statistics and 
the univariate tests of differences between the two groups of banks are presented. 
Variable # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. t-test a) Wilcoxon test/Chi-squared 
test a) 
Board busyness         
   Bailed out 32 2.840 2.575 1.153 5.750 1.100 -1.588 1.303 
   Not bailed out 40 2.463 2.325 0.860 5.250 1.450   
Credit risk         
   Bailed out 26 3.237 1.350 5.696 28.920 0.280 -1.970* 1.210 
   Not bailed out 31 1.197 0.890 0.870 3.420 0.080   
Liquidity risk         
   Bailed out 32 186.242 154.680 189.402 656.560 64.220 -0.459 0.197 
   Not bailed out 36 169.614 157.400 100.730 1186.760 46.320   
Growth risk          
   Bailed out 32 230.937 203.066 89.938 422.249 132.475 0.532 0.504 
   Not bailed out 40 244.708 223.497 122.315 692.477 47.080   
Bank size         
   Bailed out 32 16.518 16.621 1.072 18.390 14.225 -2.221** 2.000** 
   Not bailed out 40 15.760 15.837 1.674 18.893 12.305   
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Table 3.2 – Comparison between bailed out and not bailed out banks (cont.) 
The table reports a comparison of the main variables used in the paper’s multivariate analysis between bailed out and not bailed out banks. Descriptive statistics and 
the univariate tests of differences between the two groups of banks are presented. 
Variable # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. t-test a) Wilcoxon test/Chi-squared 
test a) 
Capital         
   Bailed out 32 4.653 4.416 1.877 10.317 2.076 2.399** 2.306** 
   Not bailed out 40 6.143 5.528 3.083 14.672 1.792   
Note: Observations vary because of missing data.  
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 3.1 for the definition of each variable. 
a) t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for the continuous variables and the Chi-squared test for the categorical variable (CEO duality).  
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Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics categorised for banks that received 
bailouts between 2007 and 2009 and for banks that did not. Also, Table 3.2 reports the 
results of the t-test, non-parametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test and Chi-squared test 
of the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two subsamples of banks. 
Comparing the results for bailed out and not bailed out banks, and according to 
the mean difference test (t-test), we find that bailed out banks have a larger board, 
higher credit risk, larger size and less capital. The results remain unchanged, with the 
exception of credit risk, according to the median difference tests (Wilcoxon/Mann-
Whitney test and Chi-squared test). Since in a univariate setting we do not control for 
various factors that may influence the likelihood of a bank being bailed out, we will 
forego a detailed analysis of the univariate statistics and instead rely on the multivariate 
regression results to interpret the influence of the variables on bank bailouts in greater 
detail. 
Table 3.3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the independent variables. 
Due to the problem of space, given the number of variables, we present the correlation 
matrix in three different panels. Panel A presents the correlation between the main 
variables themselves, Panel B presents the correlation between the main variables and 
the control variables and Panel C presents the correlation between the control variables 
themselves.  
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Table 3.3 – Pearson correlation matrix  
Panel A: 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Board 
independence 
1.000           
2 Board size -0.141 1.000          
3 CEO duality 0.021 -0.084 1.000         
4 Board experience -0.153 0.223 -0.057 1.000        
5 Director tenure 0.091 0.046 0.099 0.193 1.000       
6 Board busyness -0.142 0.376*** -0.034 0.434*** 0.135 1.000      
7 Credit risk -0.011 0.068 0.290** -0.015 -0.154 -0.221 1.000     
8 Liquidity risk -0.017 -0.020 -0.165 0.018 0.280 0.141 -0.263 1.000    
9 Growth risk  0.066 -0.288** 0.077 -0.037 0.130 -0.217 -0.057 -0.100 1.000   
10 Bank size 0.442*** 0.240* 0.097 0.065 -0.056 0.136 -0.037 0.453*** 0.219 1.000  
11 Capital -0176 -0.193 0.153 0.050 0.029 -0.065 0.070 -0.183 -0.025 -0.376*** 1.000 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 3.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Table 3.3 – Pearson correlation matrix (cont.) 
Panel B: 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
12 2006 performance -0.192 0.038 -0.161 0.415*** 0.030 0.185 0.074 -0.107 0.351*** -0.084 -0.083 
13 Institutional 
ownership 
-0.009 0.094 -0.325** 0.269* 0.125 0.237* -0.104 0.043 -0.064 -0.163 -0.139 
14 CG committee 0.248 -0.050 0.061 0.086 0.276 0.009 -0.020 -0.031 0.168 0.125 -0.088 
15 Audit committee -0.032 -0.053 -0.030 0.024 0.011 -0.109 -0.300** -0.205 0.307** 0.191 -0.306** 
16 Concentration -0.191 -0.083 -0.106 0.099 0.075 0.083 -0.373*** -0.176 0.104 -0.045 -0.256* 
17 IIBIS 0.157 -0.179 -0.154 -0.091 0.015 -0.078 -0.173 -0.188 -0.011 0.081 0.059 
18 Foreign 0.124 -0.016 -0.085 -0.123 0.002 -0.104 0.007 -0.203 0.040 0.166 0.011 
19 GDP per capita 0.051 -0.323** -0.193 -0.303** -0.295** -0.076 -0.279** -0.168 -0.240* 0.046 -0.061 
20 Official index -0.147 -0.073 -0.035 0.277** 0.099 -0.048 -0.114 -0.161 0.269* -0.135 0.108 
21 Financial freedom 0.295** -0.387*** -0.181 -0.174 0.084 -0.221 -0.427*** -0.041 0.124 0.202 -0.131 
22 Freedom corruption -0.004 -0.209 -0.239* -0.029 -0.085 0.026 -0.534*** 0.049 -0.038 0.133 -0.328** 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 3.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Table 3.3 – Pearson correlation matrix (cont.) 
Panel C: 
 Variables 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12 2006 performance 1.000           
13 Institutional 
ownership 
0.184 1.000          
14 CG committee -0.012 -0.136 1.000         
15 Audit committee -0.042 0.035 0.108 1.000        
16 Concentration 0.011 0.066 0.151 0.742*** 1.000       
17 IIBIS -0.203 0.023 0.281** 0.354*** 0.261* 1.000      
18 Foreign -0.277** 0.099 0.281** 0.337** 0.124 0.878*** 1.000     
19 GDP per capita -0.183 -0.034 -0.214 0.149 0.241* 0.402*** 0.092 1.000    
20 Official index 0.108 -0.126 0.346** 0.416*** 0.455*** 0.453*** 0.304** -0.105 1.000   
21 Financial freedom -0.147 0.100 0.037 0.498*** 0.287** 0.623*** 0.518*** 0.483*** 0.125 1.000  
22 Freedom corruption -0.007 0.162 -0.052 0.613*** 0.660*** 0.368*** 0.141 0.702*** 0.144 0.684*** 1.000 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 3.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in our model. The correlation 
coefficients among all independent variables included in each regression analysis are 
less, in absolute value, than 0.8,49 that is the threshold beyond which multicollinearity 
problems arise (e.g., Gujarati, 2004). In addition, to double check for any 
multicollinearity issue we also compute the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each 
independent variable. All the VIF values (unreported but available upon request) are 
below the critical value of 10 (e.g., Gujarati, 2004; Asteriou and Hall, 2011; Chatterjee 
and Hadi, 2012), which indicate that multicollinearity is not a major problem in the 
regression analyses. We note that, since multicollinearity is mainly an issue involving 
independent variables in a regression rather than the dependent variable or the link 
function between the independent and the dependent variables, the use of available 
linear regression methods is usually applicable in nonlinear regression settings. As 
Menard (2002, p. 76) points up “because the concern is with the relationship among the 
independent variables, the functional form of the model for the dependent variable is 
irrelevant to the estimation of collinearity.” 
 
 
3.4.2 Estimation results on the determinants of bailouts 
 
In this sub-section we present and analyse the results of the probit regressions 
which test the relationship between the dependent variable Bank bailouts and a set of 
corporate governance variables, bank specific risks, bank capital, bank size and control 
variables. Our goal is to analyse the determinants of the likelihood of bailouts in the 
European banking sector in the context of the global financial crisis. 
Table 3.4, in Column (1), reports the results of the probit regressions for the 
baseline model. In Columns (2) to (4) we test the robustness of our findings.  
Table 3.5 reports the results of the baseline model augmented by additional 
control variables. 
                                                 
49 The Pearson correlation between the variables IIBIS and Foreign is higher than 0.8 (specifically 0.878) 
but, first of all for theoretical reasons, they are not included simultaneously in the regression. 
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Table 3.4 – Determinants of bailouts 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis. 
Variable (1)  
Baseline Model 
(2) (3) (4) 
Board independence 0.021* 
(0.055) 
0.022** 
(0.044) 
0.026** 
(0.019) 
0.007 
(0.448) 
Board size 0.034 
(0.552) 
0.035 
(0.542) 
0.038 
(0.476) 
0.049 
(0.308) 
CEO duality -0.139 
(0.883) 
2.845** 
(0.013) 
-0.092 
(0.919) 
1.414  
(0.150) 
Board independence × CEO duality --- 
 
-0.049** 
(0.032) 
--- --- 
Board experience -0.190*** 
(0.002) 
-0.185*** 
(0.002) 
-0.144** 
(0.016) 
-0.173*** 
(0.004) 
Director tenure -0.594*** 
(0.010) 
-0.617*** 
(0.007) 
-0.544** 
(0.020) 
-0.527** 
(0.011) 
Board busyness 1.328*** 
(0.005) 
1.285*** 
(0.004) 
1.296** 
(0.011) 
0.955** 
(0.017) 
Credit risk 1.083*** 
(0.000) 
1.080*** 
(0.000) 
1.050*** 
(0.000) 
1.125*** 
(0.004) 
Liquidity risk 0.010** 
(0.013) 
0.010*** 
(0.009) 
0.011*** 
(0.007) 
-0.067** 
(0.015) 
Growth risk -0.001 
(0.969) 
0.002 
(0.957) 
0.001 
(0.970) 
-0.002 
(0.792) 
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Table 3.4 – Determinants of bailouts (cont.) 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis. 
Variable (1)  
Baseline Model 
(2) (3) (4) 
Bank size 0.210 
(0.497) 
0.203 
(0.504) 
0.018 
(0.952) 
0.118 
(0.723) 
Capital -0.233  
(0.149) 
-0.222  
(0.168) 
-0.249  
(0.134) 
-0.041 
(0.765) 
2006 performance 0.043** 
(0.050) 
0.042* 
(0.055) 
0.053** 
(0.035) 
0.043** 
(0.045) 
Institutional ownership -0.006 
(0.529) 
-0.006 
(0.510) 
-0.017  
(0.172) 
-0.005 
(0.623) 
CG committee -2.266*** 
(0.007) 
-2.215*** 
(0.006) 
-1.955** 
(0.023) 
-1.645* 
(0.051) 
Concentration 0.083*** 
(0.002) 
0.086*** 
(0.001) 
0.044*** 
(0.004)  
0.045** 
(0.025) 
IIBIS 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
---  0.026*** 
(0.001) 
Foreign --- 
 
--- 0.062*** 
(0.002) 
--- 
GDP per capita -3.513** 
(0.016) 
-3.599** 
(0.013) 
-1.688 
(0.155)  
-3.176** 
(0.027) 
N 53 53 53 53 
Bailed out 23 23 23 23 
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Table 3.4 – Determinants of bailouts (cont.) 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis. 
Variable (1)  
Baseline Model 
(2) (3) (4) 
Not bailed out 30 30 30 30 
% correct  83.02 83.02 81.13 75.47 
LR statistics 35.801 
(0.005) 
36.418 
(0.006) 
34.236 
(0.008) 
29.924 
(0.027) 
Pseudo R2  0.493 0.502 0.472 0.412 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please 
refer to Appendix 3.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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3.4.2.1   The baseline model 
 
The baseline estimation results, Column (1) in Table 3.4, show that the coefficient 
on the Board independence variable is positive and statistically significant and thus, 
board independence positively influence the likelihood of a bailout. This confirms 
hypothesis H1 and is consistent with previous studies in the context of the financial 
crisis (Adams, 2012) and related to corporate failure (Hsu and Wu, 2014). Our result 
suggests that independent directors suffer from bank-specific knowledge, which 
penalises the effectiveness of the board and thus, increases the likelihood of a bank 
participating in a bailout programme.  
The coefficient on the Board size variable, on the contrary, is not statistically 
significant, indicating no association between the board size and the probability of 
bailouts of our sample banks. This finding is consistent with Elloumi and Gueyié 
(2001), Lajili and Zéghal (2010) and Darrat et al. (2014) respectively on financial 
distress and bankrupt firms, but contradicts Adams (2012) who finds that banks that 
received funds from TARP in the US have larger board. In a sample of European banks 
we do not find evidence that larger boards of banks are detrimental and, thereby, 
increase the probability of participating in a bailout programme. Our hypothesis H2 is 
not confirmed. 
The lack of statistical significance regarding the CEO duality variable indicates 
that separating the positions of CEO and Chairman has no impact on the likelihood of a 
bank being bailed out. Therefore, we do not find support for the hypothesis H3. This 
finding is consistent with previous financial distress studies (Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001; 
Abdullah, 2006; Miglani et al., 2015), bankruptcy studies (Lajili and Zéghal, 2010) and 
the study by Carty and Weiss (2012) which, using a sample of US publicly traded 
banks, shows that banks with a dual CEO structure are not more likely to participate in 
bailout programmes. Thus, results in the European context are in accordance with 
results in the US context. 
On the contrary, Column (1) in Table 3.4 reveals that banking experience matters 
and so, we find support for hypothesis H4. The coefficient on the Board experience 
variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that banking experience 
providing a deep and sound knowledge of the complexity, dynamics and specificities of 
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the banking activity, as well as a better comprehension of its opaqueness and regulatory 
environment, make it less likely for a bank to be bailed out as found by Fernandes and 
Fich (2013). Thus, banking experience of the board’s supervisory directors enables 
banks to be safer from government assistance. Similarly, the coefficient on the Director 
tenure variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, confirming 
hypothesis H5. As expected, banks with shorter supervisory directors’ tenure are more 
likely to need State aid. Thus, a bank is better served by longer-standing supervisory 
directors’, who have more bank specific knowledge and are better able to monitor and 
advise bank managers. This finding is also found, for example, by Lajili and Zéghal 
(2010). The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the Board busyness 
variable indicates that busier supervisory directors increase the probability of a bank 
participating in a bailout programme, confirming hypothesis H6. This result provides 
support for the Busyness Hypothesis and the view that the presence of supervisory 
directors holding too many directorships compromises board effectiveness. 
With respect to bank specific risks, the coefficients on the Credit risk and 
Liquidity risk variables are positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient on 
the Growth risk variable is not statistically significant. Thus, the credit and liquidity 
risks increase the likelihood of a bank being bailed out while the growth risk has no 
impact. These results confirm hypotheses H7.1 and H7.2 but not hypothesis H7.3. 
Consistent with the general view, (e.g., Dam and Koetter, 2012), the decline in the 
quality of banks’ loan portfolios, resulting in an increasing proportion of non-
performing loans, is associated with a higher probability of being bailed out. The larger 
the proportion of non-performing loans, the more likely a bank will participate in a 
bailout plan. Also, as expected, we find a positive sign for the liquidity risk measure in 
predicting bailouts. So, as the loan-to-deposit ratio increases the likelihood of a bank 
being bailed out increases. This finding is in accordance with the existence of benefits 
associated with liquidity.  
Furthermore, in our sample of cross-country European banks the coefficient on 
the Bank size variable is not statistically significant, which does not confirm 
hypothesis H8. So, our findings do not support the view that individual bank size creates 
a moral hazard problem resulting from the fact that, as banks grow they increase their 
importance and so the probability of being saved. The issue of “too-big-to-fail” is not 
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validated at bank-level but is validated at country-level given that the coefficient on the 
Concentration variable is positive and statistically significant. Concentration variable is 
used as proxy for the importance of the banking sector and its potential influence on 
banking regulations and policies. Size of individual banks does not seem to matter, but 
size (and importance) of the banking sector in a country increases the probability of 
receiving bailouts from government. In contrast to our expectation, the coefficient on 
the Capital variable is not statistically significant. Thus, the capital of banks, in our 
sample, has no impact on the likelihood of bailouts and hypothesis H9 is not confirmed.  
Concerning bank-level control variables, the coefficient on the 2006 performance 
variable is positive and statistically significant and the coefficient on the CG committee 
variable is negative and statistically significant. Our results show that performance 
before the crisis increases the likelihood of bailouts. So, the better-performing banks 
before the crisis are the most likely to be bailed out following the crisis. Also, banks 
with a corporate governance committee are less likely to participate in a bailout 
programme. On the contrary, the coefficient on the Institutional ownership variable is 
not statistically significant and thus, institutional investors do not influence the 
likelihood of bailouts. 
Moreover, we find that country-level variables explain the probability of 
individual banks being bailed out. The coefficients on Concentration and IIBIS 
variables are both positive and statistically significant. In line with the “concentration-
fragility” view, (e.g., De Nicoló et al., 2004; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011), we find that 
banks located in more concentrated banking sectors are more likely to be bailed out. 
Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence suggesting the importance of the degree of 
international integration. Increasing the international exposure of a country’s banking 
system increases the probability of a bank of that country participating in a bailout 
programme. Finally, the coefficient on the GDP per capita is negative and significant, 
indicating that banks are more likely to be bailed out in poorer countries.  
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3.4.2.2   Robustness checks 
 
To assess the reliability of the baseline results, we employ a set of robustness 
checks, Table 3.4, Columns (2) to (4).  
While we do not formally hypothesise interactive effects, we now extend our 
research by explicitly modelling a corporate governance interaction term. The 
underlying idea is that, in addition to the effect of various governance variables (taken 
individually) on the likelihood of bailouts, the interaction effect among these variables 
can help to predict bailouts. Encouraged by previous studies in the context of corporate 
bankruptcy (Daily and Dalton, 1994a, 1994b) we test the interaction between board 
independence and CEO duality. This interaction variable is the unweighted 
multiplication of a bank's proportion of independent directors and dual CEO corporate 
governance structure. Column (2) presents the results when the interaction term among 
the corporate governance variables is included. Interestingly, although board 
independence and CEO duality (taken individually) have a positive impact on the 
likelihood of bailouts, the two-way interaction between board independence and CEO 
duality has a negative impact. Our findings do not confirm those of Daily and Dalton 
(1994a, 1994b), who find a positive relationship in the context of bankrupt firms. The 
introduction of the interaction term leaves the results unchanged, with the exception of 
CEO duality that gains statistical significance. 
In column (3) we replace the IIBIS variable in the baseline model with the 
Foreign variable, which is the fraction of the number of foreign owned banks to the 
number of the total banks in the country. As result of increasing financial integration, 
foreign banks have become important in domestic financial intermediation (Claessens 
and van Horen, 2011). As there is a potential overlap between both variables we do not 
include them simultaneously in the regressions below. Similarly to the coefficient on 
the IIBIS variable, the coefficient on the Foreign variable is significantly positive. 
Additionally, our qualitative findings with respect to the main explanatory variables 
remain unchanged and with regard to the control variables the differences are 
negligible, supporting the robustness of our results. 
In Column (4) we investigate the sensitivity of the results of our baseline model 
using a different definition of specific risks, bank size and concentration. Specifically, 
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we measure: 1) credit risk as the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets, 2) 
liquidity risk as the ratio of total deposits to total assets, 3) growth risk as the percentage 
of assets growth in the year immediately prior to the financial crisis, 4) bank size as the 
natural logarithm of assets and 5) concentration in the banking industry as the fraction 
of assets held by the three largest banks in each country. Estimation results are very 
similar to the baseline model thus, suggesting that our results are scarcely affected by 
the use of alternative variables. We note that only the coefficient on the Board 
independence variable loses statistical significance.  
In unreported regression we replicate the estimation in Columns (2) and (4) using 
Foreign variable instead of the IIBIS variable and we arrive at similar conclusions. 
 
 
3.4.2.3   Introducing additional control variables 
 
As a new step we augmented the baseline model by introducing additional bank-
level and country-level control variables. First, we want to confirm that our main 
conclusions hold when additional control variables are accounted for. Second, we 
intend to test whether the existence of a board audit committee, the supervision and the 
regulation in the banking sector affect the likelihood of a bank being bailed out. 
Controlling for differences in national policies provides not only a simple robustness 
test but it is also independently valuable as countries implement regulations to promote 
stability. 
Table 3.5 presents the results. 
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Table 3.5 – Determinants of bailouts with additional control variables 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis, 
including additional control variables.  
Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Board independence 0.021* 
(0.099) 
0.026** 
(0.040) 
0.014  
(0.130) 
0.024* 
(0.062) 
Board size 0.053 
(0.358) 
0.025 
(0.679) 
0.089  
(0.126) 
0.047 
(0.496) 
CEO duality 0.400 
(0.711) 
-0.496 
(0.609) 
-0.355 
(0.728) 
-0.334 
(0.727) 
Board experience -0.202*** 
(0.001) 
-0.291*** 
(0.000) 
-0.114** 
(0.016) 
-0.196*** 
(0.001) 
Director tenure -0.639*** 
(0.006) 
-0.703*** 
(0.001) 
-0.450*** 
(0.002) 
-0.609*** 
(0.005) 
Board busyness 1.252*** 
(0.009) 
1.692*** 
(0.000) 
1.079** 
(0.000) 
1.390*** 
(0.002) 
Credit risk 1.127*** 
(0.001) 
1.320*** 
(0.000) 
1.053*** 
(0.000) 
1.256*** 
(0.001) 
Liquidity risk 0.010** 
(0.019) 
0.012** 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.122) 
0.011** 
(0.030) 
Growth risk 0.004 
(0.380) 
-0.004 
(0.381) 
0.003 
(0.363) 
0.001 
(0.910) 
Bank size 0.243 
(0.445) 
0.541 
(0.149)  
-0.046 
(0.860) 
0.154 
(0.654) 
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Table 3.5 – Determinants of bailouts with additional control variables (cont.) 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis, 
including additional control variables.  
Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Capital -0.296* 
(0.089) 
-0.248  
(0.170)  
-0.031 
(0.800) 
-0.213  
(0.177)  
2006 performance 0.031 
(0.194)  
0.055  
(0.170)  
0.016 
(0.426) 
0.041* 
(0.065) 
Institutional ownership 0.001 
(0.928) 
8.99E-05 
(0.993) 
-0.008 
(0.500) 
-0.011 
(0.394) 
CG committee -2.861*** 
(0.001) 
-3.322** 
(0.002) 
-0.289 
(0.694) 
-2.270*** 
(0.009) 
Audit committee -2.055** 
(0.037) 
--- --- --- 
Concentration 0.115*** 
(0.000) 
0.098*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.007) 
0.076*** 
(0.008) 
IIBIS 0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.001) 
--- 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
GDP per capita -3.768*** 
(0.008) 
-4.182*** 
(0.003) 
-4.755* 
(0.099) 
-4.372** 
(0.003) 
Official index --- 0.244 
(0.221) 
--- --- 
Financial freedom --- --- 0.059*** 
(0.010) 
--- 
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Table 3.5 – Determinants of bailouts with additional control variables (cont.) 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis, 
including additional control variables.  
Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Freedom corruption --- --- --- 0.030 
(0.459) 
N 53 53 53 53 
Bailed out 23 23 23 23 
Not bailed out 30 30 30 30 
% correct  84.91 84.91 77.36 83.02 
LR statistics 37.907 
(0.004) 
37.327 
(0.005) 
28.906 
(0.035) 
36.213 
(0.007) 
Pseudo R2  0.523 0.515 0.398 0.499 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please 
refer to Appendix 3.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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In Table 3.5, Column (1), to account for the impact of the existence of a separate 
audit committee, we also include the Audit committee variable, which is a dummy 
variable with a value of one if the bank has an audit committee and zero otherwise. We 
conclude that, similarly to Miglani et al. (2015), the coefficient on the Audit committee 
variable is negative and statistically significant. The existence of an audit committee, as 
well as the existence of a corporate governance committee, decreases the likelihood of 
bailouts. This finding is consistent with the argument of Forker (1992) that the presence 
of an audit committee enhances board monitoring quality and attenuates agency costs. 
We note that the coefficient on the Capital variable is, now, negative and statistically 
significant. 
Next we account for differences in bank supervision and regulation. In 
Column (2), we add to our baseline model the official supervisory powers index, 
Official index variable, which is an index of the power of the country’s commercial 
bank supervisory agency. We find that the coefficient on the Official index variable is 
not statistically significant and that our results are robust to the introduction of this 
additional control variable.  
Further, alternatively, in Column (3), we include the variable Financial freedom, 
which is an indicator of the general openness and regulatory framework as it contains 
elements like openness to foreign competition and the extent of government regulation 
of financial services. Also, we note the potential overlap between the IIBIS and the 
Financial freedom variables, yet we do not include them at the same time. The results 
are not very different from the baseline model. Regarding our main variables, the 
coefficients on the Board independence and Liquidity risk variables are now not 
statistically significant. Also, we find that the coefficient on the Financial freedom 
variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that fewer restrictions on 
banking freedom and greater openness increase the likelihood of bailouts. Thus, our 
results suggest detrimental effects of financial freedom. Banks are able to operate more 
freely and to engage in different and risky activities, far beyond their core activities. 
Also, the data points to the presence of contagion effects.  
Lastly, in Column (4), we check the extent to which our results might be driven 
by corruption differences in countries. The estimation results corroborate our findings 
for the baseline specification. Also, the coefficient on the Freedom corruption variable 
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is not significant at the conventional levels. Thus, as Faccio et al. (2006), the level of 
corruption is not statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of a bailout.  
 
 
3.4.3 Predictive performance of the model  
 
An important property of the probit and logit models is its precision in terms of 
minimising Type I and Type II errors (Persons, 1999). “The evaluation of the predictive 
ability requires knowledge of the models’ Type I and Type II error rates” (Persons, 
1999, p. 140). A Type I error occurs when the model fails to identify the bailed out 
bank. So, a bailed out bank is incorrectly classified as not bailed out. In other words, 
Type I error rate is the probability of misclassifying a bailed out bank as not bailed out. 
On the other hand, a Type II error occurs when a not bailed out bank is falsely identified 
as bailed out. Thus, Type II error rate is the probability of misclassifying a not bailed 
out bank as bailed out. To attribute a particular bank into one of the two categories 
(bailed out versus not bailed out), we need to set up a cutoff point in terms of the 
probability of bailout. All banks above that cutoff point are blacklisted as bailed out 
banks, while all banks below that point are classified as not bailed out. 
A higher cutoff point leads to a lower number of banks on the blacklist of bailed 
out banks, which tends to increase the Type I error. Setting a lower cutoff point can 
reduce the Type I error, but at the expense of a higher Type II error. In our previous 
analysis the percentage of correct classification reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 is 
obtained using 50% as the cutoff point, which is the most often used cutoff point. The 
optimal cutoff point depends on the relative weights that an analyst puts on Type I and 
Type II errors. However, from a prudential perspective, it is reasonable to put a larger 
weight on the Type I error, because supervisors, regulators and governments are mainly 
concerned with avoiding bailouts. This implies a preference for relatively low cutoff 
points, which limit the Type I errors at the expense of more Type II error. To address 
the trade-off between Type I and Type II errors, we illustrate the sensitivity of Type I 
and Type II errors with respect to the choice of the cutoff point.  
Table 3.6 displays the relationship between model predictions and actual bailout 
events for our baseline specification using three different cutoff points (50%, 10%, and 
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5%). The table shows that the model correctly classifies 18 of 23 bailout events 
(78.26%) and 26 of 30 non-bailouts events (86.67%) for the 50%. cutoff point. The 
model failed to correctly classify 5 of 23 bailout events, 21.74% (Type I error) and 
wrongly classified 4 of 30 (13.33%) not bailed banks as bailed out (Type II error). 
Lowering the cutoff point to 10% results in a decrease in the Type I error rate, 
which is now 4.35%. However, this coincides with a substantial increase in the Type II 
error rate, which is now 53.33%. So, the ability to predict bailouts increases, although 
the ability to predict non bailouts decreases. 
Finally, decreasing the cutoff point further to 5% results in an even larger increase 
in the Type II error rate, 60%, while leaving the Type I error rate unchanged. 
 
 
Table 3.6 – Relationship between model predictions and actual bailouts events 
using different cutoff points 
The table presents the comparison between model predictions and actual bailouts for the baseline model 
using as cutoff 50%, 10%, and 5%. 
  Actual bailouts 
  Yes No Total 
Cutoff point = 50% 
   Classified bailouts 
 
Yes 
No 
Total  
 
18 c) 
5 d) 
23 
 
4 d) 
26 c) 
30 
 
22 
31 
53 
Cutoff point = 10% 
   Classified bailouts 
 
Yes 
No 
Total 
 
22 c) 
1 d) 
23 
 
16 d) 
14 c) 
30 
 
38 
15 
53 
Cutoff point = 5% 
   Classified bailouts 
 
Yes 
No 
Total 
 
22 c) 
1 d) 
23 
 
18 d) 
12 c) 
30 
 
40 
13 
53 
c) Correct classification 
d) Incorrect classification 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
Governments intervened massively and repeatedly to support banks during the 
financial crisis in order to ensure their survival. Due to the uniqueness of banks and 
their impact on the stability of the financial system, several rescue programmes were 
adopted. Given the tremendous and costly bailout packages worldwide, the analysis of 
the determinants of the likelihood of banks being bailed out is of the utmost importance, 
namely in the process of reforming the financial regulation, the weaknesses of which 
were revealed by the global financial crisis. The results of our study therefore have 
relevant public policy implications. Overall, our results show that a set of characteristics 
of the board, bank risks and control variables have predictive power in explaining the 
probability of bailouts. Specifically, banks with more experienced boards, longer tenure 
and less busy supervisory directors are less likely to be bailed out. So, strong emphasis 
should be placed on the analysis of the board of a bank. On the other hand, both credit 
risk and liquidity risk, as well as the country-specific banking sector factors, 
concentration and international exposure, increase the likelihood of a bank participating 
in a bailout programme. These qualitative findings are unchanged in all regressions. 
Also, in the baseline model, board independence, performance prior to the financial 
crisis, the existence of a corporate governance committee and the level of economic 
development, measured by GDP per capita, have predictive power.  
Additionally, we first examine the impact of the existence of an audit committee 
and, second, the impact of the supervisory and regulatory environment variables. We 
find that the existence of an audit committee and the index of financial freedom are, 
respectively, negatively and positively associated with the likelihood of bailouts. These 
findings are consistent with the idea that the presence of an audit committee strengthens 
board monitoring and reduces agency costs and that greater freedom, acting as a 
contagion channel of shocks, has a detrimental effect. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 3.1 – Variables definitions 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Bank bailouts A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is bailed out any time over the 
period from July 2007 to December 2009, 0 otherwise. 
July 2007 to December 2009 European Comission 
website; Bank’s official 
website; Annual Reports; 
Google website 
Board independence Percentage of independent directors, that is, the number of independent 
board directors on the board divided by board size. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Board size Total number of directors serving on the board of the bank. December 2006 BoardEx 
CEO duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Board experience Supervisory directors’ average years of experience in the banking 
sector. To track banking experience we examine each supervisory 
director’s biography as provided in the BoardEx database. First, we 
compute the number of years each supervisory director has worked in 
the banking sector and sum all these years. Second, we divide this total 
by the number of supervisory directors on the board of the bank. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Director tenure Average length of time, stated in years, that the supervisory directors 
have been on the bank’s board. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Board busyness  Average number of board positions (number of directorships) held by 
supervisory directors. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
 
Credit risk Non-performing loan ratio, calculated as non-performing loans to total 
loans; Alternatively, non-performing assets ratio, calculated as non-
performing assets to total assets. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Liquidity risk Loan-to-deposit ratio, that is, total loans divided by total deposits. 
Alternatively, ratio of total deposits to total assets, that is, total deposits 
divided by total assets. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Growth risk Market-to-book ratio, that is, ratio of the market value of equity to the 
book value of equity. Alternatively, percentage of assets growth in the 
year immediately prior to the financial crisis. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Bank size Natural logarithm of the bank’s market capitalisation.  December 2006 Datastream 
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Appendix 3.1 – Variables definitions (cont.) 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Bank size (cont.) Alternatively, natural logarithm of the bank’s assets. December 2006 Datastream 
Capital Bank capital, computed as the ratio of total equity to total assets. December 2006 Datastream 
2006 performance Buy-and-hold stock returns. January 2006 to December 2006 Datastream  
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. December 2006 Thomson Financial 
CG committee A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has a corporate governance 
committee, 0 otherwise. 
December 2006 BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Audit committee A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has an audit committee, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Concentration Measure of concentration in the banking industry. Assets of the five 
largest banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. 
Alternatively, assets of the three largest banks as a share of total 
commercial banking assets. 
December 2006 World Bank website50 
IIBIS Measure of the degree of international integration. Ratio of 
consolidated foreign claims to GDP of the banks that are reporting to 
BIS. 
December 2006 World Bank website51 
Foreign Percentage of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the 
total banks in an economy. A foreign bank is a bank where at least 
50% of its shares are owned by foreigners 
December 2006 World Bank website52 
GDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. December 2006 World Bank website53 
Official index The official supervisory powers index measures the degree to which 
the country’s commercial bank supervisory agency has the authority to 
take specific actions. It is composed of information on many features 
of official supervision: 1. Does the supervisory agency have the right to  
2007 (revised June 2008)54 World Bank website;55 
Barth et al. (2008) 
                                                 
50 Global Financial Development Database, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
51 Global Financial Development Database, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
52 Global Financial Development Database, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
53 Global Financial Development Database, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
54 We use data as close as possible to the financial crisis. 
55 Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision carried out by the World Bank, available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.h
tml#Survey_III 
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Appendix 3.1 – Variables definitions (cont.) 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Official index (cont.) meet with external auditors about banks? 2. Are auditors required to 
communicate directly to the supervisory agency about elicit activities, 
fraud, or insider abuse? 3. Can supervisors take legal action against 
external auditors for negligence? 4. Can the supervisory authority 
forcea bank to change its internal organisational structure? 5. Are off-
balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory 
agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute 
provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the supervisory 
agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: a) Dividends? b) 
Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8. Can the supervisory agency 
supersede the rights of bank shareholders-and declare a bank insolvent? 
9. Can the supervisory agency suspend some or all ownership rights? 
10. Can the supervisory agency: a) Supersede shareholder rights? b) 
Remove and replace management? c) Remove and replace directors? 
The official supervisory index has a maximum value of 14 and a 
minimum value of 0, where higher values indicate greater power. 
2007 (revised June 2008) World Bank website;56 
Barth et al. (2008) 
 
Financial freedom Indicator of financial and banking freedom specifically, whether 
foreign banks are able to operate freely, whether the government 
influences allocation of credit, how difficult it is to open domestic 
banks and other financial services firms, to which extent the financial 
system is regulated, the presence of State-owned banks and whether 
banks are free to provide insurance and securities services to 
customers. The index ranges from 0 to 100, with high values signifying 
more freedom and thus fewer restrictions. 
December 2006 Heritage Foundation 
website57 
Freedom corruption Indicator of freedom from corruption. Values range from 0 to 100, with 
higher values indicating lower levels of corruption. 
December 2006 Heritage Foundation 
website58 
 
                                                 
56 Global Financial Development Database, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development 
57 http://www.heritage.org 
58 http://www.heritage.org 
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4 WHAT EXPLAINS EUROPEAN BANKS’ RISK-TAKING IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE 2007-2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS? A SIMULTANEOUS 
EQUATIONS APPROACH 
 
Abstract 
 
The global financial crisis has led to an increasingly focused attention on 
excessive bank risk-taking and one of the consequences is that the role of internal 
governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors, in monitoring risk has come 
under greater scrutiny. 
In this paper we examine the impact of board structure, ownership structure, risk 
governance mechanisms and other bank-specific factors on bank risk-taking for a 
sample of 72 publicly listed European banks. Using a simultaneous equations approach, 
our main findings indicate that the proportion of independent directors, board size and 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power (or CEO authority) negatively affect bank risk-
taking in the financial crisis. On the contrary, institutional shareholders positively 
influence bank risk-taking and both the existence of a risk committee and a Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO) who is a member of the board have no significant impact. The results 
remain unchanged when applying the three-stage least squares (3SLS) and the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimation methods as well as when all variables are 
winsorised, except for CEO power which has no predictive power using 2SLS.  
Additionally, we replicate our analysis for the period before the financial crisis 
(proxy for “stable” periods) to test whether the impact of governance mechanisms and 
other determinants of risk-taking depend on environmental conditions and we conclude 
that it is indeed sensitive to the economic context. In fact, we find that some of them are 
relevant in crisis conditions but not in non-crisis conditions and thus, their impact 
depends on macroeconomic conditions. Also, the results are robust to the use of the 
alternative estimation method (3SLS and 2SLS) and winsorisation. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Banks, Financial Crisis, Risk, Simultaneous 
Equations Approach. 
JEL classification: G01; G21; G34. 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
Throughout the world, by the end of 2008, many banks had seen most of their 
equity destroyed by the crisis initiated in 2007 in the United States (US) subprime 
sector, considered the largest since the Great Depression, 1929-1932 (e.g., Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012). This illustrates how vulnerable and unprotected economies are to the 
irresponsible risk-taking behaviour by financial institutions in general and banks in 
particular. For Stulz (2015) the success of banks and the health of the financial system 
depend in a critical manner on how they take risks. Undue risk-taking by banks 
threatens the safety and soundness of individual institutions as well as the stability of 
the entire financial sector (Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016). 
In the context of the financial crisis, several academics and practitioners argue 
that the mechanisms of corporate governance did not serve their purpose to properly 
safeguard the interests of stakeholders, increasing risk-taking without appropriate 
management (Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2012). “In retrospect, it seems clear that many 
banks took excessive risks in the mid 2000s” (Fortin et al., 2010, p. 892). Given the 
significance of the risk-taking behaviour in the recent crisis context and the renewed 
emphasis on bank internal governance mechanisms, especially the board of directors, 
studying bank risk-taking and whether bank governance influences the level of risk 
undertaken is extremely relevant.  
Bank risk is a major concern for bank regulators due to the special role that the 
banking sector plays in the economy. “Increased riskiness of banks to the extreme may 
lead to financial crises and the collapse of the financial system, causing huge negative 
externalities to the entire economy” (Deng et al., 2013, p. 387), as witnessed during the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. As banks are crucial to the stability of the financial 
system they are more tightly regulated. Moreover, the problems with poor governance 
are more severe for banks than for non-bank firms and their failures have even more 
substantial costs (Pathan, 2009). This is, because banks are “special” firms due to their 
distinct roles in financial intermediation59 (payments system, and liquidity, amongst 
others). The critical role of the board of directors, in order to ensure sound governance, 
                                                 
59 The principal distinctive attribute of banks is their liquidity production function (Macey and O'Hara, 
2003; Mülbert, 2009). By holding illiquid assets and issuing liquid liabilities, banks create liquidity for 
the economy, see Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
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is especially important in banks because the fiduciary duties of directors (“duty of care” 
and “duty of loyalty”) expand beyond shareholders to depositors, other creditors and 
regulators 60  (e.g., Macey and O'Hara, 2003). Therefore, shareholders are not the 
exclusive beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in its final document “Principles 
for Enhancing Corporate Governance”, attributes to the board a vital role in monitoring 
and guiding corporate strategy and risk policy, as the board should “approve and 
oversee the implementation of the bank’s overall risk strategy, including its risk 
tolerance/appetite; policies for risk, risk management and compliance; internal controls 
system; corporate governance framework, principles and corporate values (…)” 
(BCBS, 2010, p. 8). Also, for Srivastav and Hagendorff (2016) the board has an overall 
responsibility for providing oversight into the monitoring of bank management and 
implementing an effective system of risk governance. The opacity of banks and the 
singularity of their assets make the risk-taking problem more serious for these 
institutions compared to non-financial firms, and risk-taking is critical to corporate 
success (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012).  
Notwithstanding the greater severity of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the past 
decades have also been characterised by repeated banking crises, such as the 1994-1995 
Mexican and the 1997-1998 Asian financial crises. Such episodes highlight the 
inherently unstable nature of banking and the tendency of banks toward excessive risk-
taking (Barry et al., 2011) and justify an adequate analysis of the factors behind the 
risk-taking incentives of banks. To prevent further crises, it is imperative to understand 
the factors that influence corporate risk-taking (Jiraporn et al., 2015). 
Our main purpose is, thus, to analyse the impact of a set of corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as board characteristics and ownership structure, on the risk-taking 
by publicly held European banks. In fact, despite the increased debate regarding the role 
of the mechanisms of corporate governance (particularly the boards of directors) in 
solving the conflicts of interest between stakeholders, few papers have focused their 
                                                 
60 Also, Macey and O'Hara (2003, p. 93) argue that “to the extent that fiduciary duties lower agency costs 
by reducing the freedom of management to act in its own unconstrained self-interest, such duties will be 
especially valuable devices in the banking context because of the inherent difficulties in monitoring 
banks.” 
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attention on corporate risk-taking (Pathan, 2009) and even less have focused on the 
crisis period and on a non-US sample. So, our study attempts to fill this gap in the 
literature. Additionally, we replicate the analysis for the period before the financial 
crisis (using data pertaining to 2006) in order to analyse whether our results are 
sensitive to the economic conditions. The underlying idea is that governance 
mechanisms may operate differently in crisis and non-crisis periods.  
We take into account the bi-directional causality between risk and board 
characteristics. According to some existing literature, the causal nature of the 
relationship between these variables is not completely clear: it is possible that not only 
board characteristics may impact risk-taking, but also that risk-taking may affect board 
characteristics. For instance, banks increase risk-taking in response to poor corporate 
governance (e.g., the structure of the board of directors may affect its ability to function 
effectively and so, corporate boards influence risk-taking) or poor corporate governance 
of banks is a consequence of greater risk-taking by banks (and thus, risk-taking 
determines governance) meaning in that case that the effectiveness of the board of 
directors depends on the bank risk-taking? To identify the underlying causal 
relationship we apply a system of simultaneous equations, which treats risk-taking and 
board characteristics as being endogenous. The board features variables endogenised in 
the system are board independence and board size. On the one hand, more independent 
directors lead to less risk-taking (Pathan, 2009; Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2012) and smaller 
board size results in more risk-taking (Cheng, 2008; Pathan, 2009; Nakano and Nguyen, 
2012). On the other hand, bank risk may impact on both board independence and board 
size. Linck et al. (2008), for example, report that high stock return volatility is 
associated with smaller and less independent boards. 
Our paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature in three fundamental ways. 
First, our study explores the relationship between a set of corporate governance 
variables, as well as various bank specific characteristics, and risk-taking for a non-US 
sample of banks. It covers the global financial crisis, that is commonly directly linked to 
the much criticised risk-taking behaviour of banks, in which we witness a renewed 
focus on bank internal governance mechanisms. Therefore, in this context, it is timely to 
analyse the relationship between governance and risk.  
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Second, our study provides a cross-country analysis of the determinants of bank 
risk-taking from a contextualised agency theory perspective.61 We expand the analysis 
by investigating whether the impact of corporate governance mechanisms is contingent 
upon environmental circumstances and the extent to which governance 
recommendations are universally valuable. So, we analyse the explanatory factors of 
risk not only during the financial crisis but also before the crisis, as a proxy for 
“normal” periods. Thus, our study contributes to the growing body of literature that 
suggests that the efficacy and universality of governance prescriptions and impact may 
depend on firm-specific context or contingencies (e.g., Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Judge, 2012; Desender et al., 2013). 
Third, when analysing the two issues above we address the endogeneity problem 
arising from a potential simultaneity bias using a simultaneous equations framework. 
In summary, our main findings show that board independence, board size, CEO 
power and institutional ownership influence bank risk-taking in the financial crisis but 
CEO power loses its predictive power in the non-financial crisis period. Also, we find 
statistical significance for some control variables as is the case of bank size. 
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the literature 
review and the hypotheses development, Section 4.3 describes the data and 
methodology, Section 4.4 provides the empirical results and Section 4.5 provides the 
conclusion. 
 
 
4.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
In this section, we review the existing literature on corporate risk-taking that 
allows us to identify its determinants and we develop the hypotheses that support the 
risk model. We present arguments that justify the expected relationship between a set of 
corporate governance variables, such as board characteristics and ownership structure, 
and bank risk-taking. 
 
                                                 
61 Contextualised agency theory perspective in the sense that the agency theory must adequately consider 
the context and so, take into account the governance environment (e.g., Judge, 2012). 
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4.2.1 Board independence and bank risk-taking 
 
There is sparse literature that analyses the relationship between board composition 
and corporate risk-taking (Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2012). However, the effectiveness with 
which the board of a bank monitors bank managers and limits their opportunistic 
behaviour depends upon its characteristics, such as size and composition (Pathan, 
2009). Prior (and more abundant) studies analyse the relationship between board 
independence and performance, however the relation between board independence and 
risk-taking might not be in the same direction. For example, although Erkens et al. 
(2012) find that financial firms with more independent boards performed worse during 
the crisis, they do not find that firms with more independent boards took more risk prior 
to the crisis. Their findings are, thus, inconsistent with independent board members 
having encouraged managers to take greater risk in their investment policies before the 
onset of the crisis. In turn, Pathan (2009) finds that more independent directors lead to 
less risk-taking by banks in the period 1997-2004, which may occur because 
independent directors are more sensitive to regulatory compliance. Ferrero-Ferrero et al. 
(2012) find that higher proportion of independent directors on a board leads to lower 
levels of corporate risk-taking in an economic recession period (2008) but not in a 
period of economic growth. Based on the above studies, the first hypothesis (H1) is 
stated as follows: 
H1: Board independence is negatively related to bank risk-taking. 
 
 
4.2.2 Board size and bank risk-taking 
 
Board of directors is an essential governance mechanism that can mitigate the 
agency problem between management and shareholders. A board characteristic which is 
perceived to affect its ability to function effectively is its size. Although there is no 
optimal board size for all firms (Coles et al., 2008), the size of the board appears to 
affect corporate value (e.g., Staikouras et al., 2007; Guest, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 
2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013), firm policy choices and risk-taking (Cheng, 2008; Pathan, 
2009; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Wang, 2012; Huang and Wang, 2015). However, 
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while the impact of board size on the performance of firms is well documented in 
literature, relatively few studies explicitly investigate how risk-taking by firms is related 
to board size (Wang, 2012). Board size affects the decision-making process and the 
effectiveness of the board and, in turn, the decision-making process and the quality of 
monitoring impact on risk-taking. Several prior studies on group decision-making (in 
the fields of economics and social psychology) suggest that it takes more effort for a 
larger group to reach a consensus, and so the final decisions of larger groups reflect 
more compromises and are less extreme than those of smaller groups (e.g., Moscovici 
and Zavalloni, 1969; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1991). Thus, it is likely that by making less 
extreme decisions, larger boards are associated with less variability of corporate 
performance. Although for Jensen (1993, p. 865) “when boards get beyond seven or 
eight people they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to 
control”, a larger board also “moderate the extremity of board decisions, as it takes 
more negotiation and compromise for a larger board to reach a final decision” (Cheng, 
2008, p. 159). For Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) larger groups should express 
moderate positions that represent a compromise among individual positions. Also, for 
Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) the final decision of a group reflects a compromise among 
different views of each group member. So, riskier projects are more likely to be rejected 
because it is more difficult to reach an agreement in a large group.62 Additionally, Sah 
and Stiglitz (1991) show that the decision quality of large boards has less variability. 
Consistent with the above arguments related to the literature on group decisions, and 
applied to corporate boards, Cheng (2008) shows that firms with larger boards exhibit 
lower performance volatility. Also, in a sample of US firms, the results of Wang (2012) 
support the hypothesis that board size has a negative impact on risk-taking by firms. In 
addition, in the case of US bank holding companies (BHCs) (Pathan, 2009), Japanese 
firms (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012) and Chinese firms (Huang and Wang, 2015) board 
size is associated with lower return volatility. This finding is confirmed by Ferrero-
Ferrero et al. (2012) in an economic growth period but not during the financial crisis. 
Supported by the literature on group decisions and following the previous studies, 
we hypothesise that smaller boards tend to encourage and approve risky policies and 
                                                 
62 The same is true for good projects as their approval also requires a convergence of opinions between 
group elements. So, larger groups select neither very good nor very bad projects, that is, they choose 
projects whose performance tends to be more stable. 
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consequently lead to higher risk-taking by banks. Thus, we formulate the second 
hypothesis (H2) as follows: 
H2: Board size is negatively related to bank risk-taking. 
 
 
4.2.3 CEO power and bank risk-taking 
 
The structural CEO power is based on his/her formal position in the firm (Daily 
and Johnson, 1997). It comes from the CEO having legitimate authority over others 
because of the nature of the position (Finkelstein, 1992). As a central element of the top 
management team, the CEO occupies a position of unique influence in the firm. Sources 
of structural power, such as the dual leadership structure (CEO duality), are the most 
commonly employed proxies of CEO power. CEO duality refers to the situation where 
the CEO is also the Chairman of the board. 
According to the agency theory, board effectiveness in monitoring and controlling 
management will be reduced when duality is present, in which case the board will have 
less power and the monitoring of the CEO will be lessened. Most arguments against 
CEO duality leadership are based on the issue of power concentration on dual CEOs 
(Daily and Dalton, 1997). Concentrated power may protect the CEO/Chairman from 
board oversight (Daily and Dalton, 1997), enabling dual CEOs to dominate the board 
and promote CEO entrenchment (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). Also, a dual CEO can 
exercise significant influence on the board by restricting the flow information and 
through intervening in the process of new director selection and appointments. “When 
the CEO and board chair positions are split, the board should have more power and, 
thus, influence in new director selection” (Westphal and Zajac, 1995, p. 66). Agency 
theory supported by the divergence of interests when ownership and control of the firm 
are separate, which creates “agency problems” between shareholders and managers, 
specify that, in order to protect their non-diversifiable human capital (talent, job related 
experience), managers will be more risk averse than shareholders (Amihud and Lev, 
1981; Eisenhardt, 1989; Beatty and Zajac, 1994). To the extent that bank managers have 
concentrated wealth including their non-diversifiable and non-tradable human capital, 
they are expected to protect this internally by selecting safer projects or by 
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diversification63 (May, 1995). While shareholders can easily diversify their investment 
risk in the capital market, managers can only do so at the firm level (May, 1995). So, 
shareholders hope that managers invest in all positive net present value projects, 
irrespective of the risk associated with these projects (Guay, 1999). However, due to a 
lack of diversification, risk-averse managers may choose to renounce on some positive 
net present value projects that would increase the risk of the firm (Guay, 1999). 
Additionally, bank managers can have different risk-taking incentives if they are 
remunerated through fixed compensation (e.g., salary) rather than variable 
compensation (e.g., shares, options and bonuses). When receiving fixed compensation, 
managers may behave in a risk-averse manner and so they are reluctant to take the risky 
projects because their rewards from the risk-taking are limited. 64  “This is because 
managers have little to gain if their banks do exceptionally well (their salaries are 
fixed) but probably will lose their jobs and human capital investments in a bank if they 
fail” (Saunders and Cornett, 2008, p. 557). Thus, risk-averse bank managers may accept 
safer, value-decreasing projects, and reject riskier, but value-increasing, projects. The 
previous arguments suggest that as risk-averse managers, bank CEOs are motivated to 
take less risk. In short, in the agency theory framework, powerful CEOs are expected to 
pursue actions and make decisions, which are in their own personal best interests, and 
so, because of the assumption of risk aversion it will not be anticipated that they make 
choices that are considered risky. Accordingly, Kim and Buchanan (2008) provide 
empirical evidence that firms adopting CEO duality leadership show significantly lower 
levels of risk. Pathan (2009), using a sample of US BHCs, also finds that CEO power is 
associated with lower bank risk, although Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle (2012) in their 
study of subprime lending firms in the US find that CEO power is positively related to 
excessive risk-taking.  
In accordance with the agency theory, managers opt for less risky projects in 
order to protect their wealth in terms of job, salary and other perks. As risk-averse 
managers, bank CEOs have incentives to take less risk. Hence, our third hypothesis (H3) 
is stated as follows: 
                                                 
63 According to May (1995) CEOs with more non-diversifiable wealth vested in the firm will have more 
incentive to decrease personal risk through diversification. As human capital invested in the firm 
increases, there is more incentive to reduce firm-specific risk.  
64 For instance, for Fortin et al. (2010), US BHCs that pay CEOs high base salaries take less risk, while 
BHCs that grant CEOs more in stock options or that pay CEOs higher bonuses take more risk. 
  163 
H3: CEO power is negatively related to bank risk-taking. 
 
 
4.2.4 Institutional ownership and bank risk-taking 
 
In recent decades, institutional investors have become the largest shareholders of 
publicly traded firms (Deng et al., 2013). According to the literature, agency problems 
and risk-taking behaviour are distinctive depending on the nature of the shareholder. 
Institutional investors (e.g., investment advisors, pension funds and hedge funds) who 
exert significant voting power can influence the nature of corporate risk-taking activity 
(Wright et al., 1996; Barry et al., 2011). Regarding “shareholder size and expertise in 
processing information and monitoring managers, such investors are different from 
atomistic individual investors because they can exercise greater control for reasons of 
economies of scale in corporate supervision” (Barry et al., 2011, p. 1328). Theory and 
empirical evidence confirms that institutional investors can provide active monitoring 
that is difficult for smaller, more inactive or less informed investors.65 However, the 
intensity of institutional investors' monitoring can be limited by distinct factors such as 
the potential business relationship with the firm (e.g., Brickley et al., 1988) and 
concerns about the liquidity of their portfolios (e.g., Coffee, 1991; Bhide, 1994). Also, 
since institutional investors have a diversified portfolio of investments, they may have 
lower incentives to exercise control (Barry et al., 2011).  
The Information Asymmetry Hypothesis (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) predicts 
that a firm's operations may be so difficult to understand, that even a large shareholder 
may not be able to monitor it effectively. Thus, the opaque nature of banking gives 
institutional investors little control over bank managers. Conversely, the Prudent Man 
Hypothesis predicts the opposite. “According to this hypothesis institutional investors as 
large blockholders have more expertise, resources and incentives for monitoring bank 
management, and are less subject to the information asymmetries suffered by other 
stockholders” (Chun et al., 2011, p. 160). Institutional investors and blockholders might 
also affect firm value and risk-taking through their influence on managerial decisions.66  
                                                 
65 See, for example, Gillan and Starks (2000), Woidtke (2002) and Hartzell and Starks (2003). 
66 Although monitoring by institutional investors may affect many firms' decisions, much of its influence 
is not observable (e.g., projects not taken) and hence difficult to test and evaluate (Almazan et al., 2005). 
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Existing studies have shown that institutional investors play a major role in 
monitoring the investee firms and in directing their crucial decisions such as executive 
compensation structure (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Almazan et al., 2005) and firm 
diversification (Deng et al., 2013). On the one hand, institutional investors, acting under 
due-diligence and prudent behaviour rules, may try to avoid risk by furthering 
diversification. Accordingly, they could promote greater diversification and lower risk 
because their wealth is closely tied to firm value, which becomes more volatile with 
risk. In particular, hired-manager banks become less risky when a given owner has 
his/her wealth highly concentrated in the bank (Sullivan and Spong, 2007), as is the 
case of institutional owners. On the other hand, institutional investors might have 
incentives to increase the firm’s risk in order to increase its value and consequently, 
their own wealth. In this context, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that blockholders 
may restrict managers from investing in risk-reducing strategies that reduce shareholder 
value. Institutional investors have similar motivations. Accordingly, Wright et al. 
(1996) find evidence that institutional investors positively influence risk-taking for 
firms with larger growth opportunities. Regarding banks, Barry et al. (2011) find that 
ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but mainly for privately 
owned banks. Institutional investors impose the riskiest strategies when they hold 
higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership structure do not influence 
risk-taking (Barry et al., 2011). Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behaviour of 
publicly held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in 
explaining risk differences. However, Deng et al. (2013) find that large and stable 
institutional ownership is associated with a higher level of diversification and lower 
risk, suggesting that institutional investors are prudent and favour risk-reducing 
diversification strategies. They show that institutional shareholders exerted greater 
influence on publicly traded BHCs’ diversification decisions during the crisis period, 
which in turn lowers firm insolvency risk. On the contrary, Erkens et al. (2012) find that 
financial firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, 
which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period. In other words, 
firms with higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the 
crisis period because institutional shareholders encouraged managers to increase 
shareholder returns through greater risk-taking prior to the crisis. Institutional investors 
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may find it optimal to increase risk, in order to increase their returns, because they do 
not internalise the social costs of financial institution failures. Additionally, institutional 
arrangements such as deposit insurance may weaken debtholder discipline. More 
recently, Cheng et al. (2015) also find a positive relationship between institutional 
investors and risk-taking choices. Accordingly, the fourth hypothesis (H4) is formulated 
as follows: 
H4: Institutional ownership is positively related to bank risk-taking. 
 
 
4.2.5 Risk governance mechanisms and bank risk-taking 
 
In many recent public policy documents, published in the aftermath of large-scale 
financial scandals and the financial crisis, “one common recommendation is to “put risk 
high on the agenda” by creating respective structures” (Aebi et al., 2012, p. 3214). 
Specific measures involve either the establishment of a dedicated risk committee or 
designating a CRO who oversees all relevant risks within the firm (Brancato et al., 
2006; Mongiardino and Plath, 2010; Sabato, 2010). Mongiardino and Plath (2010) 
present evidence that risk governance at large banks seems to have improved only to a 
limited extent since the beginning of the financial crisis, despite market and regulatory 
pressures. Most large banks run complex businesses, with many distinct business lines, 
frequently including non-banking activities. Understanding fully all the risks to which 
banks are exposed requires both skill and time. Thus, Mongiardino and Plath (2010) 
describe best practices in the banking industry risk governance and emphasise the need 
to have: (1) a dedicated board-level risk committee to supervise all types of risk, (2) a 
risk committee in which the majority of its members should be independent and at least 
some of them should have previous risk management experience and (3) a CRO who 
should be a member of the bank’s executive committee and report jointly to the CEO 
and the board. “While the full board retains ultimate responsibility for risk supervision, 
it is unrealistic to expect it will perform its duties effectively without a robust committee 
structure” (Mongiardino and Plath, 2010, p. 118). Also, the lack of visibility of the 
CRO at board level is one of the main issues that should be solved in order to ensure the 
independence of the risk function (Sabato, 2010). For Sabato (2010) the risk governance 
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structure may have played a crucial role in the failure of risk management practices at 
most banks. The existence of a separate risk committee as well as the presence of a 
CRO, whose position and reporting line ensure an appropriate level of accessibility to 
the board of directors, are important elements of robust risk governance. Also, for Stulz 
(2015), risk managers play a crucial role in measuring, monitoring and managing risk. 
In accordance with high-quality risk governance practices, we expect that the 
existence of a separate risk committee as well as a CRO who is a board member induce 
the board to take less risk. Hence, we predict the fifth hypothesis (H5) as follows: 
H5: Risk governance mechanisms, (existence of a separate risk committee and a CRO 
who is a board member) are negatively related to bank risk-taking. 
 
 
4.3 Data and methodology 
 
In this section we characterise the bank sample and the data sources. Further, we 
describe in detail the variables used in the regression equations and, finally, we present 
the empirical framework. 
 
 
4.3.1 Sample and data sources 
 
Our cross-country sample includes 72 publicly listed European banks. The data is 
sourced from Datastream, BoardEx, Thomson Financial and annual reports. The 
information on bank risk-taking was collected from Datastream, with the detailed data 
on bank board characteristics and risk governance structure mostly obtained from 
BoardEx and complemented with information contained in the annual reports. Finally, 
the information on ownership was extracted from Thomson Financial. In the risk-taking 
analysis we consider two different periods: during the financial crisis (2007-2008) and 
before the financial crisis, or stable period (2006). So, we collect data from three 
different years: 2006, 2007 and 2008. For the crisis period we use average data. 
Accordingly, for each explanatory variable we compute the average value of the crisis 
period using data from 2007 and 2008, except for dummy variables. 
  167 
4.3.2 Variables description 
 
In this sub-section we describe in detail the set of variables considered in our 
study: the dependent variable, the main explanatory variables and the control variables. 
A clear definition of each of them is provided. Please see Appendix 4.1.  
 
 
4.3.2.1   Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is a risk variable, Bank risk, which represents the risk-
taking by a bank. A significant body of literature uses the standard deviation of stock 
returns as a measure of risk-taking (Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Cheng, 2008; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2012; 
Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). So, following previous studies, our risk measure is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the bank’s daily stock returns and represents total 
risk. 67  This measure captures the overall variability in bank stock returns and 
incorporates the market’s perception on the risks underlying the bank’s positions 
(Pathan, 2009).  
 
  
4.3.2.2   Independent variables 
 
The independent variables according to our hypotheses are: Board independence, 
Board size, CEO power, Institutional ownership, Risk committee and CRO. Board 
independence is the percentage of independent directors. Board size is the total number 
of directors on the board. CEO power, which is used to capture CEO influence over 
bank board decisions, is a dummy variable with a value of one if the CEO is 
simultaneously the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Regarding ownership 
structure we define Institutional ownership as the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors. Finally, two proxies of risk governance mechanisms are used. 
                                                 
67 Total risk includes both the risk involved in the particular stock (idiosyncratic risk) and market risk 
(systematic risk). 
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Our first proxy is Risk committee, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if the bank has a separate risk committee and zero otherwise. Our second proxy is CRO, 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CRO is a board member 
and zero otherwise. 
 
 
4.3.2.3   Control variables 
 
Other variables that may affect bank risk are used to control for differences in the 
sample of banks so that the actual relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables can be determined. The control variables that we use as determinants of policy 
choices and bank risk are in accordance with the existing literature. Five variables are 
included to control for: (1) the previous position of the bank’s Chairman or, more 
specifically, whether the Chairman is an ex-CEO (Chair ex_CEO), (2) bank past 
performance (Performance), (3) bank size (Bank size), (4) bank capital (Capital) and (5) 
growth opportunities (Growth opportunities).  
The effectiveness of the Chairman's role in a given firm can be compromised if 
the Chairman has previously served CEO of this firm given that he/she may not be 
(completely) independent from current management. Because of the potentially inactive 
and ineffective role of a Chairman that is an ex-CEO, due to his/her previous 
relationship with the bank, we expect that banks in which the Chairman has also 
occupied the CEO position exhibit more risk. Chairman ex_CEO is a dummy variable, 
which equals one if the current Chairman has previously occupied the position of CEO 
in the bank and zero otherwise. 
Since it is possible that banks change their level of risk-taking following previous 
performance, we use, similarly to Cheng (2008), lagged performance as a control 
variable. Managers with poor prior performance may be inclined to take up excessive 
risk in the hope of meeting performance targets (Van Wesep and Wang, 2014). If a bank 
does not meet the targeted bank performance in the previous year, managers in an 
attempt to meet these targets in the current year may take more risk. In this case, 
performance of the previous year will be associated with higher bank risk in the current 
year. Accordingly, the results of Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) suggest that 
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organisational decline positively influence risk. Similarly, Singh (1986) finds that 
poorly performing organisations engage in more risk taking than organisations that are 
performing well. Also, other previous studies find a negative risk-return association for 
firms having returns below target levels and a positive association for those with returns 
above target (e.g., Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988). Thus, we use bank past 
performance (Performance) as control variable. Performance is computed as the natural 
logarithmic of the ratio of the stock price (adjusted), that is, 𝑙𝑛 (𝑃𝑖𝑡/𝑃𝑖𝑡−1).  
It has been argued that firm size affects a number of organisational outcomes, 
namely risk-taking, and so, very often it is used as control variable in several papers 
(Cheng, 2008; Pathan, 2009; Barry et al., 2011; Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2012; Lewellyn 
and Muller-Kahle, 2012; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Wang, 2012; Deng et al., 2013; 
Huang and Wang, 2015). The theoretical arguments that justify the relationship between 
bank size and risk-taking are conflicting. On the one hand, in accordance with the “too 
big to fail” issue, bank size increases bank risk-taking. On the other hand, due to the 
diversification effect, bank size reduces bank risk-taking. Bank size, used to control for 
differences in sizes of the banks, is measured by the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation as, for example, Wang (2012).  
As in other studies (e.g., Cheng, 2008; Pathan, 2009; Barry et al., 2011; Nakano 
and Nguyen, 2012), we control for bank capital. Although Cheng (2008) reports that 
leverage has no impact on the volatility the shares of US firms, Nakano and Nguyen 
(2012) find that leverage has a positive effect on the volatility of stock returns, meaning 
that as leverage increases the level of risk also increases. Our measure of bank capital 
(Capital) is defined as shareholders total equity over total assets. We expect that higher 
capitalised banks are subject to less risk. 
Finally, in accordance with past research, (Wang, 2012; Huang and Wang, 2015), 
we control for growth opportunities (Growth opportunities). Specifically, we use the 
market-to-book ratio, defined as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book 
value of equity, as a proxy for growth opportunities. Huang and Wang (2015) find a 
positive relationship between the market-to-book ratio and risk-taking, consistent with 
the idea that as more growth opportunities are available firms have stronger incentives 
to pursue riskier strategies. 
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We also control for possible country-specific effects by including country 
dummies, DCountry variable.  
 
 
4.3.3 The endogeneity issue and the determinants of board characteristics 
 
Given the theoretical and empirical discussion in Section 4.2 we identify a set of 
explanatory variables of bank risk and their association. However, based on previous 
literature, the causal nature of these relationships is not clear: board attributes may 
affect risk-taking but risk-taking may also determine a specific board structure. 
Accordingly, we take into consideration the bi-directional causality and complex 
interrelationships that may exist between risk-taking and board characteristics, more 
specifically board independence and board size. On the one hand, the causal 
relationship between the variables may result from board independence and board size 
to corporate performance variability. Pathan (2009) and Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2012) for 
example, find that a higher level of independent directors leads to a lower level of risk-
taking and Cheng (2008) and Nakano and Nguyen (2012) show that larger boards lead 
to lower variability of performance. Also, for Huang and Wang (2015) smaller boards 
are associated with riskier firm policy choices and consequently greater firm risk. On 
the other hand, the causal association between the variables may result from corporate 
performance variability to board independence and board size. For instance, Boone et 
al. (2007) and Linck et al. (2008) show that stock return variability is negatively related 
to independent directors and board size.  
 
 
4.3.3.1   Explanatory variables of endogenous board characteristics 
 
Existing literature on boards of directors treats the independence and size of the 
board as endogenous variables (Hermalin and Weisback, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 
2007) and provides evidence regarding the determinants of these board characteristics 
(Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008). In order to estimate the 
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equations concerning board independence and board size we identify, in accordance 
with the existing literature, a main set of variables that we describe below. 
 
 
A. Scope of operations  
 
The expression “scope of operations” refers to the nature, diversity and 
complexity of the firm’s business production process (Boone et al., 2007). To capture 
the different aspects of the scope of operations, previous studies have used several 
proxies for it, such as firm size, age, leverage and the number of business segments 
involved (e.g., Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Pathan, 2009). 
For instance, Coles et al. (2008, p. 351) argue that “complex firms such as those that are 
diversified across industries, large in size, or have high leverage are likely to have 
greater advising requirements. Hence, these firms are more likely to benefit from a 
larger board of directors, particularly from outside directors who possess relevant 
experience and expertise.”  
 
 
A.1 Bank size 
 
As the benefits of monitoring increase, boards will do more monitoring, leading to 
more outsiders on the board (Linck et al., 2008). Since independent directors are 
presumably better monitors and the potential for agency conflicts is expected to increase 
with firm size, large firms could require more of such directors in order to diminish the 
augmented agency problems of being large (Lehn et al., 2009). On the one hand, outside 
directors bring expertise, experience and potentially important connections to the firm 
and therefore, they are of high importance to large firms (Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 
2008). On the other hand, an in-depth knowledge of the firm is particularly important 
for larger firms, namely in advising managers concerning the firm’s business strategy. 
Following this view, inside directors are likely to play an important role as they have a 
broad and detailed knowledge of the internal workings of the firm, its strengths, 
weaknesses and constraints. In addition to board independence, firm size can also affect 
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board size. Larger or more diverse firms may require more new board members to serve 
on their board committees, (Boone et al., 2007). In the same way, the information 
requirements of larger and more complex firms generally result in the need for larger 
boards (Pathan and Skully, 2010). Due to the higher volume and greater diversity of 
activities, larger firms have more demand for information than their smaller 
counterparts (Lehn et al., 2009). As firms grow, boards grow in response to the 
increasing net benefits of monitoring and specialisation by board members (Boone et 
al., 2007), as well as to the increased gains of advising. So, we expect a positive 
relationship between bank size and board size. Previous studies (e.g., Denis and Sarin, 
1999; Lasfer, 2006; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2008; Linck et al., 
2008; Belkhir, 2009; Lehn et al., 2009) have established a positive relationship between 
firm size and, respectively, board size and board independence. However, according to 
the existing arguments the impact of bank size on board independence is not, a priori, 
completely clear. On the one hand, since larger firms require more managerial effort 
and more diverse expertise, they will have more independent directors. On the other 
hand, as larger firms require a broad knowledge regarding their multiple specificities 
(internal policies, strategies, etc) and complexities, and being inside directors an 
important source of firm-specific information (Raheja, 2005), then larger firms will 
have more inside directors. As Lasfer (2006), Boone et al. (2007) and Lehn et al. (2009) 
the size of the bank (Bank size) is measured as the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation. 
 
 
A.2 Bank capital, bank age and bank diversification 
 
Empirical studies, such as Boone et al. (2007), Coles et al. (2008), Guest (2008) 
and Linck et al. (2008) suggest that board size and independence are positively 
associated with leverage, firm age, and diversification. These findings reflect the idea 
that firms with higher financial leverage, greater age and higher diversification are more 
complex, thereby demanding more experience and skills, as well as greater advisory 
requirements (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2008). 
Firms with high leverage depend significantly on external resources and may have 
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greater needs for advice (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 1998). A larger board and a higher 
proportion of outsiders can provide greater information and, therefore, both should 
increase as the advisory needs increase (Guest, 2008). Consistent with this view, Pfeffer 
(1972) finds that firms with greater needs for access to external capital have a higher 
number of directors and a higher percentage of outside members on their boards. 
However, Pathan and Skully (2010) find a positive relationship between board size and 
bank capital and Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) find no significant association between 
board size and non-financial firm leverage. Moreover, bank capital may positively 
affect board independence because a high capital ratio means a lower level of debt. Debt 
is considered to be an important market monitoring mechanism in disciplining bank 
managers (Flannery, 1998). Thus, given the lack of such monitoring mechanism, other 
internal governance devices, such as independent directors, may become more 
important (Pathan and Skully, 2010). 
Also, we account for the age of the bank. As time passes (banks become older and 
more established), managers are promoted to directors, increasing board size (Mak and 
Li, 2001). Accordingly, a positive relationship between board size and bank age is 
expected. However, for Mak and Li (2001), Hillier and McColgan (2006) and Pathan 
and Skully (2010), firm age is not significantly associated with board size.  
Furthermore, we account for diversification. Previous studies such as Boone et al. 
(2007), Linck et al. (2008) and Lehn et al. (2009) use the number of business segments 
as a measure of diversification for non-bank firms and Mak and Li (2001) use the 
percentage of subsidiaries and associates for financial and non-financial firms. 
However, for banks we use the primary measure of revenue diversification proposed by 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006), which “seemed more appropriate because it captures the 
complexity and the level of diversification of banks through their income sources” 
(Pathan and Skully, 2010, p. 1594). For instance, Mak and Li (2001) predict that 
diversified firms will have larger boards because of the need for more directors with 
expertise in different areas of business and Pathan and Skully (2010) also find that bank 
diversification increases bank board size but not board independence. 
Similarly to Pathan and Skully (2010), we measure bank capital (Capital), as the 
ratio of total equity to total assets. The age of the bank (Bank age), as Guest (2008) and 
Pathan and Skully (2010) is measured as the number of years since the bank was first 
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listed on Datastream. Finally, regarding bank diversification (Diversification), we use a 
measure of revenue diversification by Stiroh and Rumble (2006) which is calculated as 
1- (squared share of net operating revenue from net interest sources plus squared share 
of net operating revenue from non-interest sources). A higher value indicates a more 
diversified mix: 0.0 means that all revenue comes from a single source (complete 
concentration), while 0.5 is an even split between net interest income and non-interest 
income (complete diversification). 
 
 
B. Growth opportunities 
 
The information asymmetry associated with high-growth firms is expected to 
affect board composition (Mak and Roush, 2000). It can be argued that firms with more 
future growth opportunities may have more outside directors on the board to control the 
higher agency problems inherent in such firms (Bathala and Rao, 1995). In other words, 
to mitigate the potential agency problems associated with high growth firms, one might 
expect to find greater representation of outside directors on the boards of these firms. 
Consistent with this argument, Mak and Roush (2000) show that the proportion of 
outside directors is positively related to the extent of growth opportunities available to a 
firm. On the other hand, information asymmetry impairs the ability of outside directors 
to fulfil their advisory function in high growth firms (Lehn et al., 2009). Either the 
outside directors make decisions based on less information than their peers in low 
growth firms, or they incur in higher costs when obtaining information to enable them 
to make more informed decisions. In addition, as the outside directors serve a 
monitoring function, the CEO may have an incentive to hide certain types of 
information. These arguments support an inverse relationship between growth 
opportunities and the proportion of independent directors. In accordance, Linck et al. 
(2008) find that firms with high growth opportunities are associated with less 
independent boards. Board size is also likely to be affected by the firm’s growth 
opportunities. The costs of monitoring managers increase with a firm’s growth 
opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992). Consequently, the free rider problem of large 
boards is more pronounced in high growth firms (Lasfer, 2006; Lehn et al., 2009). In 
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order for board members to have enough incentive to bear the high monitoring costs in 
firms with high growth opportunities, boards are expected to have a small size (Lehn et 
al., 2009). In addition, Lehn et al. (2009) argue that, since high growth firms operate in 
more volatile environments than low growth firms, they require board structures that 
facilitate rapid decision-making and redeployment of assets. Thus, the more volatile the 
environment in which a firm operates, the smaller its board is likely to be. Growth firms 
may find it important to have boards that can make timely strategic decisions and such 
firms may, therefore, prefer smaller boards (Mak and Roush, 2000). For Mak and 
Roush (2000) there is some evidence that firms expected to have more growth 
opportunities tend to employ smaller boards. Similarly, Linck et al. (2008) find that 
firms with high growth opportunities are associated with smaller boards as do Lehn et 
al. (2009) when using the market-to-book value of assets ratio as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. We use the market-to-book ratio to measure growth opportunities 
(Growth opportunities).   
 
 
C. CEO characteristics 
 
Board independence decreases with the CEO’s bargaining power (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998; Baker and Gompers, 2003) and such CEO power derives from his/her 
perceived ability, relative to a replacement (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), to influence 
board decisions. The findings of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest that board 
independence will decline over the course of the CEO’s tenure. Keeping his/her job for 
a long period of time gives the CEO bargaining power vis-à-vis the directors. Therefore, 
he/she is able to pressure for a board that is more favourable to him/her and so more 
insiders are placed in board positions. Instead, “a new CEO is an unknown quantity with 
relatively less power than an established CEO. Consequently, shareholders feel that a 
new CEO requires more scrutiny, so they will put more outsiders on the board to 
monitor him. In addition, shareholders are better able to put monitors on the board 
because the new CEO is not yet powerful enough to keep them off” (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988, p. 605). Furthermore, the longer the CEO has been with the firm, the 
more entrenched that person is likely to be. This entrenchment derives from the fact that 
  176 
over time, CEOs can influence the composition of their boards through the director 
nomination process (Mallette and Fowler, 1992). Other existing literature such as 
Bathala and Rao (1995) finds a negative association between CEO tenure and board 
independence, indicating that the longer a CEO has held this position, the greater the 
influence he/she has to change the board into a more favourable one with insiders. 
However, Pathan and Skully (2010) find that the coefficient on the CEO tenure variable 
is not statistically significant in their board independence regression. CEO tenure is 
measured as the number of years the CEO has served in this position. 
Board independence can also be affected by the CEO succession process 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Linck et al., 2008). Although, for Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) as a CEO nears retirement firms tend to add insiders to the board, for 
Pathan and Skully (2010) there is no significant relationship between CEO age, proxy 
for CEO succession planning, and board independence. Similarly to Linck et al. (2008) 
and Pathan and Skully (2010), CEO age is measured as the length of time to retirement. 
 
 
4.3.4 Empirical framework 
 
The regression Equation (4.1) shown below is formulated to test empirically the 
main hypotheses, H1 to H5, given the literature discussion in Section 4.2. In this paper 
we intend to analyse whether bank risk-taking and the efficacy of governance 
mechanisms are contingent upon environmental circumstances: crisis and non-crisis 
periods. So, we test the hypotheses for two different economic contexts: during the 
financial crisis and before the financial crisis. First, the equation is regressed in a 
recession period, using data for 2007 and 2008 and second, the equation is regressed in 
a “normal” period using data for 2006. In the former case, except for dummies, the 
independent variables are averaged over the period. Thus, for the crisis period each 
sample bank has only one observation.  
As it is possible that not only board independence and board size may influence 
bank risk, but also that bank risk may influence these board characteristics,68 we use a 
                                                 
68  The relationship can then be bi-directional and accordingly the variables will be determined 
simultaneously. 
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simultaneous equations approach. This way, we take into account the interdependencies 
between risk and board characteristics. In terms of methodology we develop a system of 
simultaneous equations in which bank risk, board independence and board size are 
endogenised. So, we estimate three equations in the system, one for each endogenous 
variable. Equations (4.2) and (4.3) relate, respectively, to board independence and board 
size. 
 
The three regression equations are: 
(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽2(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 
    + 𝛽3(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑖,𝑡 + 
    + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽6(𝐶𝑅𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑥_𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 +  
    + 𝛽8(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 
    + 𝛽10(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽11(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 
+ ∑ 𝛽(11+𝑗)(𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)𝑗𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                        (4.1)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
 
(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0+ 𝛽1(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽2(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖,𝑡 + 
            + 𝛽3(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 + 
            + 𝛽5(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 + 
            + 𝛽6(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 +   
            + 𝛽8(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 
+ ∑ 𝛽(8+𝑗)(𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)𝑗𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (4.2)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
 
(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0+ 𝛽1(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽2(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖,𝑡 + 
     + 𝛽3(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 
     + 𝛽6(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 
+ ∑ 𝛽(7+𝑗)(𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)𝑗𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                          (4.3)
𝑛
𝑗=1
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where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank, 𝑡 is the time period, 𝑛 is the number of country 
dummies and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 are the country dummies indicating the 
country of the bank. 
For a detailed definition of the variables please see sub-section 4.3.2 and 
Appendix 4.1. 
 
To estimate the system of simultaneous equations, we employ the 3SLS 
estimation method and, as a robustness test, the 2SLS estimation method. 69  The 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the parameters of the equations with 
endogenous variables on the right-hand side are biased and inconsistent, a problem 
usually referred to as “the simultaneous equation  bias”.70 Also, we take into account the 
heteroscedasticity issue. 
The endogenous variables in our system of equations are Bank risk, Board 
independence and Board size. Under our system of equations, these variables are 
dependent on each other, and also on other exogenous variables. In estimating the 
system of equations, we use the exogenous variables as instruments. 
According to the order condition “In a model of M simultaneous equations in 
order for an equation to be identified, it must exclude at least M-1 variables 
(endogenous as well as predetermined) appearing in the model. If it excludes exactly  
M-1 variables, the equation is just identified. If it excludes more than M-1 variables, it 
is overidentified” (Gujarati, 2004, p. 748). In our model, in order to satisfy the order, 
each equation must exclude at least two of the exogenous variables. It can be verified 
that it is the case with our model.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 Also, as a robustness test we use 3SLS estimation method, with all variables winsorised at the 1st and 
99th percentile. See, please, sub-section 4.4.3.2. 
70 OLS estimation of an equation that contains an endogenous explanatory variable generally produces 
biased and inconsistent estimators (Wooldridge, 2012). 
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4.4 Empirical results 
 
In this section we first present and analyse the directors on the board and the 
Pearson correlation matrix. Then, we present and discuss the estimation results using 
the 3SLS estimation method, in the crisis period and in the non-crisis period. 
 
 
4.4.1  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the various board structure, 
ownership, CEO characteristics and bank-specific variables in the crisis period, with the 
exception of the Performance variable, which measures past performance (year 2006).  
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Table 4.1 – Descriptive statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of each variable by showing mean, median, standard deviation 
(Std. dev.), maximum (Max.) and minimum (Min.). 
Variable # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
Panel A: Board structure variables 
Board independence (%) 72 41.468 47.078 26.796 92.308 0.000 
Board size (Nº) 72  16.472 15.000 6.015 34.000 6.000 
CRO 72 0.056 0.000 0.231 1.000 0.000 
Chair ex_CEO 72 0.250 0.000 0.436 1.000 0.000 
Panel B: Ownership structure variable 
Institutional ownership (%) 69 49.600 48.485 24.993 99.015 0.050 
Panel C: CEO characteristics variables 
CEO power 72 0.056 0.000  0.231 1.000 0.000 
CEO tenure (years) 72 5.040 3.500 4.843 27.400 0.3500 
CEO age (years) 72 53.924 54.250 8.110 77.500 33.500 
Panel D: Bank-specific variables 
Bank risk (%) 72 3.315 3.018 1.484 9.100 0.541 
Risk committee 72 0.403 0.000 0.494 1.000 0.000 
Performance (%) 72 25.072 20.836 19.611 93.981 -29.251 
Bank size (€ bil.) 72 14.185 7.421 19.107 109.975 0.236 
Capital (%) 72 5.694 4.699 4.478 34.936 1.501 
Bank age (years) 72 21.507 20.489 11.112 43.500 2.733 
Diversification 72 0.420 0.452 0.083 0.499 0.103 
Growth opportunities (%) 72 133.871 125.129 67.058 480.742 45.080 
Note: Observations vary because of missing data.  
Please refer to Appendix 4.1 for the definition of each variable. 
 
 
The board structure variables in Panel A of Table 4.1 show that the mean 
(median) percentage of independent directors is 41.468% (47.078%) with a minimum of 
0%, meaning that in this case all the directors are non-independent, and a maximum of 
92.308%. The mean (median) number of bank board directors is 16.472, with a 
minimum of 6.000 directors and a maximum of 34.000 directors. Only 5.6% of the 
CROs in our sample of banks are a board member and 25% of the current Chairmen 
have previously occupied the position of CEO.  
Regarding the ownership structure variable, in Panel B of Table 4.1, the mean 
(median) value of institutional ownership is 49.600% (48.485%).  
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In Panel C of Table 4.1, the descriptive statistics of the CEO characteristics 
variables indicate that only 5.6% of the CEOs in our sample of banks also serve as 
Chairman of the board, which is greater than what is reported by McNulty et al. (2013), 
4.95%, in a sample of non-financial firms and much lower than the percentage shown 
by Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle (2012), 73%, in a sample of financial firms. The mean 
(median) tenure of the CEO is 5.040 years (3.500 years). Therefore, on average, the 
CEO served 5.040 years in this position, which is below the value reported by Bathala 
and Rao (1995), 10.53 years, and Pathan and Skully (2010), 8.85 years. In addition, the 
mean (median) age of the CEO is 53.924 years (54.250 years) and the oldest CEO is 
77.500 years old. 
Finally, Panel D of Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the bank-
specific characteristics variables. Concerning the descriptive statistics of the bank risk 
measure the mean (median) is 3.315% (3.018%). In our sample 40.3% of the banks 
have a risk committee. The mean (median) past performance, is 25.072% (20.836%), 
reaching a negative minimum value of -29.251%. The sample mean (median) bank size 
is €14.185 billion (€7.421 billion) and the mean (median) capital ratio is 5.694% 
(4.699%), a value below the limits imposed under the Basel III framework.71/72 The 
mean (median) bank age is 21.507 years (20.489 years), with a minimum of 2.733 years 
ans a maximum of 43.500 years. Finally, the mean (median) diversification is 0.420 
(0.452), reaching a maximum value of 0.499 (near complete diversification), and the 
mean (median) growth opportunities is 133.871% (125.129%). 
Table 4.2 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables. Due to the 
problem of space, given the number of variables, we present the correlation matrix in 
three different panels, calculated for the common observations (N=69). Panel A 
presents the correlation between the variables used in Equation (4.1), Panel B presents 
the correlation between the variables used in Equation (4.2) and Panel C presents the 
correlation between the variables used in Equation (4.3). We note that since some 
variables appear in more than one equation, their correlation is presented in more than 
one Panel. 
                                                 
71 We note that, following previous studies, we use a non-risk-weighted capital ratio (a simple measure a 
capital), while in the Basel framework the focus is on risk-weighted capital measures. 
72 With emergence of the Basel III regulators seek to increase both the quality and the quantity of banks’ 
capital (Moussu and Petitromec, 2013). 
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Table 4.2 – Pearson correlation matrix  
Panel A: 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Bank risk 1.000            
2 Board 
independence 
0.313*** 1.000           
3 Board size 0.020 -0.235* 1.000          
4 CEO power -0.084 -0.043 -0.061 1.000         
5 Institutional 
ownership 
0.015 -0.024 0.175 -0.350*** 1.000        
6 Risk 
committee 
0.235* 0.114 0.088 0.048 0.118 1.000       
7 CRO 0.023 -0.025 0.164 -0.053 0.134 0.258** 1.000      
8 Chair ex_CEO -0.003 0.116 -0.088 0.146 0.003 0.075 -0.122 1.000     
9 Performance -0.043 -0.174 0.066 -0.033 -0.001 -0.058 -0.006 -0.124 1.000    
10 Bank size 0.358*** 0.369*** 0.353*** 0.070 -0.140 0.239** 0.105 -0.098 -0.100 1.000   
11 Capital -0.247** 0.043 -0.253** 0.046 -0.127 -0.155 -0.115 0.034 0.090 -0.210 1.000  
12 Growth 
opportunities 
-0.268** 
 
-0.091 -0.299** 0.174 -0.188 -0.095 -0.040 0.096 0.151 -0.176 -0.027 1.000 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 4.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Table 4.2 – Pearson correlation matrix (cont.) 
Panel B: 
 Variables 1 2 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Bank risk  1.000         
2 Board independence 0.313*** 1.000        
3 Board size 0.020 -0.235* 1.000       
10 Bank size 0.358*** 0.369*** 0.353*** 1.000      
11 Capital -0.247** 0.043 -0.253** -0.210 1.000     
12 Growth opportunities -0.268** -0.091 -0.299** -0.176 -0.027 1.000    
13 Diversification 0.153 0.183 0.187 0.290** -0.399*** -0.069 1.000   
14 CEO tenure -0.233* -0.281** 0.017 -0.163 0.035 0.092 -0.032 1.000  
15 CEO age -0.077 -0.233* 0.210* 0.215* -0.034 -0.198 -0.028 0.381*** 1.000 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 4.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Table 4.2 – Pearson correlation matrix  (cont.) 
Panel C: 
 Variables 1 2 3 10 11 12 13 16 
1 Bank risk  1.000        
2 Board independence 0.313*** 1.000       
3 Board size 0.020 -0.235* 1.000      
10 Bank size 0.358*** 0.369*** 0.353*** 1.000     
11 Capital -0.247** 0.043 -0.253** -0.210 1.000    
12 Growth opportunities -0.268** -0.091 -0.299** -0.176 -0.027 1.000   
13 Diversification 0.153 0.183 0.187 0.290** -0.399*** -0.069 1.000  
16 Bank age 0.360*** 0.255** 0.109 0.303** -0.117 -0.146 0.157 1.000 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 4.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Multicollinearity among the variables should not be a concern as the maximum 
value of the correlation coefficient is, in absolute value, 0.399. This is, below the 
threshold of 0.8 beyond which multicollinearity is considered a problem (e.g., Gujarati, 
2004). Correlation between variables is considered undesirable for multivariate analysis 
if the value exceeds 0.8.73 
 
 
4.4.2 3SLS estimation results 
 
In this sub-section we first present and analyse the 3SLS estimation results in the 
crisis period (Table 4.3).  
Additionally, we test whether the impact of the determinants of bank risk and 
board structure depends on environmental conditions and therefore, whether the effect 
of such determinants is different in crisis and non-crisis periods. Thus, we then present 
3SLS estimation results in the non-crisis period (Table 4.4).  
 
 
4.4.2.1   3SLS in the crisis period 
 
Table 4.3 reports the 3SLS estimates of the system of the three regression 
equations, that is, Equations (4.1) to (4.3) for Bank risk, Board independence and Board 
size respectively.  
 
                                                 
73 As a rule-of-thumb, multicollinearity is considered harmful only when the correlation between two 
regressors exceed 0.8 (e.g., Gujarati, 2004). 
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Table 4.3 – Determinants of bank risk-taking in the crisis period – 3SLS 
The table presents 3SLS regression results of bank risk-taking and board structure in the financial crisis.  
Variable (1) 
Bank risk 
(2) 
Board independence 
(3) 
Board size 
Bank risk --- 
 
4.928** 
(0.024) 
-0.230 
(0.197) 
Board independence -0.013* 
(0.058) 
--- 0.049*** 
(0.000) 
Board size -0.340*** 
(0.002) 
15.597*** 
(0.000) 
--- 
 
CEO power -2.277* 
(0.065) 
--- --- 
Institutional ownership 0.017** 
(0.014) 
--- --- 
Risk committee 0.201 
(0.609) 
--- --- 
CRO -1.671 
(0.564) 
--- --- 
Chair ex_CEO 2.214*** 
(0.000) 
--- 
 
--- 
Performance -0.018* 
(0.083) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Bank size 1.585*** 
(0.000) 
-42.560*** 
(0.000) 
2.460*** 
(0.000) 
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Table 4.3 – Determinants of bank risk-taking in the crisis period – 3SLS (cont.) 
The table presents 3SLS regression results of bank risk-taking and board structure in the financial crisis.  
Variable (1) 
Bank risk 
(2) 
Board independence 
(3) 
Board size 
Capital -0.159* 
(0.067) 
6.194*** 
(0.000) 
-0.377*** 
(0.000) 
Growth opportunities -0.003  
(0.192) 
0.312*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.017*** 
(0.000) 
Bank age --- --- 0.032 
(0.322) 
Diversification --- -177.470*** 
(0.000) 
11.654*** 
(0.000) 
CEO tenure --- -1.351** 
(0.047) 
--- 
CEO age --- 0.765* 
(0.053) 
--- 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 69 69 69 
Adj-R2 0.937 0.864 0.989 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please 
refer to Appendix 4.1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Column (1), in Table 4.3, presents the 3SLS estimates of regression 
Equation (4.1), when Bank risk is the dependent variable. During the financial crisis we 
find evidence that higher proportion of independent directors leads to lower levels of 
bank risk-taking, as the coefficient on the Board independence variable is negative and 
statistically significant, supporting hypothesis H1. A reason that may explain this result 
is that independent directors are more sensitive to the regulatory requirements and 
consequently take more prudent, moderate and conservative actions, thereby influencing 
bank managers actions, in order to avoid loss of professional reputation and even 
lawsuits in the event of large scale destruction of shareholder value resulting from lax 
monitoring. Therefore, they are particularly careful in carrying out the monitoring role. 
This result is consistent with Pathan (2009) and Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2012) for the 
crisis period.  
With regard to the size of the board, the coefficient on the Board size variable is 
also negative and statistically significant. Therefore, as hypothesised, a small board is 
associated with more bank risk-taking or, in other words, associated with more 
variability of bank performance. This result is in accordance with previous studies 
related to group decision-making process, which argue that larger groups tend to make 
less extreme decisions. Also, a larger board facilitates monitoring and advising by 
managers due to the additional human capital available. This finding is also consistent 
with several previous studies such as Cheng (2008), Pathan (2009), Ferrero-Ferrero et 
al. (2012) in an economic growth period, Nakano and Nguyen (2012), Wang (2012) and 
Huang and Wang (2015) and it confirms hypothesis H2.  
As expected, the coefficient on the CEO power variable is negative and 
statistically significant. Thus, a powerful CEO decreases bank risk-taking, supporting 
hypothesis H3. This may be because as managers are risk averse they have less 
incentive to take risk. To safeguard their non-diversifiable wealth they are not inclined 
to invest in riskier projects. Additionally, whenever his/her remuneration is not linked to 
risk-taking (fixed compensation) the CEO prefers safer projects.  
With respect to ownership structure, the coefficient on the Institutional ownership 
variable is positive and so, we find that institutional investors increase bank risk-taking, 
thus confirming hypothesis H4. This finding is supported by the argument that such 
investors encourage managers to take more risk in order to increase bank value and 
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consequently, their own wealth. The focus of institutional ownership on short-term 
profitability encourages bank risk-taking. 
Contrary to the expectation, neither the coefficient on the Risk committee variable 
nor the coefficient on the CRO variable are statistically significant. Although following 
the financial crisis, the existence of a separate risk committee and the presence of a 
CRO on the board were commonly recommended, we do not find evidence that these 
risk governance mechanisms influence bank risk-taking and so, hypothesis H5 is not 
confirmed. The reasons that may explain this finding are that, on the one hand, “even 
though most large banks had a dedicated risk committee, most of them met very 
infrequently” (Aebi et al., 2012, p. 3214) and, on the other hand, most risk committees 
may not be comprised of a sufficient number of independent and financially 
knowledgeable/experienced members who know how to implement appropriate risk 
management strategies, resulting in a failure of risk management at banks.74 
The coefficients on the other bank characteristics also offer important insights. As 
expected, the coefficient on the Chair ex_CEO variable is positive and statistically 
significant, meaning that banks in which the Chairman has previously served as CEO 
take more risk. Holding a management position at the bank negatively interferes with 
the current duties and responsibilities as Chairman. In accordance with the expectation, 
the statistically significant negative coefficient on the Performance variable, which 
measures past performance, demonstrates that bank risk-taking increases following poor 
performance. The coefficient on the Bank size variable is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that bank size is associated with more risk-taking. Additionally, 
the statistically significant negative coefficient on the Capital variable indicates that 
highly capitalised banks observe less performance variability. Finally, the coefficient on 
the Growth opportunities variable is not statistically significant and so, this variable has 
no predictive power in explaining bank risk-taking. 
Column (2), in Table 4.3, presents the 3SLS estimates of regression 
Equation (4.2), when Board independence is the dependent variable. Specifically, we 
find that board independence increases as bank risk-taking increases. Increased risk 
                                                 
74 Stulz (2008) characterises a failure of risk management as one of the following: failure to identify and 
measure risks, failure to communicate effectively risk exposures, providing timely information to the 
board and top management and failure to monitor and manage risks. 
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leads to increased independent directors, which in turn lead to a decline in bank risk-
taking (see Column (1) in Table 4.3). In other words, as risk rises banks are encouraged 
to include more independent directors given that more independent boards originate less 
risk-taking. Also, as the board becomes larger board independence increases. On the 
contrary, bank size negatively impacts on board independence suggesting that larger 
banks demand more inside directors because their large size requires more specific 
information (and so, the inclusion of insiders can lead to more effective decision 
making), although it gives rise to more significant agency problems (Lehn et al., 2009). 
Similarly, Berry et al. (2006) find that firm size is also negatively related to board 
independence, showing that as firms get larger outside board representation declines. As 
expected, bank capital positively affects board independence. High capital ratio implies 
low debt ratio and with debt being a market monitoring device, in the absence (scarcity) 
of this mechanism, board independence works as a substitute control mechanism and so, 
it increases. Similarly, growth opportunities have a positive impact on board 
independence. This finding provide support for the argument that firms with greater 
agency problems, related to growth opportunities, are likely to choose boards of 
directors that are more effective at mitigating such problems. Lastly, with respect to 
bank specific characteristics, we find that bank diversification is negatively related to 
board independence. The direction of this relationship is consistent, for example, with 
Pathan and Skully (2010), however they do not find statistical significance. Regarding 
the CEO characteristics, the significant negative coefficient on the CEO tenure variable 
indicates that as the length of time during which the CEO has served as CEO increases, 
the proportion of independent directors decreases. This result is consistent not only with 
the bargaining/negotiation hypothesis, which predicts that board independence is 
negatively related to CEO tenure (a measure of the CEO’s influence), but also with the 
entrenchment theory. The longer the tenure of a firm’s CEO, the more entrenched 
he/she is likely to be. Finally, at odds with the expectation, the coefficient on the CEO 
age variable is positive and statistically significant. Thus, as a CEO approaches 
retirement banks add independent directors to the board. A potential explanation for this 
unexpected result is that as the CEO approaches retirement there is a loss of power on 
his/her part and shareholders may, in that case, be more readily able to impose 
additional independent members on the board, thus signalling a future change in the 
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strategy (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) and perhaps intending to engage such members 
more intensely in succession planning activities at the board level. 
Column (3), in Table 4.3, reports the results of the 3SLS estimates of regression 
Equation (4.3), when Board size is the dependent variable. More precisely, we find that 
neither the coefficient on the Bank risk variable nor the coefficient on the Bank age 
variable are statistically significant. Consistent with Mak and Li (2001), Hillier and 
McColgan (2006), Guest (2008) and Pathan and Skully (2010) respectively, in a sample 
of non-financial firms and banks, firm age has no impact on explaining board size. The 
coefficient on the Board independence variable is positive and statistically significant 
and so, as the proportion of independent directors increases the board becomes larger. 
Also, the coefficient on the Bank size variable is positive and statistically significant 
providing support for the hypothesis that larger banks have larger boards. This result is 
consistent with Baker and Gompers (2003), Boone et al. (2007), Coles et al. (2008), 
Guest (2008), Linck et al. (2008), Lehn et al. (2009) and Pathan and Skully (2010). 
Furthermore, both the coefficients on the Capital and Growth opportunities variables 
are negative and statistically significant, at 1%. Thus, banks with high capital ratios are 
associated with smaller boards, which is in accordance with previous studies that show 
a positive relationship between debt and board size (Guest, 2008; Linck et al., 2008). 
Also, banks with high growth opportunities have smaller boards, which facilitate faster 
and timely decisions. This result confirms the view that firms with high growth 
opportunities generally require more agile governance structures. Finally, the positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on the Diversification variable indicates that 
diversified banks have larger boards (e.g., Pathan and Skully, 2010). 
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4.4.2.2   3SLS in the non-crisis period 
  
We repeat the estimation of Equations (4.1) to (4.3) as specified in sub-section 
4.3.4 for the non-crisis period. Table 4.4 reports the results.  
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Table 4.4 – Determinants of bank risk-taking in the non-crisis period – 3SLS 
The table presents 3SLS regression results of bank risk-taking and board structure in the non-crisis period (2006). 
Variable (1) 
Bank risk 
(2) 
Board independence 
(3) 
Board size 
Bank risk --- 
 
16.529* 
(0.060) 
-2.576*** 
(0.003) 
Board independence -0.004** 
(0.030) 
--- 
 
0.111*** 
(0.000) 
Board size -0.018 
(0.321) 
3.503* 
(0.066) 
--- 
 
CEO power 0.128 
(0.559) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Institutional ownership 0.011*** 
(0.000) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Risk committee -0.092 
(0.430) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
CRO -0.288 
(0.672) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Chair ex_CEO -0.400*** 
(0.005) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Performance 0.023*** 
(0.000) 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Bank size 0.049 
(0.163) 
-2.179 
(0.468) 
0.894** 
(0.025) 
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Table 4.4 – Determinants of bank risk-taking in the non-crisis period – 3SLS (cont.) 
The table presents 3SLS regression results of bank risk-taking and board structure in the non-crisis period (2006). 
Variable (1) 
Bank risk 
(2) 
Board independence 
(3) 
Board size 
Capital -0.019 
(0.405) 
-5.449*** 
(0.000) 
0.434*** 
(0.006) 
Growth opportunities 0.001  
(0.604) 
0.070*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Bank age --- 
 
--- 0.109*** 
(0.002) 
Diversification --- 
 
-102.960*** 
(0.000) 
19.333*** 
(0.000) 
CEO tenure --- 
 
-1.058* 
(0.092) 
--- 
 
CEO age --- 
 
0.473 
(0.332) 
--- 
 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 67 67 67 
Adj-R2 0.990 0.963 0.984 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please 
refer to Appendix 4.1 for the definition of each variable. 
 
 
  195 
Column (1), in Table 4.4, presents the 3SLS estimates of regression 
Equation (4.1), in the non-crisis period, and we find differences from the results 
reported in Column (1), in Table 4.3, in the crisis period. In particular, regarding our 
main variables, both the coefficients on the Board size and CEO power variables are not 
statistically significant and so, neither the size of the board nor a powerful CEO affect 
bank risk-taking in the non-crisis period (proxy to “normal” periods). In a non-recession 
period, the advantages of larger boards in minimising risk do not seem to be relevant. 
Board decisions in such period involve less uncertainty and are more predictable. In this 
sense, the macroeconomic stability produces less performance variability. Also, bank 
risk is not influenced by leadership power. The risk-averse behaviour of bank managers, 
which encourages them to take less risk, become insignificant in the presence of more 
favourable macroeconomic conditions. In short, the impact of these governance 
mechanisms on risk-taking reduction disappears in a non-crisis period. Regarding the 
control variables, both the coefficients on the Chair ex_CEO and Performance variables 
maintain their statistical significance but change sign. So, their impact in bank risk-
taking in a non-recession period is exactly the opposite of that in a crisis period. 
Additionally, we note that the positive coefficient on the Bank size variable and the 
negative coefficient on the Capital variable are now not statistically significant and 
thus, both the size and capital of the bank have no impact on bank risk in the non-crisis 
period. Taken together, our findings indicate that some governance mechanisms (and 
other control variables) are helpful in crisis conditions but not in stable conditions and 
thus, their effect seems to be contingent upon macroeconomic conditions. 
Column (2), in Table 4.4, presents the 3SLS estimates of regression 
Equation (4.2), in the non-crisis period, and we also find deviations from the results 
reported in Column (2), in Table 4.3, in the crisis period. Both the coefficients on the 
Bank size and CEO age variables are no longer statistically significant. Consequently, 
neither the size of the bank nor the age of the CEO have an influence on board 
independence in the non-crisis period. Furthermore, the coefficient on the Capital 
variable is still statistically significant but is now negative. In a stable period perhaps 
banks are less concerned about board vigilance carried out by independent directors. 
Thus, despite the increase in capital implying a relative decrease of debt and a decrease 
in its monitoring role, the proportion of independent directors also decreases. 
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Column (3), in Table 4.4, reports the 3SLS estimates of regression Equation (4.3), 
in the non-crisis period, and we also detect deviations from the results reported in 
Column (3), in Table 4.3, in the crisis period. Both the coefficients on the Bank risk and 
the Bank age variables are now statistically significant. Therefore, both bank risk-taking 
and bank age influence board size in the non-crisis period. For instance, as banks 
become older, more directors join the board and as result boards become larger (Mak 
and Li, 2001). Additionally, the coefficient on the Capital variable remains statistically 
significant but is now positive, consistent with Pathan and Skully (2010). 
Replicating our analysis in a non-crisis period, we are able to show that the 
influence of some governance mechanisms and other factors on bank risk-taking have 
different effects in stable and crisis conditions. Thus, such influence depends on the 
macroeconomic environment. 
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4.4.3 Robustness checks 
 
We now perform additional tests to check the robustness of the previous results, 
in the crisis and non-crisis periods. These tests include, first, the estimation of the 
Equations (4.1) to (4.3) in a simultaneous system using the 2SLS estimation method. 
Second, to account for the (potential) effect of outliers, winsorisation was performed on 
all variables. 
Given that Equation (4.1), Bank risk equation, is the main equation and in order to 
save on space we only present the findings regarding bank risk-taking. Thus, the 
estimation results of Equations (4.2) and (4.3), Board independence and Board size, 
respectively, are not reported, they are nevertheless available upon request. 
 
 
4.4.3.1   2SLS in the crisis and non-crisis periods 
 
Estimation results of Equation (4.1) using 2SLS in the crisis and non-crisis period 
are shown in Table 4.5, respectively, in Columns (1) and (2).  
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Table 4.5 – Determinants of bank risk-taking in the crisis period and non-crisis 
period – 2SLS 
The table presents 2SLS regression results of bank risk-taking in the financial crisis and before the 
financial crisis (2006). 
Variable (1) 
Bank risk  
(crisis period) 
(2) 
Bank risk 
(non-crisis period) 
Board independence -0.016** 
(0.048) 
-0.004** 
(0.039) 
Board size -0.360*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019 
(0.351) 
CEO power -1.753 
(0.216) 
0.201 
(0.420) 
Institutional ownership 0.024*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
Risk committee 0.164 
(0.707) 
-0.101 
(0.440) 
CRO -1.444 
(0.663) 
-0.322 
(0.674) 
Chair ex_CEO 2.325*** 
(0.000) 
-0.417*** 
(0.008) 
Performance -0.014 
(0.224) 
0.024*** 
(0.000) 
Bank size 1.636*** 
(0.000) 
0.052 
(0.181) 
Capital -0.158* 
(0.100) 
-0.024 
(0.341) 
Growth opportunities -0.003 
(0.247) 
0.001 
(0.764) 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
N 69 67 
Adj-R2  0.937 0.990 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 4.1 for the 
definition of each variable. 
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Column (1), in Table 4.5, reports the results for the determinants of bank risk as 
specified by Equation (4.1) in the crisis period. The results remain the same as with 
those reported in Column (1), in Table 4.3, except that the coefficients on CEO power 
and Performance variables are no longer statistically significant. 
Column (2), in Table 4.5, reports the results for the determinants of bank risk as 
specified by Equation (4.1) in the non-crisis period. The findings remain unchanged 
comparatively to those presented in Column (1), in Table 4.4. 
In summary, the qualitative findings with respect to the main explanatory 
variables (with the exception of the CEO power variable, in the crisis period) and the 
control variables (with the exception of the Performance variable also in the crisis 
period) remain unchanged, providing robustness for our results. 
 
 
4.4.3.2   Winsorisation 
 
In order to consider the (potential) impact of outliers on our results, we winsorise 
all the variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. Specifically, this means that for each 
variable: (1) all observations below the 1st percentile are replaced by the value 
corresponding to the 1st percentile and (2) all observations above the 99th percentile are 
replaced by the value corresponding to the 99th percentile. In effect, the 1st and 99th 
percentile become the minimum and maximum values.  
Table 4.6 reports the estimation results of Equation (4.1), the main equation,75 
using 3SLS and applying winsorisation in the crisis and non-crisis periods, respectively, 
in Columns (1) and (2).  
  
                                                 
75 To save on space, we omit the estimation results of Equations (4.2) and (4.3), they are nevertheless 
available upon request. 
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Table 4.6 – Determinants of bank risk-taking in the crisis period and non-crisis 
period – 3SLS and winsorisation 
The table presents 3SLS regression results of bank risk-taking in the financial crisis and before the 
financial crisis (2006) with winsorisation. 
Variable (1) 
Bank risk  
(crisis period) 
(2) 
Bank risk 
(non-crisis period) 
Board independence -0.016** 
(0.022) 
-0.004** 
(0.023) 
Board size -0.289*** 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.436) 
CEO power -2.210* 
(0.069) 
0.059 
(0.767) 
Institutional ownership 0.017** 
(0.016) 
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
Risk committee 0.370 
(0.339) 
-0.003 
(0.978) 
CRO -1.624 
(0.569) 
-0.378 
(0.549) 
Chair ex_CEO 2.029*** 
(0.000) 
-0.429*** 
(0.001) 
Performance -0.023** 
(0.027) 
0.020*** 
(0.000) 
Bank size 1.491*** 
(0.000) 
0.039 
(0.236) 
Capital -0.105 
(0.221) 
0.005 
(0.812) 
Growth opportunities -0.002 
(0.496) 
0.001 
(0.138) 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
N 69 67 
Adj-R2  0.937 0.990 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 4.1 for the 
definition of each variable. 
 
 
Column (1), in Table 4.6, shows the results for the determinants of bank risk as 
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specified by Equation (4.1), in the crisis period, with winsorisation. The results remain 
the same as those reported in Column (1), in Table 4.3, except that the coefficient on the 
Capital variable (a control variable) is now not statistically significant. Thus, the 
previous results presented in Table 4.3 remain valid since only bank capital now has no 
impact on bank risk-taking. 
Furthermore, in Column (2), in Table 4.6, presents the results for the determinants 
of bank risk as specified by Equation (4.1) in the non-crisis period, with winsorisation. 
The estimation results corroborate our previous findings, reported in Column (1), in 
Table 4.4. 
In short, the qualitative findings regarding the main explanatory variables, the 
main variables of interest, and the control variables (with the exception of the Capital 
variable, in the crisis period) remain unchanged, confirming the robustness of our 
results. 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The global financial crisis that began unfolding in 2007 has highlighted the 
importance of the need for robust bank risk-taking supervision in order to ensure their 
safety and soundness. Key characteristics of strong risk oversight at banks include the 
board of directors and risk governance mechanisms.  
Given the relevance of studying bank risk-taking (in particular, European banks 
which are much less analysed) and the emphasis on governance mechanisms, it is 
important to examine the relationship between these mechanisms (and other corporate 
factors) and risk-taking by banks during the crisis period.  
Consistent with the expectations, in a simultaneous equation framework, using the 
3SLS estimation method, our results support the existence of such significant relation. 
In particular, we find that board independence, board size and CEO power are 
negatively related to bank risk-taking in the financial crisis. These results suggest 
that: (1) the role of the independent directors is performed as a trade-off between the 
interests of shareholders (who prefer more risk), regulators and other public authorities 
(who prefer less risk and safer policies) and it is particularly sensitive to regulatory 
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recommendations/requirements, (2) larger boards decrease risk-taking due to the 
availability of more human capital and greater moderation in the decision-making 
process and (3) CEO power also reduces bank risk-taking, consistent with the idea that 
bank managers exhibit risk aversion due to their non-diversifiable wealth, which may be 
aggravated by the form of their compensation. Thus, such governance mechanisms are 
important determinants of risk-taking by European banks. Regarding ownership 
structure, we also find that institutional ownership positively affects risk-taking, 
meaning that institutional shareholders encourage bank managers to take more risk. 
However, contrary to our expectations, the risk governance mechanisms are not 
associated with bank risk-taking. Also, we find that the existence of a Chairman that is 
an ex-CEO, past performance, bank size and capital influence risk. Our main findings 
remain unchanged using 3SLS, 2SLS as well as 3SLS when winsorisation was 
performed on all variables, with the exception of the CEO power variable, which 
coefficient loses statistical significance, using 2SLS estimation method. 
Using the simultaneous equations approach, due to the bi-directional relationship 
between risk and board structure reported in existing literature, we also identify the 
determinants of board independence and board size. Banks with high stock return 
volatility, larger boards, more capital, high growth opportunities and older CEOs are 
associated with more independent boards, while larger banks, more diversified and 
whose CEO has longer tenure tend to have less independent boards. Considering 
specifically the relationship between board independence and risk-taking, we find that 
as risk increases the board independence also increases, which in turn leads to bank 
risk-taking reduction. Said differently, as risk grows banks are encouraged to 
incorporate more independent directors given that more independent boards lead to less 
risk-taking. Furthermore, more independent boards, larger and more diversified banks 
are associated with larger boards, while banks with a high-capital ratio and high growth 
opportunities have smaller boards. 
Additionally, we replicate the regression of simultaneous equations system in the 
non-crisis period (more specifically the year immediately before the financial crisis) in 
order to analyse whether the influence of the governance mechanisms and other bank 
specific factors is subject to contextual contingencies. If it is the case then the impact 
will be different depending on the macroeconomic conditions. The results show that 
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such influence is not the same during and before the financial crisis. In the non-crisis 
period we find that board size, CEO power, bank size and bank capital are not 
significant in explaining risk-taking. Also, the influence of past performance and the 
current chairman who is ex-CEO is in the opposite direction. 
Regarding board independence and board size we also find deviations compared 
to the crisis period. Alternatively to the 3SLS estimation method, when applying the 
2SLS estimation method and the 3SLS with winsorisation our main results remain 
unchanged.  
Overall, the findings of our study imply that bank internal governance 
mechanisms are important determinants of bank risk-taking but that their effectiveness 
is sensitive to the economic period.  
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Appendices 
 
 Appendix 4.1 – Variables definitions 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Bank risk Standard deviation of the daily bank stock returns. January 2006 to December 2006 
(non-crisis period); July 2007 to 
December 2008 (crisis period) 
Datastream  
Board independence Percentage of independent directors, that is, the number of independent 
board directors on the board divided by board size. 
December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
BoardEx 
Board size Total number of directors serving on the board of the bank. December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
BoardEx 
CEO power A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
December 2007/December 2008 
(crisis period) 
BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors.  December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
Thomson Financial 
Risk committee A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has a risk committee, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
December 2007/December 2008 
(crisis period) 
BoardEx; Annual Reports 
CRO A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CRO is a board member, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
December 2007/December 2008 
(crisis period) 
BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Chair ex_CEO A dummy variable equal to 1 if the current Chairman is ex-CEO, that 
is, if he/she has previously served as CEO, 0 otherwise. 
December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
December 2007/December 2008 
(crisis period) 
BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Performance Past buy-and-hold stock returns. January 2005 to December 2005 
(non-crisis period); January 2006 to 
December 2006 (crisis period) 
Datastream 
Bank size Natural logarithm of the bank’s market capitalisation. December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
Datastream 
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Appendix 4.1 – Variables definitions (cont.) 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Capital Bank capital, computed as the ratio of total equity to total assets. December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
Datastream  
Growth opportunities Market-to-book ratio, i.e., ratio of the market value of equity to the 
book value of equity. 
December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
Datastream 
Bank age Number of years since the bank was listed in the Datastream database. December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
Datastream 
Diversification Measure of revenue diversification of Stiroh and Rumble (2006) which 
is calculated as 1-(squared share of net operating revenue from net 
interest sources plus squared share of net operating revenue from non-
interest sources). 
December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
Datastream 
CEO tenure Number of years the CEO of the bank has served as CEO December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
BoardEx; Annual Reports 
CEO age Bank CEO’s age in years. December 2006 (non-crisis period); 
(average) December 
2007/December 2008 (crisis period) 
BoardEx; Annual Reports 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter contains the general conclusions of the thesis, organised according to 
the three papers. We also discuss the research contributions and policy implications, 
limitations and provide some suggestions for future research. 
 
 
5.1 General conclusions 
 
In the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, corporate governance mechanisms 
in the banking industry have received heightened attention. Motivated by the renewed 
interest in the effectiveness of such mechanisms, especially the increased scrutiny of 
board-level governance at banks, we investigate the impact of corporate governance on 
the European banking sector in the context of the global financial crisis. Because of the 
special nature of financial services, most academic papers exclude financial firms from 
their data and focus on the governance of non-financial firms (Adams, 2012; de Haan 
and Vlahu, 2016). Banks have unique features that affect and interact with corporate 
governance mechanisms (John et al., 2016) and during the financial meltdown several 
economists and policymakers, amongst others, have criticised the governance of banks 
and in particular the board of directors. For the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) “effective corporate governance is critical to the proper 
functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole” (BCBS, 2015, p. 10). 
The first paper, presented in Chapter 2, focuses on the impact of several 
characteristics of the board of directors on the performance of banks during the 2007-
2008 financial crisis. In the search for explanations on the huge fall of the stock market 
capitalisation of many banks worldwide, we investigate whether, and to what extent, the 
board of directors, one of the main corporate governance mechanisms, impacted on the 
performance of banks during the more recent financial turmoil. The financial crisis has 
raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of banks and it is 
important to know how the governance of banks affects their performance (de Haan and 
Vlahu, 2016). We mainly focus on the board of directors because they play a vital role 
in achieving effective governance and failures associated to it have often been 
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highlighted. Given that as a monitor the board supervises the managers and as an 
advisor it provides advices, opinions and direction moving forward, the role of the 
board should be particularly important in a crisis. In accordance with this, our findings 
show that the characteristics of the supervisory board really matter in the financial crisis 
given that, as we observed, they affect the performance of banks. Our evidence shows 
that more independent and busier supervisory directors decrease the performance of 
banks during the crisis, suggesting that independent directors may not have an in-depth 
bank-specific knowledge and that busier directors do not devote enough time and 
attention on each individual board, compromising the fulfilment of their duties and 
confirming the Busyness Hypothesis. The opaqueness and complexity of banks require 
more time and effort from directors in order to effectively fulfil their roles. These 
findings are in line with previous literature such as Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011), 
Erkens et al. (2012), Pathan and Faff (2013) and Méndez et al. (2015). Additionally, we 
find that supervisory directors’ experience in the banking sector, gender and age 
diversity increase the performance of banks during the crisis. Banking experience of the 
supervisory directors is beneficial for banks. The fact that banks with supervisory 
directors who have banking experience performed better during the crisis suggests that, 
for these directors, the cost of acquiring bank-specific information is relatively low. We 
also conclude that diversity matters. Gender and age diversity create value, which is 
consistent with the idea that female board members and heterogeneity on age offer 
diverse and valuable viewpoints, perspectives and work styles. Our conclusion provides 
support to the advocates of more diversity at board-level namely an increased inclusion 
of female board representation. Also, according to the BCBS “board members should 
have a range of knowledge and experience in relevant areas and have varied 
backgrounds to promote diversity of view”, an understanding “of the legal and 
regulatory environment” and “have sufficient time to fully carry out their 
responsibilities” (BCBS, 2015, p. 13). In addition, we construct an index of the quality 
of governance based on the regulation or regulatory recommendations concerning the 
characteristics of the board and we conclude that the quality of governance positively 
influences the performance of banks during the crisis period. Overall, our results show 
that the performance of banks during the financial crisis depends on the quality of their 
governance and particularly on the characteristics of their boards. 
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The second paper, presented in Chapter 3, analyses the determinants of European 
banks’ bailouts following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Since the onset of the global 
financial crisis, given the imminent collapse of many banks, governments worldwide 
have launched unprecedented and costly bailout packages. The massive public 
assistance (and the huge amount of State aid) provided to banks, justify the analysis of 
the determinants of the likelihood of banks being bailed out. The findings obtained 
allow us to conclude that a set of features of the board, bank risks and also bank-level 
and country-specific banking sector variables, affect the likelihood of bailouts in the 
European banking sector. Robust to several checks and additional tests, we find that 
banks with supervisory board members who have banking experience and longer tenure, 
as well as those with less busy supervisory directors are less likely to be bailed out. Our 
results indicate that banking experience provides a better understanding of the dynamics 
and complexity of the banking sector activity and its regulatory environment. 
Considering the special attributes of banks, boards with longer tenure are in a better 
position to effectively monitor and provide valuable advice, being able to timely detect 
signs of severe problems and so, potentially avoiding bailouts. Moreover, serving on 
several boards distracts supervisory directors from their duties, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of bailouts. This finding confirms the Busyness Hypothesis and is in 
accordance with previous studies related to financial distress, financial statement fraud, 
governance problems and subprime lending (Beasley, 1996; Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001; 
Berberich and Niu, 2011; Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011). Also, the BCBS 
emphasised the obligation of individual board members to dedicate sufficient time to 
their mandates and to keep abreast of developments in banking (BCBS, 2015). In 
addition, we find that credit and liquidity risks increase the probability of a bank being 
bailed out. Both, the existence of large amounts of non-performing loans and the 
consequent decline in the banks’ loan portfolios and insufficient liquidity are 
detrimental to the health of the banking system. Finally, we also conclude that some 
bank-level and country-level variables have predictive power. For instance, the 
existence of an audit committee decreases the likelihood of bailouts. On the contrary, 
the level of concentration in the banking industry, in line with the “concentration-
fragility” view, as well as international exposure and financial integration increase the 
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likelihood of bailouts. Greater financial freedom/openness may serve as a contagion 
channel in a crisis. 
Given that the vulnerability of the banking sector during the crisis was, at least 
partially, associated with excessive risk-taking (e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Fortin et al., 
2010), the third paper, presented in Chapter 4, examines the impact of board structure, 
ownership structure, risk governance mechanisms and other bank-specific factors on 
bank risk-taking in the context of the financial crisis. Using a simultaneous equations 
approach, we show that board independence, board size and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) power decrease bank risk-taking. These findings suggest that: (1) independent 
directors are more sensitive to the regulatory compliance, taking an active role in 
disciplining and overseeing excessive risk-taking, (2) larger boards reduce risk-taking as 
the final decisions of larger groups reflect a compromise among opposing views and so, 
they end up selecting average projects whose performance tends to be more stable and 
(3) CEO power reduces risk-taking in order to protect his/her non-diversifiable wealth, 
being more risk-averse than shareholders. Regarding ownership structure, we conclude 
that institutional investors encourage managers to take more risk in an attempt to 
increase their wealth. Contrary to our expectation, we do not find evidence that risk 
governance mechanisms are associated with the risk taken by banks. This may be 
because the Chief Risk Officer (Chief Risk Officer) may not have enough 
knowledge/experience and/or access to all the information necessary to perform his/her 
duties well. We note that for the BCBS “the CRO should have the organisational 
stature, authority and necessary skills to oversee the bank’s risk management activities” 
(BCBS, 2015, p. 26). Another interesting conclusion of this paper is that banks in which 
the Chairman has previously served as CEO take more risk. Additionally, we conclude 
that the influence of the governance mechanisms and other bank specific factors on 
bank risk-taking is contingent upon environmental conditions/economic context. Thus, 
such influence is not the same in stable and crisis periods.  
In short, the thesis concludes that corporate governance, in fact, impacts on the 
European banking sector in three different dimensions: performance, bailouts and risk-
taking behaviour. 
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5.2 Research contributions and policy implications 
 
This research provides contributions for both academics and policymakers. It will 
help to include relevant findings in a coherent and robust body of knowledge regarding 
the corporate governance of banks in the context of the severe global financial crisis. It 
shows the relevance of the role the corporate governance mechanisms in the European 
banking sector, since the European context is sparsely analysed and even more scarce is 
the existence of European cross-country studies.  
The first paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between board 
characteristics and bank performance, in the "special" context of the financial crisis. It 
permits the identification of the features of boards before the crisis that really influence 
the performance of banks during the crisis and thus, contributes to the understanding of 
the role of the boards in the crisis period. We add to the existing literature by showing 
that bank-level differences in boards are relevant in determining variations in bank 
performance during the crisis. Therefore, board configuration matters. Additionally, the 
research extends the literature by examining a broad set of board characteristics such as 
experience, education, various dimensions of diversity, busyness and activity. By 
demonstrating that differences in board configuration cause differences in performance, 
this paper has policy implications not only at bank-level but also at country-level. At 
bank-level, bank managers and shareholders should devote special care and attention to 
the structure of the board, as, for instance, shareholders have their wealth closely linked 
to the bank value. At country-level, this study offers guidance to regulators and other 
public authorities regarding the development and improvement of corporate governance 
codes and best practices recommendations. 
The second paper contributes to the literature by identifying the factors that 
influence the likelihood of bailouts of European banks following the financial crisis, 
helping governments to predict and avoid/reduce costly bailouts. Unlike the vast 
majority of the literature that analyses financial distress or bankruptcy, we focus on a 
particular and different dimension of financial distress, that is, bailouts. In fact, the 
literature lacks a deep and detailed examination of the factors that determine bailouts in 
the context of the financial crisis. Thus, this study aims to fill such gap. It provides 
evidence that different characteristics of the board and types of risk at bank-level, as 
  221 
well as country-level variables help to explain bailouts. The special role of banks and 
the negative externalities associated with their failure make banks’ agency problems 
costlier for the economy at large (de Haan and Vlahu, 2016; John et al., 2016) thus, 
requiring government interventions worldwide. The findings of this paper have, 
therefore, policy implications as they offer contributions to regulators, governments and 
other public authorities especially as regards ongoing financial reforms. Being 
concerned with avoiding costly bailouts that impact on the whole economy and generate 
taxpayer dissatisfaction, the findings obtained can help policymakers in the process of 
introducing new recommendations and legal rules, so as to prevent/moderate future 
collapses and, therefore, promote the health of the financial system. 
The third paper contributes to a crucial area of the literature that seeks to assess 
how corporate governance influences risk-taking. To prevent new crises, it is vital to 
understand the factors that influence risk-taking (Jiraporn et al., 2015) and this study 
identifies a set of factors that explain risk-taking by European banks in the context of 
the financial crisis. Given that excessive risk-taking by banks can lead to instability of 
the banking system (John et al., 2016), there has been considerable academic and 
regulatory interest in how to mitigate bank risk-taking behaviour in recent years 
(Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016). Thus, the results of this paper contribute to the 
process of reforming bank governance in order to constrain potentially undesirable risk-
taking by banks and ensuring the stability of the financial system. Also, at bank-level, 
the findings of this study are important for bank managers and shareholders. 
Additionally, this paper shows that the impact of governance mechanisms and other 
factors on risk-taking depends on environmental circumstances and is particularly 
relevant in the crisis period. 
 
 
5.3 Limitations and future research 
 
One limitation of this research is the small sample size. We restrict our sample to 
banks that are covered by Boardex, a data source for academic research concerning the 
board of directors. While BoardEx is the leading database on boards of publicly listed 
firms, only a limited number of European banks are covered in the database. The fact is 
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that, since in this research we are only interested in European banks and Boardex only 
provides information relating to listed companies, the size of the sample is not very 
large. Another limitation is that, although some literature, in the context of the financial 
crisis, argues that executives at banks had poor incentives, the structure of the 
compensation (variable versus fixed) was not analysed in this research. This was 
because it was not possible to obtain sufficient information regarding executive 
remuneration like annual bonuses, options, equity and salary.  
Bank governance has been a topic of intense policy and academic discussions in 
recent years. Many policy documents and academic research have outlined 
recommendations about bank governance. Accordingly, we provide suggestions and 
directions for future research on corporate governance in banks. Further research should 
investigate other characteristics relating to the “quality” of the board, in the context of 
the financial crisis, such as board networks regarding political and lobby connections. 
Network structure is relevant in determining the outcome of many important social and 
economic relationships (Jackson and Watts, 2002). For example, networks play a 
fundamental role in accessing information. So, the application of this analysis to the 
boards of banks seems to be a logical and interesting extension. Heavily regulated firms 
place a high value on being able to influence public decisions (Adams et al., 2010) and 
consequently, politically connected boards can add value. Also, these connections 
should be particularly important in crisis periods. The role of various forms of political 
connectedness should, therefore, be investigated in future research. In addition, lobby 
connections potentially affect the functioning of the board (e.g., on strategic decision-
making) and, thus, may be analysed in future research. Furthermore, in this research we 
use as proxy for board education, the number of qualifications of the supervisory 
directors and not the level of qualifications, due to problems with missing data for many 
of them, using our main database BoardEx. However, using other sources of 
information, such as annual reports, and although a considerable time-consuming task, 
it may be possible to obtain detailed information on the degree of qualifications 
(undergraduate, post-graduate, MBA, PhD or other) obtained by each director, the area 
of expertise and the university where each of the directors got his/her academic degree. 
An interesting question to answer is if there is a relationship between university 
rankings and director rankings. If this is true, then the university where the director did 
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his/her academic degree signals his/her quality. According to the above suggestions, our 
investigation leaves substantial room for future research. 
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